In re Mensah
Decision Date | 04 November 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 20-BG-560,20-BG-560 |
Citation | 262 A.3d 1100 |
Parties | IN RE Paul T. MENSAH, Respondent. A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 480889) |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Hamilton P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, for petitioner.
Justin M. Flint, Washington, with whom Channing L. Shor made an appearance, for respondent.
Before McLeese and Deahl, Associate Judges, and Steadman, Senior Judge.
This is a negotiated-discipline case. Under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d), this opinion may not be cited as precedent in contested-discipline cases except as provided in D.C. App. R. 28(g). This opinion may, however, be cited as precedent in negotiated-discipline cases.
Respondent Paul T. Mensah and Disciplinary Counsel entered into an agreement pursuant to which Mr. Mensah acknowledged that he recklessly misappropriated entrusted funds in two matters, entered into an impermissible fee-splitting arrangement, and failed to keep proper records. Mr. Mensah and Disciplinary Counsel also agreed to a sanction of a three-year suspension with a requirement that Mr. Mensah demonstrate fitness to practice law before being reinstated. We accept the recommended discipline.
A Hearing Committee recommended that this court approve the negotiated-discipline agreement. The Hearing Committee acknowledged that in In re Addams , 579 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1990) (en banc), this court held that intentional misappropriation and reckless misappropriation require disbarment in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The Hearing Committee also noted that it was undisputed that there were no "extraordinary circumstances" in this case within the meaning of Addams . The Hearing Committee concluded, however, that the negotiated-discipline process permits imposition of a sanction less stringent than Addams would otherwise require, as long as the agreed-upon sanction is "justified, and not unduly lenient." Board Prof. Resp. R. 17.5(a)(iii); see also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(c) ( ). The Hearing Committee determined that the agreed-upon sanction was justified and not unduly lenient. In support of that conclusion, the Hearing Committee explained that (1) the agreed-upon sanction of a three-year suspension with fitness requirement is the second-harshest available sanction; (2) in practical effect, disbarment amounts to a five-year suspension with fitness requirement; (3) there were no aggravating factors in Mr. Mensah's case; (4) Mr. Mensah had no prior discipline; (5) Mr. Mensah was entirely forthcoming and cooperative; (6) no client or third party had been harmed or had complained; and (7) Mr. Mensah's willingness to enter into a negotiated disposition aided the disciplinary process, by avoiding undue consumption of time and resources. In the petition for negotiated disposition, Disciplinary Counsel noted additional mitigating circumstances: after Mr. Mensah discovered the misappropriation, he acknowledged the misconduct, brought the misconduct to Disciplinary Counsel's attention, hired a bookkeeper at his own expense to provide an accounting, and deposited personal funds to return the misappropriated funds.
After the parties filed a motion seeking approval of the negotiated-discipline agreement, the court requested the views of the Board on Professional Responsibility. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d) (). The Board responded by supporting the petition for negotiated discipline. The Board acknowledged that Addams would require disbarment if this were a contested case. The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee, however, that additional flexibility was permissible in the context of negotiated discipline and that the agreed-upon sanction in this case was justified and not unduly lenient.
In adopting that view, the court in Addams emphasized the importance of avoiding the "erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the bar" and concluded that, "where client funds are involved, a more stringent rule is appropriate." 579 A.2d at 198.
The decision in Addams has generated substantial controversy and criticism over the years. See, e.g. , In re Gray , 224 A.3d 1222, 1234-35 (D.C. 2020) ( )(per curiam); id. at 1225 n.1 ( ); In re Ahaghotu , 75 A.3d 251, 258-59 (D.C. 2013) ( ); In re Pleshaw , 2 A.3d 169, 174-75 (D.C. 2010) ( ); In re Bach , 966 A.2d 350, 351-53 (D.C. 2009) ( )(ellipses omitted; quoting In re Pels , 653 A.2d 388, 398 (D.C. 1995) ); In re Bach , 966 A.2d at 353-57 (Ferren, J., concurring) (urging reconsideration of Addams ); In re Berryman , 764 A.2d 760, 765 (D.C. 2000) ( )(internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 774 (Farrell, J., concurring) ( ); In re Pierson , 690 A.2d 941, 951 (D.C. 1997) (Schwelb & Ruiz, JJ., concurring) ( ).
In 2008, this court established procedures to govern negotiated discipline. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1. Under those procedures, an attorney and Disciplinary Counsel can enter into an agreement stipulating that the attorney violated specified Rules of Professional Conduct and agreeing upon an appropriate sanction. Id. § 12.1(a), (b). A Hearing Committee reviews the agreement to determine whether (1) the attorney's consent was knowing and voluntary, (2) the underlying facts support the misconduct and sanction reflected in the agreement, and (3) the sanction is "justified." Id. § 12.1(c). If the Hearing Committee recommends approval of the agreement, this court "review[s] the recommendation in accordance with its procedures for the imposition of uncontested discipline." Id. § 12.1(d).
Under the procedures for imposition of uncontested discipline, "if no exceptions are filed to the Board's report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted for filing exceptions." D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(2). "This rule is not absolute—we would not impose discipline that is clearly against the law or the public interest, for example, merely because no party took exception to it ...." In re Stephens , 247 A.3d 698, 701 (D.C. 2021) (per curiam). Nevertheless, if "there are no exceptions to the Board's report and recommendation, our deferential standard of review becomes even more deferential." In re Viehe , 762 A.2d 542, 543 (D.C. 2000) (per curiam).
If the court adopts recommended negotiated discipline, the court will explain its decision in a brief per curiam opinion. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). As previously noted, however, opinions in negotiated-discipline cases generally may not be cited as precedent in contested-discipline cases. Id.
We first consider whether the negotiated-discipline process permits imposition of a sanction that is less stringent than our decision in Addams would otherwise require in cases of contested discipline. We hold as a matter of law that the negotiated-discipline process does permit a somewhat more flexible approach to the appropriate sanction in cases of reckless misappropriation. See, e.g. , In re Rachal , 251 A.3d 1038, 1041 (D.C. 2021) ( ).
The negotiated-discipline process is designed to encourage efficient and timely resolution of attorney-discipline matters. Disciplinary Counsel argues that, in order to achieve that purpose, the negotiated-discipline process must permit imposition of sanctions that are somewhat less stringent than might otherwise have been required in a contested-discipline cases, at least in a negotiated-discipline proceeding involving reckless misappropriation otherwise controlled by Addams . More specifically, Disciplinary Counsel contends that affording such flexibility will (1) provide incentives for attorneys to agree to negotiated discipline, thereby conserving scarce resources and reducing delay in the disciplinary process; and (2) reflect appropriate recognition of the mitigating nature of an attorney's willingness to acknowledge misconduct and accept an appropriate sanction. The Board, the Hearing Committee, and Mr. Mensah all...
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