IN RE MHS, A03A0037.
Decision Date | 29 May 2003 |
Docket Number | No. A03A0037.,A03A0037. |
Citation | 261 Ga. App. 686,583 S.E.2d 471 |
Parties | In the Interest of M.H.S., a child. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lamalua, Read & Oeland, Paul J. Oeland IV, for appellant.
John C. Leggett, for appellee.
Appellant, the biological and putative father of M.H.S., appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights in M.H.S. and denying his motion for new trial. He enumerates as error the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding of clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of his parental rights. We find that the evidence supported the decision to terminate his parental rights to M.H.S. and affirm.
The standard of review on appeal from a termination of parental rights is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's disposition, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent's right to custody should be terminated. On appeal, this Court neither weighs evidence nor determines the credibility of witnesses; rather, we defer to the juvenile court's factfinding and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of K.S.W., 233 Ga.App. 144, 147(1), 503 S.E.2d 376 (1998).
So viewed, the evidence demonstrates that appellant and his wife divorced on February 1, 2000, and the ex-wife retained physical and legal custody of their eight-year-old son M.H.S. The ex-wife testified that she and the appellant separated in 1999 as a result of his drinking and verbal and physical altercations between the couple. During the separation and after the divorce, the appellant maintained contact with M.H.S., but the ex-wife testified that his behavior became increasingly erratic. She testified that they were going to therapy together to benefit M.H.S. and that although the appellant was taking antidepressants, he still experienced extreme mood swings. She testified that shortly after the divorce she had a strange conversation with the appellant about visitation with M.H.S. and appellant suggested that he would no longer be seeing the child.
Soon after that conversation, on February 17, the appellant visited a real estate sales office under the guise of house hunting. When appellant and a female agent went to view one of the vacant houses, appellant pulled a gun on the agent, bound her feet and hands, and raped her. The victim escaped, and when the police went to the crime scene, they discovered a threatening note directed to the appellant's ex-wife. The police were concerned for her safety so she agreed to have someone around her and her children at all times. The appellant had fled in the victim's car, and police tracked him via his cellular telephone to Arizona, where he had admitted himself to a hospital for psychiatric observation. He was transported back to Georgia and during his incarceration staged two highly publicized hunger strikes. He subsequently pled guilty to rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, sexual battery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and was sentenced to serve 20 years. He is ineligible for parole and is scheduled for release in 2020. Appellant had paid court-ordered child support of $400 a month until his arrest. On May 30, 2001, appellant's ex-wife filed a petition to terminate appellant's parental rights in M.H.S. The trial court conducted a hearing, made findings of fact, and terminated the appellant's parental rights.
Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-94, the decision to terminate parental rights is a two-step process. First, the court determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability. Next, if the court finds clear and convincing evidence of parental misconduct or inability, the court then considers whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In the Interest of D.I.W., 215 Ga.App. 644, 645(1), 451 S.E.2d 804 (1994).
OCGA § 15-11-94(b)(4)(C)(i), (ii).
(Emphasis in original.) In the Interest of H.L. T., 164 Ga.App. 517, 519-520, 298 S.E.2d 33 (1982). In this case, compelling facts support the trial court finding M.H.S. deprived, including: the appellant's confession to the rape and attendant crimes, the premeditated nature...
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