In re Moran's Estate
| Decision Date | 26 March 1917 |
| Docket Number | 13817. |
| Citation | 95 Wash. 428,163 P. 922 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re MORAN'S ESTATE. v. MORAN et al. HYNES et al. |
Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Walter M. French Judge.
In the matter of the estate of James Moran, deceased, wherein Margaret Hynes, Patrick Moran, and others claimed under the will. From a decree distributing the estate, Margaret Hynes and others appeal. Affirmed.
Clise & Poe, of Seattle, for appellants.
Fred W Catlett and Emmons & Emmons, all of Seattle, for respondents.
Appeal from a decree of distribution of the estate of James Moran deceased. James Moran came to this country from Kilfenora Ireland, about 1870, and died testate at Seattle, December 29, 1913, leaving him surviving a large number of collateral relatives who claim his estate either under the will or as next of kin under a plea that the will was void for uncertainty. Appellants and respondents both claim under the will, which, in so far as it is material to our inquiry, is as follows:
'I give, bequeath and deivse to my six (second) consins named Moran, and all living in Ireland, I believe, all my property, real, personal and mixed, of every kind nature and description, of which I may die seised, for their use, share and share alike, except as I may further herein provide.'
The claimants appearing below are classified by counsel into four groups: (1) The respondents, a group of four second cousins once removed, children of Michael and grandchildren of Terence Moran. All of this group were named Moran and lived in Ireland at the time of the execution of the will. This group originally consisted of six, one of whom died in 1901 and another in 1907. All of this group were born after the testator left Ireland. (2) The appellants, a group consisting originally of seven second cousins, children of Connor, a brother of Terence, and grandchildren of James Moran, who was a brother of the grandfather of deceased. Of this group only two are now living. The members of this group were not all named Moran, nor did they all live in Ireland at the time of testator's departure. The two survivors of this group are females, and are married, and were known to the testator by their married and given names before he left Ireland the last time. (3) A group of six surviving of nine children of John Moran, a deceased brother of appellants. Only two of this group lived in Ireland, and only one was named Moran. (4) Three children of the testator's first cousin, all living in Ireland and all named Moran. This group did not claim under the will, but contended the will was void for uncertainty, and that they were entitled to the estate as next of kin. The lower court found in favor of group number one. Group number two has appealed. Groups three and four have abided by the judgment below, and do not appear in this court.
We will first address ourselves to the assignments of error arising in law. They may be united in one, urging error in the admission of oral testimony taken by deposition in Ireland and the testimony of two witnesses produced at the trial. It may be set down as well established that parol evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, or contradict the terms of a will: First, because the will is a written instrument, and as such, like all other written instruments, is the best evidence of its patent intent; second, because wills are by statute required to be in writing. This rule, however, is no stronger than its equally well-founded exception that parol evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity in any written instrument. This exception has been applied with much force to the language of wills when a latent ambiguity appears, as where the description of devisees or legatees is answered by two or more persons, parol evidence has always been admitted to show the person or persons intended, or where the beneficiary named in the will is not stated with precision, parol evidence is admissible to show the person intended to be described. This upon the theory that in construing a will the object of the courts is to ascertain the intention of the testator as that intention is expressed in the words used. Reformed Presbyterian Church v. McMillan, 31 Wash. 643, 72 P. 502; Rathjens v. Merrill, 38 Wash. 442, 80 P. 754; Siegley v. Simpson, 73 Wash. 69, 131 P. 479, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 63. It appearing that the descriptive terms of the will fit different persons in different degrees, it was proper to admit oral testimony to ascertain, if possible, the expressed...
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