In re McKeon's Estate

• Decision Date: 06 February 1940
• Docket Number: 44964.
• Citation: 289 N.W. 915,227 Iowa 1050
• Parties: In re McKEON'S ESTATE. v. McKEON. CHRISTY
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

289 N.W. 915

227 Iowa 1050

In re McKEON'S ESTATE.

CHRISTY v. McKEON.

No. 44964.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

February 6, 1940

Appeal from District Court, Carroll County; R. L. McCord, Judge.

Claim against estate on contract for services rendered decedent. Trial to jury and verdict for claimant. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

RICHARDS, J., dissenting.

D. M Kelleher, of Fort Dodge and Reynolds, Meyers & Tan Creti, of Carroll, for appellant.

Howard & Bolte, of Jefferson, and Kline & Neu, of Carroll, for appellee.

HALE Justice.

Josephine Christy, appellee, claims on an express contract for services rendered decedent, in which she alleges that such decedent agreed he would pay to the claimant a small amount, sufficient to cover the cost of her clothing and personal expenses, and that in addition thereto he would compensate and pay to claimant, out of his estate at the time of his decease, such amount as would make for the claimant a sum in excess of any amount which she would be able to earn in teaching school, and that employment would be for twelve months each year and not limited to nine months as in a school year; and that he agreed to make provision therefor by will. Claimant informed decedent that she had been receiving $90 per month and was offered $125 per month, and that she would be able to earn in a school room not less than $125; and she consented to such arrangement and consented to give up her work as a school teacher and continued in the employment of decedent from about March 15, 1924, down to the date of his death, during which time she looked after the home of decedent, did the family washing, tended garden, assisted with chores, and assisted the decedent in the clerical matters connected with his business affairs, fully complying with the terms of said arrangement, agreement, and understanding. She alleged that there was due and owing to her by reason of the performance of the contract the sum of $20,975 for such continuous services to March 8, 1938-13 years, 11 months, and 24 days at $125 per month. She also claims pay for 3 days' services after death and until burial, which the evidence shows reasonably worth $3 per day. No claim is made for any amount which she alleges decedent agreed to pay from time to time for clothing and personal expenses.

The defendant administrator as defense in addition to (1) the denial existing by operation of law, makes the special defense (2) that the claimant was employed by decedent in the capacity of housekeeper, at wages according to the reasonable value of her services, the amount to be fixed from time to time between claimant and decedent in accordance with prevailing wage standards; (3) specially denies that payments were to be deferred to the time of James McKeon's death or were to be made by will; and (4) states that claimant was paid and accepted as compensation for her services the wages paid her from time to time and that claimant had full and complete knowledge of the dates and amounts of such payments.

Trial resulted in verdict for claimant in substantially the amount claimed, and from verdict and judgment thereon and from the overruling of defendant's motion for new trial and exceptions to instructions, defendant appeals.

The wife of James McKeon died in February 1924. There were no children, but a nephew of the wife, Donald Christy (a brother of claimant), had lived in the McKeon home for six years prior to his aunt's death, and continued to live there for about six years thereafter. James McKeon survived his wife about fourteen years, dying intestate March 8, 1938, at the age of seventy-seven. His next of kin and heir was his brother, Andrew McKeon. James was born in Wisconsin and attended school there, farmed in Wisconsin, moved to Iowa and bought the 120-acre home farm in Carroll county, where he resided, except for a few years, until his death. Though not a man of much schooling, he had good business ability, and at the time of his death was the owner of 640 acres of land and about $40,000 in cash and securities.

Josephine Christy, the claimant, a niece of Mrs. McKeon was at the time of the latter's death about twenty-eight or twenty-nine years old, a high school graduate, had a first-grade uniform county teacher's certificate, and had taken some advanced work in the State Teachers' College, and some extension work. She had taught school some years, at a salary ranging from $80 to $125 per month, the latter for one year only.

The principal witness as to the claim of Josephine as to a contract was her brother Donald, who testified to various conversations he had overheard while living at his uncle's house. There is in fact no other witness who testifies fully to any form of agreement between claimant and James McKeon. Several testified as to his expressions of satisfaction with the work done by claimant, and general statements relative to his intention to reward her. It appears that she fully carried out her part of any such agreement. There is ample testimony as to the care she took of the home and of the decedent, and the work she performed in the house and on the premises. But the only witness who testifies directly as to a contract is Donald, and the court so instructed. In substance his testimony is as stated in the claim. Objection is made by defendant that no specific amount is mentioned as compensation, but evidence was introduced that James had been informed of the amount of her wages in the past, and that he had stated that she could make more in making a home for him than she could expect to make teaching and that it would be a twelve months' job each year instead of nine months. On examination of the testimony offered we think there was evidence sufficient to submit to a jury on the question of a contract. In re Estate of Newson, 206 Iowa 514, 219 N.W. 305.

The claim is not on quantum meruit for services performed, but on what is alleged to be an express contract. To constitute such there must have been an offer and acceptance as to the same thing. See Franklin v. Tuckerman et al., 68 Iowa 572, 27 N.W. 759.

In re Estate of Newson, supra, the court states [ 206 Iowa 514, 219 N.W. 307]:" It is agreement to, mutual understanding of, the existence of an obligation assumed by one of the parties to the other that, for the purpose of the point now about to be considered, is the essential element of a contract. Usually, agreement is arrived at by means of a proposal or offer, express or implied, from one side expressly or impliedly accepted on the other. But formality in proposing and accepting is not required. There must be an intention to assume legal liability as distinguished from a mere ebullition of emotion or expression of intention to do an act of generosity. A promissory expression without intention to contract is not sufficient. 1 Page Contracts (1st Ed.) § 22 et seq.; 13 C.J. 263 et seq.; 6 R.C.L. 585 et seq. The existence of the mutual understanding, the proposal, and acceptance may be implied from conduct and circumstances. These may be shown by circumstantial evidence, or by the admission of the party to be charged." (Citing cases).

See, also, Kladivo v. Melberg, 210 Iowa 306, 227 N.W. 833, 837, wherein it is stated: " The existence of a contract, ‘ meeting of the minds,’ intention to assume an obligation, the understanding is to be determined not alone from words used, but in the situation, acts, and conduct of the parties, and from their situation and the attending circumstances, and by the inferences which mankind would ordinarily and reasonably draw therefrom." (Citing cases.)

Defendant denies that the evidence indicates any such meeting of the minds. The evidence shows, as heretofore indicated, that so far as performance of the alleged contract by claimant is concerned, it was completed; and there was evidence sufficient to support the finding of the jury as to her acceptance thereof. Franklin v. Tuckerman et al., supra. No testimony of a contract, of course, was offered, or was permissible, by the claimant as a witness. The substance of the offer, so far as the evidence shows, was: " She told him she had an offer for as much as $125 a month in another school. She told him she couldn't possibly afford to give up teaching school to come in his home as housekeeper, or for any wages of that type. He told her he didn't expect to have her for that purpose, but wanted her to come and make a home for him."

In answer to another question, the evidence was: " He said he wanted her to stay with him as long as he lived. He would give her spending money for clothes and personal needs just as she needed it, but she didn't have to consider it wages, because it was not wages, and that that wasn't her purpose there. He told her he would pay her an amount more than she would ever expect to make teaching school, more than she would ever expect to realize out of it, and he would provide at the time of his death in a will for her to be taken care of in that way."

There was further testimony of the witness that the claimant suggested that they talk it over with her father and see whether it was satisfactory to her father....