In re MEB
| Decision Date | 23 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-FS-1602.,90-FS-1602. |
| Parties | In re M.E.B., Appellant. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Robert Wilkins, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, Public Defender Service, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellant.
Mary Wilson, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom John Payton, Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, DC, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before FERREN, SCHWELB and KING, Associate Judges.
Appellant, who was sixteen years of age at the time of the offense, was found guilty of second-degree murder based largely upon his confession. On appeal he claims that the confession should have been suppressed because it was tainted by the illegal arrest that preceded it. We conclude that the confession was properly admitted by the trial judge. Accordingly, we affirm.
On May 31, 1990, Lloyd Copeland was shot twice at the doorway of a laundromat in the 4400 block of South Capitol Street, at approximately 2:35 p.m. He was pronounced dead shortly afterward. A carry-out is located next to the laundromat, and the Elmira Street corner-store is located next to the laundromat.
Significant events and radio communications applicable to the issues raised in this appeal are set forth chronologically below:
2:35 p.m. Lloyd Copeland shot
2:41 p.m. Police on scene broadcast a lookout for a black male in a black jacket
and black shorts or a black jean outfit, heading in direction of South
Capitol Street
2:47-2:48 p.m. Police on scene called dispatcher to advise that suspect was a black
male, 17-18 years old, wearing a blue or black jean outfit with shorts
2:49 p.m. Updated lookout for black male, 17-18 years old, 5'8", slim build, dark
complected, "Philly" style haircut, wearing black Guess brand jacket
with matching black shorts, white T-shirt, black Reebok shoes, last
seen running on South Capitol Street toward Forrester Street
3:07 p.m. Dispatcher requested police unit to investigate call at 138 Joliet Street,
S.W., that shooting suspect had been seen on Joliet Street wearing
Guess jeans and a Bart Simpson T-shirt.
3:09 p.m. Dispatcher repeated the previous description of alleged shooter "said to
be standing with" another male wearing a black and white T-shirt.
3:11 p.m. Essentially the same transmission as at 3:09 p.m.
Homicide Detective Pamela Reed was driving to the murder scene when she heard the 3:07 broadcast about a second-sighting. She proceeded to the address given, where she interviewed Tracy Harris. Harris told Detective Reed that she had been inside the carry-out when she heard shots. She went to the door and saw A., then a fourteen year-old juvenile, whom she knew, next to the decedent. She saw no one else. She could not see a gun, but concluded that A. was the person who had fired the shots. A., who was then wearing a black jacket and black shorts, departed from the scene. Harris also informed Detective Reed that she saw A. 15-30 minutes later on Joliet Street, approximately 2-3 blocks from the shooting scene, in the company of another male who was wearing blue jeans and a black and white shirt. A. was now wearing a Bart Simpson T-shirt. Harris confronted A. about the murder, but he denied shooting the decedent. In addition, Harris told Detective Reed that she had seen both A. and the person who was with him on Joliet Street, before the shooting occurred, inside of the Elmira corner-store, two doors from the shooting scene.
After interviewing Harris and calling the dispatcher, Detective Reed went to the scene of the shooting, where she interviewed other witnesses. It was then she learned that immediately before the shooting the decedent and two other young males had been engaged in an argument inside the laundromat. One witness informed Detective Reed that the gunman was one of the two males who had argued with decedent.
3:47 p.m. An officer in the field called and asked for a repeat of the descriptions,
which the dispatcher provided. The field officer then responded that
"they" had both subjects, and would transport them to the crime scene.
At 3:50 p.m., Officer Pierce and Officer Strong took A. and appellant (who was wearing a black and white shirt) into custody at Fifth Street and Mississippi Street, S.E. The two were told that they were not under arrest. They were both handcuffed and then transported to the crime scene 10-15 blocks away. They remained at the crime scene for 5-10 minutes, and then were directed to go to a location on Galveston Street, a trip which took another 2-3 minutes, where Harris identified both A. and appellant as the two she had seen earlier. Before the identification procedures were conducted, however, A. informed Detective Reed that appellant was the shooter. Thereafter, appellant was placed under arrest and transported to the homicide division office where he confessed that he had shot the decedent.
In his confession, appellant told the police that he and his friend A. were inside the Elmira corner-store when a man with a swollen lip exchanged words with A. Appellant and A. then left the store and walked to the laundromat to play video games. The man with the swollen lip and the decedent entered the laundromat and confronted A. The decedent made a threatening remark, which appellant understood to be directed both to himself and to A. Appellant and A. left the laundromat, and appellant went to retrieve a gun he had hidden nearby. Thereafter, he returned to the laundromat, where he shot the decedent twice. At the time of the shooting, A. was standing across the street.1 Appellant and A. then went to A.'s home where they both changed clothes. Shortly afterward, the two encountered Harris on Joliet Street. Still later, he and A. were taken into custody.
Before trial, appellant moved to suppress the confession, claiming that it was: (1) the product of an illegal arrest, (2) taken in violation of his rights as guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and (3) not voluntary. The trial judge denied the motion, and appellant was subsequently found guilty, with the confession being the principal evidence presented against him. At trial, appellant repudiated his confession, and testified that A., not he, had shot the decedent. This appeal followed.
Appellant makes a multi-pronged attack upon the actions of the police that led to the taking of his confession after his formal arrest. Appellant does not contest the propriety of the police conduct with respect to the actual taking of the confession, nor does he now contend that the confession was not voluntary. His sole claim in this appeal is that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and that the confession must be suppressed because it was the direct result of, and therefore tainted by, the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-19, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-60, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The claimed Fourth Amendment violations are based on several alternative grounds, any one of which would be dispositive in appellant's favor. Specifically, appellant contends: (1) the restraints to which he was subjected, between the time he was stopped on the street through the time of the identification, constituted an arrest, which can be supported only by a showing of probable cause (which was concededly lacking); (2) that none of the information received by Detective Reed after the broadcast initiated by her may be used in determining whether the information available rose to the level of reasonable suspicion; (3) that even if the information received by Detective Reed after the initial broadcast is considered, the police did not possess sufficient information to support a Terry detention on the grounds of reasonable suspicion; and (4) even after appellant and A. were identified, and appellant had been implicated by A. as the shooter, probable cause to arrest was lacking.
Appellant was taken into custody, along with A., by Officers Pierce and Strong at 3:50 p.m.—one hour and fifteen minutes after the murder. Appellant argues that, at that point, he was subjected to a full custody seizure of the person which constituted an arrest, as opposed to a detention for investigative purposes, which can be justified only if the officers had probable cause to believe he had committed an offense. He maintains that the police did not, at that point, have sufficient information to establish probable cause. The government does not claim to the contrary, and we do not conclude otherwise. We reject, however, appellant's contention that his detention amounted to an...
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