In re Mendoza-Hernandez, Interim Decision #3951
| Decision Date | 01 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Interim Decision #3951 |
| Parties | Matter of Silvestre MENDOZA-HERNANDEZ, Respondent Matter of Rufina CAPULA-CORTES, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
A deficient notice to appear that does not include the time and place of an alien's initial removal hearing is perfected by the subsequent service of a notice of hearing specifying that missing information, which satisfies the notice requirements of section 239(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012), and triggers the "stop-time" rule of section 240A(d)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (2012). Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), distinguished; Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018), followed.
FOR RESPONDENTS: Terence S. Coonan, Esquire, Tallahassee, Florida
GREER, Board Member:
In a decision dated August 14, 2017, an Immigration Judge found the respondents removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012), as aliens present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. She also denied their applications for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012), finding that they lacked the requisite period of continuous physical presence. The respondents have appealed from that decision, arguing that they are not foreclosed from establishing continuous physical presence pursuant to Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The record will be remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings.
The respondents, a husband and wife, are both natives and citizens of Mexico. On October 11, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") served the respondents with notices to appear charging them with removability. The notices to appear did not specify the time or place at which the respondents' initial removal hearing would be held. The DHS commenced removal proceedings on November 22, 2010, by filing the notices to appear with the Immigration Court. On December 8, 2010, the Immigration Court mailed notices of hearing to the respondents, which stated that their initial removal hearing was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 6, 2011, in Miami. The respondents appeared at this and several subsequent hearings. Their attorney entered a notice of appearance on March 24, 2011.
The respondents filed applications for cancellation of removal, which the Immigration Judge denied, finding that they did not demonstrate they had been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of 10 years prior to the October 2010 service of the notice to appear, as required by section 240A(b)(1)(A) of the Act and the "stop-time" rule in section 240A(d)(1)(A).1 In her decision, the Immigration Judge found that the respondents submitted documentary evidence establishing physical presence since 2005, but she determined that they did not adequately demonstrate presence since October 2000.2 On September 5, 2017, the respondents filed a motion to reopen with the Immigration Court, seeking to submit additional evidence relating to their physical presence before 2005. The respondents also filed a notice of appeal with the Board on September 11, 2017.3
While their appeal was pending, the respondents filed another motion to remand based on Pereira. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected ourdecision in Matter of Camarillo, 25 I&N Dec. 644, 651 (BIA 2011), where we held that "service of a notice to appear triggers the 'stop-time' rule, regardless of whether the date and time of the hearing have been included in the document." Instead, the Court held that a notice to appear that does not specify the time and place of an alien's removal proceedings "is not a 'notice to appear under section [239(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012)]' and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule." Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110 (). Citing Pereira, the respondents argue that the service of their notices to appear was insufficient to trigger the "stop-time" rule and that the proceedings should be remanded for service of new "legally sufficient" notices to appear.
We requested supplemental briefing from the parties. In response to one of our inquiries, the respondents argue that the Immigration Court's subsequent service of a notice of hearing that conveyed time and place information did not trigger the "stop-time" rule because "jurisdiction has never vested" with the Immigration Court. They further assert that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by their personal appearance before the Immigration Court and that their continuous physical presence will continue to accrue until the DHS issues notices to appear that include the time and place of their removal hearing.
In its supplemental brief, the DHS contends that the respondents' notices to appear, in combination with the notices of hearing specifying the time and place of their proceedings, provided the necessary written notice required by section 239(a)(1) of the Act to trigger the "stop-time" rule. The DHS further argues that the respondents are ineligible for cancellation of removal because they did not establish 10 years of continuous physical presence prior to service of the notices of hearing that contained information regarding the time and place of their initial hearing.
The issue before us is whether the "stop-time" rule, which provides for termination of continuous residence and physical presence in the United States, is triggered when an alien who was served with a notice to appear that did not specify the time and place of the initial removal hearing is subsequently served with a notice of hearing that includes that essential information.
As an initial matter, we conclude that the respondents' jurisdictional arguments are foreclosed by Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (BIA 2018). In that case, we held that "a notice to appear that does not specify the time and place of an alien's initial removal hearing vests an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings and meets the requirements of section 239(a) of the Act, so long as a notice of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien." Id. at 447.
To date, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have considered and deferred to Bermudez-Cota in precedential decisions. See Banegas Gomez v. Barr, No. 15-3269, 2019 WL 1768914, at *6-8 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2019) (); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159-62 (9th Cir. 2019) (same); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 312-15 (6th Cir. 2018) (same).4
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit, in whose jurisdiction this case arises, recently rejected an alien's argument that she did not receive notice of her removal hearing because the notice to appear did not include the date and time of the hearing. See Molina-Guillen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 758 F. App'x 893, 898 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). The court held that the deficient notice to appear and the subsequent notice of hearing supplying the missing information "[t]ogether . . . fulfilled the notice requirements in [section 239(a)(1)]." Id. at 898-99. The Eleventh Circuit therefore determined that the Immigration Judge "was authorized to enter the removal order in [the alien's] absence when she failed to appear at the hearing." Id. ().5
In this case, the respondents were properly served with notices of hearing providing time and place information, and they attended all their scheduled removal hearings. We therefore find no jurisdictional defect in their proceedings that would warrant termination or remand on this basis. See Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. at 447.
Prior case law governing this issue is instructive and sheds light on the narrow character of the holding in Pereira. Before the Supreme Court decided Pereira, several circuit courts and the Board had addressed the question whether the notice requirements of section 239(a)(1) of the Act are satisfied by service of a notice to appear stating that the time and place of a hearing are to be set, followed by service of a separate notice of hearing that specifies that information.6
In Dababneh v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 806, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit rejected the alien's argument that the Immigration Judge did not have jurisdiction to initiate his removal proceedings because the notice to appear did not specify the date and time of his initial hearing. The court concluded that "[t]he fact that the government fulfilled its obligations under [section] 239(a) in two documents—rather than one—did not deprive the [Immigration Judge] of jurisdiction to initiate removal proceedings." Id. at 809. Regarding whether the "defective" notice to appear cut off the alien's accrual of physical presence, the Seventh Circuit held that once the DHS served the notice to appear and the notice of hearing, the alien received notice "that met the [section] 239 requirements through receipt of both" documents, and the "stop-time" rule cut off his accrual of physical presence. Id. at 810. In Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I&N Dec. at 446-47, we...
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