IN RE MB

• Decision Date: 09 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. A04A0587, No. A04A0586, No. A04A0588.
• Citation: 601 S.E.2d 370,267 Ga. App. 721
• Parties: In the Interest of M.B., a child. In the Interest of C.B., a child. In the Interest of D.B., a child.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

601 S.E.2d 370

267 Ga. App. 721

In the Interest of M.B., a child.

In the Interest of C.B., a child.

In the Interest of D.B., a child.

Nos. A04A0586, A04A0587, A04A0588.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 9, 2004.

DuAnn C. Davis, for appellant (case no. A04A0586).

McCullough & Swindell, Brantley J. Swindell, Glennville, for appellant (case no. A04A0587).

Carol B. Miller, for appellant (case no. A04A0588).

John Durden, District Attorney, Claira Mitcham, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

ADAMS, Judge.

M.B., C.B. and D.B., along with T.C., a fourth minor child, were charged with the offense of criminal damage to property in the second degree. T.C. negotiated a plea and testified against the other children. The remaining cases were consolidated for trial and all three of the children were adjudicated delinquent after a hearing on September 25, 2003. They appeal. M.B., C.B. and D.B. each assert that the trial court erred in adjudicating them delinquent because the evidence was legally insufficient. They contend that T.C.'s testimony, as an accomplice, was not sufficiently corroborated to support a finding of guilt. D.B. also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that mere presence at the scene of a crime was sufficient for a finding of criminal culpability.

In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court adjudication of delinquency, this Court applies the same standard of review that is used in any criminal case. That is, we construe the evidence in favor of the juvenile court's findings to determine if a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the act charged. The resolution of conflicts in the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses falls within the province of the trial court.

(Footnotes omitted.) In the Interest of R.H., 266 Ga.App. 751, 598 S.E.2d 369 (2004)

Viewed in that light, the evidence at the hearing showed that the four children were playing basketball on the afternoon of June 10, 2003, in the neighborhood where Mamie Lee Moore's home is located. Moore saw the children playing basketball near the street as she left to go to church. When Moore returned home, she saw M.B., C.B. and D.B. still playing, but T.C. was gone. Moore then discovered that egg was splattered on her front door and on her 1979 Mercedes Benz, which she left parked at her home. She also discovered a dent in the top of the Mercedes. Moore asked M.B., C.B. and D.B. if they had seen anyone on her car and they said "no."

T.C. testified that he and the other children damaged Moore's car because he wanted to get back at her as a result of an earlier altercation he had with her at church and because she had threatened the boys when they played basketball in the road. He stated that the four children had all planned to damage the car and that he and C.B. had thrown eggs at the car and dented it. T.C. said that both M.B. and he jumped on the hood, D.B. urinated on the tires and C.B. opened the driver's door and urinated inside the car.

C.B. testified, however, that T.C. acted alone in damaging the car and that T.C. told the others that he wanted to do something to get back at Moore because of the incident at church. C.B. testified that T.C. threatened them if they told on him, and three days after the incident, T.C. and M.B. got into a fight, during which T.C. broke M.B.'s jaw. After that, C.B. and D.B. told Moore that T.C. was the one who damaged her car. Later, after he learned that he would have to pay for all the damage to Moore's car if he was the only one involved, T.C. confessed and implicated the other three boys, specifying exactly what each child had done to the car.

Under Georgia law, a defendant may not be convicted solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, OCGA § 24-4-8, and this Court has held that the requirement for such independent corroboration is applicable to juvenile proceedings. In the Interest of J.H.M., 202 Ga.App. 79, 80, 413 S.E.2d 515 (1991). Where the participation of the accused in the crime is at issue, the corroborating evidence must independently and directly connect the accused to the crime:

There must be independent corroborating evidence which connects the accused to the crime, and

...