In re Minnesota Iron Co., 25856.
| Decision Date | 25 March 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 25856.,25856. |
| Parties | In re MINNESOTA IRON CO. MINNESOTA IRON CO. v. LIMOGES et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Bert Fesler, Judge.
Application by the Minnesota Iron Company to register the title to real estate, opposed by Ida Nolet Limoges and others. From a judgment for the applicant, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
Arnold & Arnold and Theo. Hollister, all of Duluth, and J. E. Palmer, of Minneapolis, for appellants.
Crassweller & Crassweller, of Duluth, for respondent.
The respondent applied to the district court of St. Louis county for the registration of the title to 160 acres of land, pursuant to the provisions of the so-called Torrens Act (chapter 65, R. S. 1905). The appellants answered, alleging that they had title, and praying that their title be quieted. This appeal was taken from the judgment entered on the findings.
The trial court found that on June 23, 1880, one Louis Laroche, a native of the province of Quebec, declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and took out his "first papers" in the office of the clerk of the district court for St. Louis county. On August 27, 1880, pursuant to section 2264, U. S. Stat., he filed in the United States land office at Duluth the declaratory statement and affidavit required by the pre-emption laws of the United States to obtain a patent to the land, and paid the filing fee of $2. The declaratory statement was numbered 1697, and in all subsequent proceedings in the land office the entry was referred to by that number. In the fall of the same year the declarant went to Quebec, and never returned to St. Louis county. On August 1, 1881, he married Marie Couture Nolet, a widow. She had two children by her former husband, and they are the appellants herein. The declarant died May 7, 1883, leaving his widow as his sole heir. She died January 28, 1893, leaving her two children as her sole heirs. Neither the declarant, his widow, nor her children did anything to complete pre-emption claim No. 1697.
On December 21, 1880, Louis La Roche, who was not the same person as the declarant Louis Laroche and who is referred to in the findings as the "impersonator," appeared with two witnesses at the United States land office at Duluth, and made the final proof of residence and cultivation required by the pre-emption laws to obtain a patent to the land, and paid the purchase price of $200. The proof was accepted by the local land officers, and they issued and delivered to the impersonator a land office pre-emption receipt in the usual form. On December 22, 1880, for a consideration of $500, the impersonator executed and delivered a warranty deed of the land to Charlemagne Tower and Samuel Alfred Munson. Thereafter Munson conveyed to Tower, and he to the respondent.
The impersonator was not a native-born citizen of the United States, and had not declared his intention to become a citizen when he made the final proof and obtained the pre-emption receipt. On January 3, 1881, he made an affidavit before the receiver of the land office that about two years before the date mentioned he had declared his intention to become a citizen, but had lost the certified copy of the declaration which had been furnished to him by the clerk of the district court of Ramsey county. This affidavit was false, and was made with intent to deceive the officers of the land office. Thereafter, upon the refusal of the commissioner of the General Land Office to receive the pre-emption proofs as sufficient, the impersonator procured from the clerk of the district court for St. Louis county a certified copy of Louis Laroche's declaration of his intention to become a citizen, and had it forwarded to the General Land Office.
On May 20, 1882, a patent was issued to the impersonator. It was delivered to his assignees, and never was in the possession of the declarant or any of his heirs. The land is vacant and unoccupied. The taxes were paid by Tower until he conveyed to the respondent, and it has paid them ever since. The purchase from Tower was made for a valuable consideration, in good faith, and without notice of any right, title, or interest in the land on the part of the declarant or his heirs. Since March, 1913, the appellants have known that the title was held by the respondent adversely to the claim they now assert.
Upon these findings the court held, as a matter of law, that the appellants have no right, estate, or interest in the land, and granted respondent's application to register the title. Appellants insist that in effect the findings establish their title and destroy respondent's claim to the land.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the effect of an entry of government land under the pre-emption laws is to withdraw the land from subsequent entry and segregate it from the mass of public land, and that the entryman acquires an interest in, and a valid and subsisting claim to, the land, which continues until the entry is canceled or forfeited. Hastings & D. Rd. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 10 S. Ct. 112, 33 L. Ed. 363; Sturr v. Beck, 133 U. S. 541, 10 S. Ct. 350, 33 L. Ed. 761; Whitney v. Taylor, 158 U. S. 85, 15 S. Ct. 796, 39 L. Ed. 906. But no vested rights as against the United States can be acquired by any one until all the prerequisites for the acquisition of the title have been complied with. Nicholson v. Congdon, 95 Minn. 188, 103 N. W. 1034. In short, vested rights in the land as against the United States are not obtained until the purchase money is paid and the final receipt of the land office is issued. Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187, 19 L. Ed. 668.
The interpretation placed on the pre-emption laws by the Supreme Court of the United States is clearly stated in Hutchings v. Low (The Yosemite Valley Case), 15 Wall. 77, 21 L. Ed. 82, substantially as follows: Until entry and payment for the land, the pre-emption laws give to the settler a privilege only of purchasing the land in preference to others. That in substance is the holding of this court in Red River, etc., Co. v. Sture, 32 Minn. 95, 20 N. W. 229.
The history of the pre-emption laws is reviewed in Camp v. Smith, 2...
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