In re Mitchell
| Decision Date | 05 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Bankruptcy Case No. 18-40736-JMM |
| Parties | In Re: Ricky Vee Mitchell and Brock R. Mitchell, Debtors. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Idaho |
Appearances:
R. Fred Cooper, Idaho Falls, Idaho, Attorney for Debtors.
Julian E. Gabiola, HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, Pocatello, Idaho, Attorney for Debtor Brock R. Mitchell.
Michael F. Lutz, THE SPENCE LAW FIRM, LLC, Jackson, WY, Attorney for Creditor Patrick W. Smith.
Before the Court are two discovery motions. The first is a motion to quash the subpoena for a Rule1 2004 examination to Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC"). Dkt. No. 30. The second is a motion for Rule 2004 examinations and document production subpoenas. Dkt. No. 34. The parties stipulated to have these two motions decided by the Court on the briefing provided and without oral argument, which stipulation the Court granted. Dkt. Nos. 37; 38.
The Court has considered the submissions on file and the applicable law, and now issues the following decision which resolves the motions. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052; 9014.
On April 6, 2017, Mr. Mitchell was driving home from his work on a drilling rig in a remote site in Wyoming. He was allegedly driving in the wrong lane and collided head-on with Mr. Patrick Smith ("Creditor") in Wyoming, causing significant injuries to both Mr. Mitchell and Creditor. Medical personnel responding to the accident found a bag of methamphetamine on Mr. Mitchell's person, and related drug paraphernalia was discovered in his vehicle after the accident.2 Mr. Mitchell was life-flighted to EIRMC where he was treated and Creditor believes he may have been tested and screened for intoxication.
On May 14, 2018, in Wyoming state court, Creditor filed a civil action for personal injuries resulting from Mr. Mitchell's alleged negligence. Dkt. No. 34 at Ex. 1. On August 21, 2018, Mr. Mitchell and his wife, co-debtor Ricky Mitchell, filed a Chapter 7 petition.
Creditor believes Mr. Mitchell may have been intoxicated at the time of the accident, and under § 523(a)(9), a debt that arises from the "personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle . . . if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance" is nondischargeable. Creditor wants to conduct Rule 2004 examinations, accompanied with requests for documentation under Rule 9016, to discover facts relating to the possible nondischargeability action. Mr. Mitchell objects. Dkt. Nos. 30, 35.
Creditor served a subpoena on EIRMC to conduct a Rule 2004 Examination seeking the following:
Initially, Creditor challenges Mr. Mitchell's standing to quash the subpoena, contending that only a claim of privilege will grant him standing as a third party. Creditor is correct.
In United States v. Viltrakis, 108 F.3d 1159, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1997), the panel wrote that "courts have regularly held that a defendant or a putative defendant lacks standing to object to a subpoena issued to a nonparty witness." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 10, 1987, 926 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1991); Read v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting Club, LLC, No. 08-CV-00099, 2010 WL 2697596, at *4 (D. Idaho July 6, 2010).
These decisions are grounded in the principle that the person served with process is the proper party to allege error. The exception to the general rule is when the movant can demonstrate that the information being sought is privileged. "The general rule is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. James, 264 F.R.D. 17, 18-19 (D. Me. 2010) (quoting Windsor v. Martindale, 175 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D. Colo. 1997)). Mr. Mitchell contends that the information sought by Creditor involves medical records, statements, and test results following the accident, and that he has a privacy interest in that information.
While Mr. Mitchell may well have a privacy interest in the dissemination of his medical records, this does not equate to a legally recognized privilege. Because the underpinning of these discovery efforts is Creditor's hope that his debt might be determined to be nondischargeable, the underlying cause of action is governed by federal law. And unfortunately for Mr. Mitchell, under federal law, there is no physician-patient privilege protecting medical records from discovery. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F. 2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1989) (), abrogated on other grounds by Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 801 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1986). Because a third party's standing to quash a subpoena rests on the assertion of a privilege, Mr. Mitchell does not have proper standing to support his motion.
Mr. Mitchell advances a second argument regarding his standing to challenge the subpoena at issue. He contends Civil Rule 45(d)(3)(B) permits a person who is "affected by" a subpoena to move to quash. Mr. Mitchell posits that in order to protect a person who is "affected by" a subpoena but who is not subject to it, that person must have standing to challenge the subpoena. However, he misapplies Civil Rule 45. That rule specifically allows for a subpoena to be quashed by someone "affected by" it in the event the subpoena requires: 1) "disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information," or 2) "disclosing an unretained expert's opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert's study that was not requested by a party." Civil Rule 45(d)(3)(B). Neither of those instances apply here. Accordingly, Mr. Mitchell's motion to quash the subpoena is denied because he lacks standing to bring it.
If the Court were to consider the motion on its merits, however, Mr. Mitchell would still be unsuccessful. A subpoena may be quashed for a number of reasons enumerated in the Civil Rules, such as the failure to allow a reasonable time to comply or that it requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Civil Rule 45(c). More pertinent here, a subpoena may be quashed when it "requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies," or it "subjects a person to undue burden." See Civil Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii)-(iv). The burden of demonstrating a subpoena is subject to being quashed or modified is upon the person moving for relief. Rocky Mountain Med. Mgmt., LLC v. LHP Hosp. Grp., Inc., No. 13-CV-00064-EJL, 2013 WL 6446704, at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 9, 2013) (citing 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2459 (3d ed. 2013)). However, the party issuing the subpoena must demonstrate, in turn, that the information sought is relevant and material to the allegations and claims at issue in the proceedings. Rocky Mountain Med. Mgmt., LLC., 2013 WL 6446704 at *2 (citing Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 654 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
Mr. Mitchell argues that the subpoena at issue requires the disclosure of privileged or other protected matter. As discussed above, there is no federal doctor-patient privilege he may claim. Mr. Mitchell contends, however, that health records fall within the category of "other protected matter" referred to in Civil Rule 45(d)(3)(A). He is incorrect.
Health care records are not the type of "other protected" matter protected by Civil Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iii). Rather, this provision commonly refers to testimony or documents that, 9 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 45.51[3] (3d ed. 1999). In contrast, the disclosure of medical records may be compelled when they are relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.3 Indeed, a litigant can waive his privacy right in his medical history by putting that medical history at issue in a case or when it is directly relevant to the litigation. See EEOC v Cheesecake Factory, Inc., No. C16-1942JLR, 2017 WL 3887460, *7 (Sept. 6, 2017 W.D. Wash.) ().
In the case at bar, Mr. Mitchell's attempt to discharge his debt to Creditor puts the applicability of §523(a)(9) at issue, which in turn raises the question of his alleged intoxication at the time of the accident. As such, he cannot assert a privacy right in his medical records as a shield to prevent Creditor from proving intoxication at the time of the accident, and Civil Rule 45(d)(3)(A) will not protect the information sought here.
Because the Civil Rules do not require Creditor's subpoena to be quashed, the Court is left to conduct a straightforward analysis of whether the information sought by the subpoena is relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, recalling that information need not be admissible to be discoverable. The Court will consider each of Mr....
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