In re Meltzer

• Citation: 21 N.Y.S.3d 63,136 A.D.3d 14
• Parties: In the Matter of Ronald J. MELTZER (admitted as Ronald Meltzer ), an attorney and counselor-at-law: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Ronald J. Meltzer, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 03 December 2015
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

136 A.D.3d 14

21 N.Y.S.3d 63

In the Matter of Ronald J. MELTZER (admitted as Ronald Meltzer ), an attorney and counselor-at-law: Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, Ronald J. Meltzer, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Dec. 3, 2015.

Jorge Dopico, Chief Counsel, Departmental Disciplinary Committee, New York (Vitaly Lipkansky, of counsel), for petitioner.

Patrick J. Brackley, for respondent.

PETER TOM, Justice Presiding, RICHARD T. ANDRIAS, KARLA MOSKOWITZ, ROSALYN H. RICHTER, BARBARA R. KAPNICK, Justices.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent Ronald J. Meltzer was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on March 26, 1990, under the name Ronald Meltzer. At all times relevant herein, respondent maintained a registered address within the First Department.

The Departmental Disciplinary Committee moves, pursuant to the Rules of the Appellate Division, First Department (22 NYCRR), 603.11, for an order accepting respondent's affidavit of resignation from the practice of law and striking his name from the roll of attorneys. Respondent's affidavit of resignation, sworn to September 4, 2015, complies with section 603.11 in that he states that, inter alia: (1) he has consulted with and is represented by counsel of his choice; (2) his resignation is submitted freely, voluntarily and without coercion or duress; and (3) that he is fully aware of the implications of submitting his resignation (see 22 NYCRR 603.11 [a][1] ).

Respondent states further that he is aware that he is the subject of a disciplinary investigation into allegations that, inter alia: in preparing his client, and his client's friend, for the client's criminal trial involving charges of driving while intoxicated, he suborned the perjury/false trial testimony of the friend by instructing him to "downplay" the number of times he met with respondent to prepare for trial in the event that he was asked such a question on cross-examination (603.11[a][2] ).

Respondent states that his instruction to his client's friend was given about six to eight months before the actual trial; and, on June 21, 2012, at the trial, the friend testified that he and respondent met a total of three times to discuss his testimony. In fact, they met a total of five to six times. Further, the friend testified that he did not meet with respondent the night before his trial testimony when, in fact, he did.¹ Respondent admits that he did nothing to correct the friend's false testimony, though he knew it was false at the time.

Respondent states that the reason he instructed the friend to "downplay" the number of times that they met was so that it did not appear to the jury that they had rehearsed the "perfect story." Respondent avers that he always believed his client had a valid defense in that his friend was present on the night of his arrest, and that they both went to the two venues they testified about. His client was arrested, while legally parked with the engine running, in the vicinity of one of the venues. Respondent states further that he always believed that this was a valid defense "at least up until many months after the trial when I learned that [they] had given false testimony about [the friend] being present on the night of the incident."

In addition, respondent states that he is aware that he is the subject of allegations that during the trial he knowingly made a false statement to the trial judge and the prosecutor when at a side-bar conference he falsely stated to the court that there was no written material that he was obligated to turn over to the prosecution pursuant to People v. Rosario, 124 A.D.2d 683, 508 N.Y.S.2d 58 (2nd Dept.1986)lv. denied...