In re Naturalization of Subjects of Germany

• Decision Date: 14 May 1917
• Parties: In re NATURALIZATION OF SUBJECTS OF GERMANY.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

242 F. 971

In re NATURALIZATION OF SUBJECTS OF GERMANY.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

May 14, 1917

William T. Birkby, Naturalization Examiner, of Chicago, Ill., for the United States.

GEIGER District Judge.

At the last hearing of naturalization matters, there were presented four petitions by persons who were subjects of Germany. These had been filed, and notice of their pendency given, in the regular manner. The proofs upon each were taken, and it is conceded in each case that the applicant, though a subject of Germany, is qualified to become an American citizen. No bar is interposed to admission, save such as arises-- if any does arise-- by virtue of a statute of the United States, viz.:

'Sec 2171. No alien who is a native citizen or subject, or a denizen of any country, state, or sovereignty with which the United States are at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United States. ' Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 4362.

So much of the statute is material for present consideration. It contains certain other provisos, to which allusion will be made. On its face this statute appears quite plain. It so happens that on the 6th day of April, 1917, the Congress of the United States passed a resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial Government of Germany, and hence, when these cases were called, the examiner, upon the authority of this statute objected to the issuance of a certificate of naturalization to the four applicants to whom I have referred.

The question arises: What is meant by the language 'with which the United States are at war,' etc.? On the one hand, it may be urged that 'at the time of his application' refers to the time of filing the formal written petition with the clerk of the court, and whereof 90 days' notice must be given before the actual naturalization can take place. On the other hand, it may be urged that the word 'application' means what it meant when the law was passed, 115 years ago. At this time the formality respecting the proceeding for naturalization consisted in a declaration of intention, as under the present law, and the subsequent coming into court of the applicant with his witnesses, and in open court asking that his proofs be received, and, if found sufficient, the oath be administered and the certificate of naturalization granted; in other words, that he be adjudged admitted to citizenship. So we have this situation: That when this law was passed, in 1802, the term 'application,' as then used, referred to that manner of proceeding. That law remained in force, and now remains in force; but, 104 years later, the present naturalization law, providing for the present routine of proceedings, was passed, and for the first time introduced the requirement of the filing by the applicant for citizenship of what is denominated in the law a 'petition,' which, being filed by the clerk is entered of record as a proceeding by the applicant to procure naturalization. A 90 days' notice is given, with the further limitation upon the court that no one shall be naturalized unless that petition shall be heard in open court by and in the presence of the judge, upon the testimony of the applicant and his witnesses.

Four weeks ago, after a very brief opportunity for investigation, I expressed the informal opinion that the statute means the same thing to-day, has the same meaning to-day, as it had at the time it was passed; and, with the investigation that I have been able to give the matter in the meantime, my then expressed informal view has not only not been shaken, but has been fortified, so that to-day I am ready to say that I am entirely clear as to the meaning of the statute, and as to the course which the court must pursue in respect of these four applicants, and any other application that may come before it for hearing during the time of the present hostility between this country and Germany.

The statute, obviously, at the time of its passage, could have but one meaning. If the application at that time referred to the act of coming into open court, presenting the proofs...