In re NB
Decision Date | 07 February 2003 |
Citation | 817 A.2d 530 |
Parties | In re N.B. Appeal of P.B., Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Peter D. Schneider, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Before STEVENS, KLEIN, and TAMILIA, JJ.
OPINION BY STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 This is an appeal from the April 4, 2001 order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which denied Appellant's ("Mother") motion to change counsel at an adjudicatory hearing held pursuant to a dependency petition filed under the Juvenile Act. For the following reasons, we quash.
¶ 2 The undisputed facts of the case have been aptly summarized by the lower court as follows:
Lower Court's Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) Opinion, 11/30/01 at 3, 5-6.
¶ 3 On April 16, 2001, Mother filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court's order prohibiting CLS counsel from entering her appearance, but the lower court denied the motion by order of May 2, 2001. On May 4, 2001, Mother filed the present appeal challenging the order denying her right to representation by counsel of her own choosing.
¶ 4 Mother raises the following issue for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND DENY THE MOTHER DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN, IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING HER DAUGHTER, IT DENIED HER THE RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY RETAINED COUNSEL OF HER CHOOSING AND INSTEAD REQUIRED HER TO BE REPRESENTED BY COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL, WHO HAD ALSO BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT THE CHILD'S FATHER[?]
¶ 5 Initially, we sua sponte raise the issue of whether an order that denies a parent the power to discharge court-appointed counsel in favor of privately retained counsel is immediately appealable to this Court. See Duttry v. Talkish, 394 Pa.Super. 382, 576 A.2d 53, 58 (1990)
(. ) The question of the appealability of an order goes directly to the jurisdiction of the Court asked to review the order. Pace v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 717 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa.Super.1998). We address the appealability of the April 4, 2001 order denying Mother's request to change counsel because the order is not, on its face, a final order, in that it did not contain a contemporaneous determination of dependency or a disposition of the child. See In re C.A.M., 264 Pa.Super. 300, 399 A.2d 786 (1979) ( ).
¶ 6 Under Pennsylvania law, an appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified by the trial court as a final order (Pa.R.A.P.341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P.311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa. R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); (4) or a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P.313). Beltran v. Piersody, 748 A.2d 715 (Pa.Super.2000). A final order is any order that disposes of all claims and all parties, is expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a final order pursuant to the trial court's determination. Pa. R.A.P. 341(b)(1)-(3).
¶ 7 Here, there are no grounds for this Court to consider the order on appeal as final under Pa.R.A.P. 341. The order appealed from does not dispose of all claims or all parties involved, is not expressly defined as a final order by statute, and was not entered as a final order. Moreover, neither Rule 311 nor 312 relates to the present matter.
¶ 8 Nor may we find the order appealable under Rule 313, which provides an exception to the rule of finality for certain interlocutory orders that qualify for an exception applied to collateral orders.1 Specifically, under this exception, an order is immediately appealable if (1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978) ( ).2
¶ 9 This Court has applied the Cohen criteria to cases, both civil and criminal, involving orders denying counsel. In Duttry, supra, this Court held that an order denying an indigent's request for appointment of counsel in an ongoing custody/visitation case was interlocutory and failed to satisfy exceptions carved out in Cohen, et al. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 550 Pa. 298, 705 A.2d 830 (1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an order disqualifying a criminal defendant's choice of defense counsel is interlocutory and is not immediately appealable. Consistent with the Cohen exception, the Supreme Court in Johnson recognized the entitlement of criminal defendants to an immediate appeal depends on whether such an appeal is "necessary to ensure that they would not be deprived of a constitutional right." Johnson, 550 Pa. at 303, 705 A.2d at 833.
¶ 10 To illustrate when an immediate appeal would be "necessary," the Court contrasted the case of an order denying a motion to dismiss based upon double jeopardy absent a trial court finding that the motion is frivolous with the case of an order denying a motion to suppress evidence. Both motions seek to vindicate constitutional rights allegedly violated, but only in the double jeopardy case would the constitutional right (to be free of a second prosecution) be lost by postponing appeal to post-judgment. The suppression motion, on the other hand, may be effectively reviewed post-judgment, and if the ruling was incorrect, the defendant may be granted a new trial wherein the illegally-obtained evidence is suppressed. The Court then concluded:
Johnson, 550 Pa. at 305-306, 705 A.2d at 834. (emphasis added).
¶ 11 Accordingly, the Court in Johnson held that an order removing one's counsel of choice from representation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable in the criminal context. Where, as here, appellants' interests are not clearly any more essential than the interests in liberty that defendants in criminal trials hold, we see no reason to refrain from applying the Cohen criteria to the case at bar.
¶ 12 It is well-settled that there exists in parents a right to counsel in dependency cases, which right...
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