In re Merriam's Estate

• Citation: 141 N.Y. 479,36 N.E. 505
• Parties: In re MERRIAM'S ESTATE.
• Decision Date: 06 March 1894
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

141 N.Y. 479

36 N.E. 505

In re MERRIAM'S ESTATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 6, 1894.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, second department.

Appraisement of the estate of William W. Merriam for taxation under the collateral inheritance and legacy tax. From an order of the general term (26 N. Y. Supp. 191) affirming orders of the surrogate, Clifford B. Ackerly, as executor, and the United States appeals. Affirmed.

Jesse Johnson and Charles Duane Baker, for appellant.

Edward Hassett, for respondent.

BARTLETT, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the general term of the supreme court in the second department, affirming two several orders of the surrogate's court of Suffolk county. Two questions are raised by this appeal: First, whether or not a bequest of money to the United States is liable to pay the inheritance tax imposed by the laws of this state; second, can such a tax be levied on stock of a foreign corporation, which was the property of the decedent at the time of his death, the proceeds of which pass to the United State? The courts below have answered both of these questions in the affirmative. The testator died January 30, 1889, and the tax was assessed February 16, 1893, on the personal estate bequeathed to the United States. At that time, chapter 399, Laws 1892, entitled ‘An act in relation to taxable transfers of property,’ was in force, and had repealed all previous acts, subject to a saving clause contained in section 24 of said act, providing, in substance, that the repeal should not affect or impair any act done, or right accruing, accrued, or acquired, or liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred, prior to the passage of said act. Section 25 of said act also provides that ‘the provisions of this act, so far as they are substantially the same as those of laws existing April 30th, 1892, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws, modified or amended according to the language employed in this act, and not as new enactments.’ So that, when this tax was assessed, it was, under the said law of 1892, construed as amending the previous statutes. Section 1 of said act reads, in part, as follows: ‘A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal, of the value of five hundred dollars or over, * * * to persons or corporations not exempt by law from taxation on real or personal property,’ etc.

In the view we take of this case, the legacy to the United States is subject to this tax, whether we consider the assessment as made under the language of the law of 1892, or of the various statutes it amends and repeals. Whether the transfer is ‘to persons or corporations,’ in the language of the law of 1892, or ‘to any person or persons, or to a body politic or corporate,’ in the words of the earlier statutes, we are of opinion the language includes the government of the United States. For the purpose of receiving legacies, and for many other purposes, the United States is to be regarded as a body politic and corporate. In U. S. v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, Fed. Cas. No. 15,747, Chief Justice Marshall says, at page 109: ‘The United States is a government, and consequently a body politic and corporate, capable of attaining the objects for which it was created by the means which are necessary for their attainment. This...