In re McNulta's Estate
| Decision Date | 15 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | 23645. |
| Citation | 168 Wash. 397,12 P.2d 389 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re McNULTA'S ESTATE. v. McNULTA et al. LYNCH |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Calvin S. Hall, Judge.
In matter of the Estate of Robert P. McNulta, deceased. Proceeding upon the petition of John S. Lynch, executor, for construction of decedent's will and direction as to petitioner's procedure thereunder, in response to which petition Grace Benefiel McNulta, Herbert McNulta, and others appeared. From an order directing the executor to make payments under a contract of purchase of real estate entered into by decedent, and directing that the property, when fully paid for, should become the property of Grace Benefiel McNulta as devisee, Herbert McNulta and others appeal.
Reversed with instructions.
Roberts Skeel & Holman and W. E. Evenson, Jr., all of Seattle, for appellants.
S. H Kelleran, of Seattle, for executor.
Hastings & Rubens, of Seattle, for respondent.
Robert P. McNulta, a member of the bar of this court, died testate May 22, 1930. Shortly after his death his will, bearing date June 16, 1928, was admitted to probate by the superior court for King county, and the appointment of John S. Lynch Esquire, whom the testator had named as executor of his will, was confirmed. The estate consisted of some farm property in the state of Illinois, personal property which was appraised at a little less than $3,500, and the testator's interest as purchaser under an executory contract for the sale of real estate, bearing date June 18, 1928, whereby Mr. McNulta had contracted to pay $16,600 for a tract of land in the city of Seattle, upon which was situated a duplex dwelling. At the time of making the contract for the purchase of real estate, the deceased and his wife paid $3,750 in cash, and agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price at the rate of $100 per month, together with other payments on dates specified; there being due on the contract when Mr. McNulta died a balance of $11,161.19. The only real estate in the state of Washington in which Mr. McNulta had any interest at the time of his death was the property in the city of Seattle above referred to. He had previously owned other lands in this state, but had disposed of all thereof.
The deceased was survived by his widow, Grace Benefiel McNulta, and by two brothers and a sister, as well as by two nephews and a niece. It is conceded that Mr. McNulta's property was practically all his separate estate and subject to his testamentary disposition. By his will Mr. McNulta provided, first, that his debts be paid; second, that there should go to his wife 'any and all real estate * * * that I may own in the state of Washington at the time of my death;' next, that his executor should sell and dispose of all real estate and other property not otherwise disposed of, and convert the same into cash, turning the proceeds thereof over to a trustee named in the will; and, finally, that the proceeds of the property should be invested and the income arising therefrom paid to Mrs. McNulta for her life, or until her remarriage, with remainder to certain designated residuary legatees, the appellants herein.
By the will Mrs. McNulta was required to accept the provisions thereof in lieu of any award or allowance that the law would otherwise give her.
The widow claimed the Seattle real estate, and demanded that the executor pay out of the estate the balance due upon the executory contract; the executor, being in doubt as to the proper construction of the will, petitioned the superior court for directions as to his procedure and for an order construing the will. The parties interested appeared in response to the executor's petition, and a hearing was had, which resulted in an order directing the executor to carry out the contract of purchase of the real estate and make the payments due thereunder from the estate of the decedent; the property, when fully paid for, to become the property of Mrs. McNulta, as devisee under her husband's will. From this order the residuary legatees appeal to this court, assigning error upon the admission of certain testimony and the making of a finding based upon all the evidence, as well as upon the entry of the order providing that the widow take the property exonerated from the unpaid balance of the purchase price and directing that such balance be paid out of the estate.
The trial court admitted evidence offered on behalf of Mrs. McNulta, respondent on this appeal, to the effect that the testator, during his lifetime, had stated that he would buy a home for respondent, and that in a former will he had bequeathed her $20,000, in addition to a life estate in the Illinois property. The former will was not offered in evidence, Mrs. McNulta testifying that she had had the same in her possession but had lost it.
Whether or not the testimony of which appellants complain should have been admitted need not be decided, as in our opinion the questions at issue must be determined upon the will of the decedent, unaided by extraneous testimony. In the first place, it is to be noted that appellants concede that Mr. McNulta's interest in the real property with which we are here concerned shall be considered as real estate owned by him at the time of his death, and, for the purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that, under the circumstances here present, such an interest should be held to be real estate, and pass to Mrs. McNulta under the devise above quoted.
The basic rule governing the construction of a will is that the testator's intent controls, which principle is recognized by the statute law of this state. Rem. Comp. Stat. § 1415. The intent is, of course, to be determined as of the date of the execution of the will. Peiffer v. Old National Bank (Wash.) 6 P. (2d) 386. If the testamentary intention can be ascertained from the language of the will, extrinsic evidence concerning the same should not be received; such evidence being admissible only in case it be held that the testament is ambiguous. The will, if it plainly expresses...
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Hubbard v. Wiggins
...titles and the powers she had in reference to the property held by her. Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515, 34 Am.Rep. 136; In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389; 57 Am.Jur., Wills, section 1163. My brethren do not specify anything in 'the fact that testatrix held at her death two ......
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Nawrocki's Estate, In re
...was entitled to exoneration. The opinion in Re Cloninger's Estate, supra, referred to an earlier Washington decision, In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389, in the following 'The appellant puts much reliance in our own case of In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389,......
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§22.3 - The Vendor-Vendee Relationship
...that can be taxed in decedent's domiciliary state. In re Estate of Plasterer, 49 Wn.2d 339, 301 P.2d 539 (1956). In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932), explicitly recognized that the real estate contract buyer had an interest in real property. The case involved the death......
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Table of Cases
...135 Wn.2d 1005 (1998): 17.5(4)(e) McMillan v. Great N. Ry., 45 Wn.2d 802, 278 P.2d 316 (1954): 17.7(2)(b)(i) McNulta's Estate, In re, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932): 22.3(4)(a) McPherson v. Purdue, 21 Wn.App. 450, 585 P.2d 830 (1978): 21.10(3) McSorley v. Lindsay, 62 Wash. 203, 113 P. 26......
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Table of Cases
...187, 375 McLaughlin's Estate, In re, 11 Wn. App. 320, 523 P.2d 437, review denied, 84 Wn.2d 1007 (1974): 14, 141 McNulta's Estate, In re, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 (1932): 179, 219 McNulty v. Dean, 154 Wash. 110, 281 P. 9 (1929): 176 Meagher's Estate, In re, 60 Wn.2d 691, 375 P.2d 148 (196......
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Chapter A. General Rules of Construction and Interpretation
...In re Robinson's Estate, 46 Wn.2d 298, 280 P.2d 676 (1955) (no exoneration unless intended at time of execution); In re McNulta's Estate, 168 Wash. 397, 12 P.2d 389 51 73 Wn.2d 865, 441 P.2d 768 (1968). 52 The same rule of construction was used to reach the opposite result under the post-te......