In re Melvin M.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1315, Sept. Term, 2009.,1315, Sept. Term, 2009. |
| Parties | In re MELVIN M. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Brian M. Saccenti (Paul B. DeWolfe Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Gary E. O'Connor (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Panel: EYLER, DEBORAH S., KEHOE, PAUL E. ALPERT (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
The Circuit Court for Charles County, sitting as a juvenile court, found Melvin M., appellant, involved in the delinquent act of theft of property (automobile) worth $500 or more. See Md.Code (2002), Crim. Law Art. § 7-104(c), (g). The court found appellant not involved on a charge of fleeing and eluding a police officer. Appellant was subsequently placed on probation under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Services and ordered to pay $100 in court costs. Appellant asks a single question on appeal: Was there sufficient evidence of possession of the stolen automobile to sustain his conviction for theft? For the following reasons, we shall reverse the judgment.
At appellant's trial, two witnesses testified for the State: Margaret Eads, the owner of the stolen vehicle, and Trooper Thomas Scott of the Maryland State Police. Appellant presented no testimonial evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the following was established.
Around 9:00 a.m. on July 12, 2008, Ms. Eads parked her 1994 four-door Geo Prism at a friend's house in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. She left the keys in the car and the windows rolled down. She explained that the car was old, and although valuable to her, she did not believe it was valuable to anyone else. Around 5:00 p.m., she returned to where she had left her car; it was gone. The parties stipulatedthat the car was worth more than $500, and Ms. Eads had not given anyone permission to use it.
Around 11:00 p.m. that same day, Trooper Scott was in his police car on routine patrol when he observed the Geo Prism make a left turn on a red arrow at the intersection of Mattawoman Drive and Route 301 North in Charles County. When the trooper attempted to stop the vehicle, the vehicle initially slowed down and pulled into the right lane but then pulled back into the lane of traffic and accelerated away. The trooper gave chase. During the chase, the vehicle attempted to turn from Northbound 301 onto Cedarville Road. As it did so, the vehicle hit a curb and flipped over onto its roof, landing in the parking lot of the corner 7-Eleven store.
Coincidently, several officers from the Prince George's County Police Department were sitting in a police car in the parking lot of the 7-Eleven when the accident occurred. When Trooper Scott drove his car into the parking lot, an estimated twenty to thirty seconds after he saw the vehicle start to flip over, he observed appellant and a Prince George's County police officer standing twenty to thirty feet from the vehicle. Trooper Scott parked his car and walked to where the driver of the Geo Prism was being arrested, near another convenience store across Route 301. Additionally, the trooper learned that a passenger was arrested behind the 7-Eleven. When the trooper approached the appellant, he told him that he was not driving the vehicle but was a passenger.1 Appellantalso said that he knew the vehicle was stolen. Although the trooper testified that all of the occupants had "fled" the car, when asked on cross-examination why he thought appellant had fled, he testified that he based his conclusion on the fact that all the occupants were either arrested or stopped away from the vehicle.
The three occupants suffered minor injuries and were taken to a hospital. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed that the vehicle's keys were in the ignition-the ignition was not "popped." The vehicle was totaled.
After hearing the evidence and counsels' arguments, the master found appellant involved in theft but not involved in fleeing and eluding. Appellant filed exceptions, but the juvenile court agreed with the master. The court explained that although there was no evidence that appellant took the vehicle, it found appellant involved in theft based on the inference regarding the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods.
Appellant argues that his theft conviction must be reversed. He argues that although he knew that the car was stolen, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he, a mere passenger in the car, was in possession of the vehicle. We agree and so shall reverse his conviction.2
Our review in a juvenile delinquency case is "limited to whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Heather B., 369 Md. 257, 270, 799 A.2d 397 (2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted). "Judging the weight of evidence and the credibility of witnesses and resolving conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trier of fact." In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 379, 681 A.2d 501 (1996) (citationsomitted). "When the trier of fact is the trial court, its judgment on the evidence will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous." Id. at 379-80, 681 A.2d 501. (citations omitted).
As with direct evidence, circumstantial evidence will sustain a conviction when all the facts taken together do not require that the fact-finder resort to speculation or mere conjecture. See Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 13, 796 A.2d 821 (2002) () (quoting Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 537, 573 A.2d 831 (1990)). See also Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 458, 697 A.2d 462 (1997) () (citations omitted). "Where it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make aninference, we must let them do so, as the question is not whether the trier of fact could have made other inferences from the evidence or even refused to draw any inference, but whether the inference it did make was supported by the evidence." State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425, 447, 842 A.2d 716 (2004) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Section 7-104(c) of the Maryland Consolidated Theft Statute provides:
(Emphasis added). If the property is worth $500 or more, the crime is a felony subject to imprisonment not to exceed 15 years and/or a fine not to exceed $25,000. Crim. Law § 7-104(g). "We have long and consistently held that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods, absent a satisfactory explanation, permits the drawing of an inference of fact strong enough to sustain a conviction that the possessor was the thief[.]" Burns v. State, 149 Md.App. 526, 552, 817 A.2d 885 (2003) (quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted).
In sum, possession is an element of the crime of theft and a requirement for application of the above inference. The question before us then is whether there was sufficient evidence of possession to warrant application of the inference and sustain the conviction for theft. We hold that there was not.
Possession may be actual or constructive, exclusive or joint. Taylor, 346 Md. at 458, 697 A.2d 462. While the theft statute does not define possession, the dangerous substances section does. Section 5-101(u), Crim. Law Art., defines "possess" as "to exercise actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons." "Control" of a dangerous substance has been defined as "the exercise of a restraining or directing influence over the thing allegedly possessed." Taylor, 346 Md. at 457, 697 A.2d 462 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In the dangerous substance context, we have listed the following factors as relevant to determine possession:
1) proximity between the defendant and the contraband, 2) the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the defendant, 3) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or 4) the presence of circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.
Larocca v. State, 164 Md.App. 460, 473, 883 A.2d 986 (quoting Folk v. State, 11 Md.App. 508, 518, 275 A.2d 184 (1971)), cert. denied, 390 Md. 285, 888 A.2d 342 (2005).
In Burns, supra, we noted the "[s]hifting notions of possession in different contexts[.]" Burns, 149 Md.App. at 551, 817 A.2d 885. In that case, Earl Burns was one of three occupants-the right, rear-seat passenger-in a vehicle stopped by the police. Id. at 530, 817 A.2d 885. The police recovered from the car, among other things, a loaded stolen handgun under the front passenger seat. Id. Burns was convictedof, among other things, illegal possession of a regulated firearm by a convicted felon and theft of the handgun. Burns appealed raising the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. We affirmed his possession conviction but reversed his theft conviction.
In the context of determining whether there was sufficient possession to support his convictions for possession of a handgun and theft of...
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