In re Necessity for the Hospitalization Gabriel C.

• Decision Date: 29 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. S–14256.,S–14256.
• Citation: 324 P.3d 835
• Parties: In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of GABRIEL C.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

324 P.3d 835

In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of GABRIEL C.

No. S–14256.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

April 4, 2014.

Rehearing Denied May 29, 2014.

Kelly R. Taylor, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant.

Michael G. Mitchell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.

Meg Allison Zaletel and Mark Regan, Anchorage, for Amicus Curiae Disability Law Center of Alaska.

Before: FABE, Chief Justice, WINFREE, STOWERS, MAASSEN, and BOLGER, Justices.

OPINION

BOLGER, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The respondent in a mental health commitment proceeding argues that the delay between his detention and his involuntary commitment hearing violated time limits imposed by statute and due process of law. But we conclude that the relevant statutory time limit begins upon a respondent's arrival at an evaluation facility, that there was no obvious or prejudicial statutory violation in this case, and that the delay in this case did not violate due process. We also conclude that the respondent's appeal of his involuntary medication order is now moot.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On Sunday, February 20, 2011, Gabriel C.¹ was taken into protective custody by the Kenai Police Department, after his family reported that he was off his psychiatric medication and displaying erratic and threatening behavior. He was transported to Central Peninsula Hospital, where a licensed clinical social worker conducted an emergency examination and prepared a petition for involuntary commitment.

That same day, at 5:00 p.m., an Anchorage committing magistrate signed an ex parte order authorizing Gabriel to be transported to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for evaluation.² The order stated that the evaluation had to be completed within 72 hours of Gabriel's arrival at that facility. The Public Defender Agency was appointed and granted access to Gabriel's records. The following day was a judicial holiday, so the master's order was not approved by the superior court until February 22. After the judge signed the order, it was distributed to the Attorney General's Office, the Public Defender Agency, and to API.

Gabriel was not transported to API until late the next day, arriving at about 1:30 a.m. on Thursday, February 24. On Monday, February 28, API filed a petition for a 30–day commitment and a petition for permission to administer psychotropic medication. A master held a hearing the following day—Tuesday, March 1, at 1:55 p.m.—and approved API's requests. At the hearing, Gabriel's counsel objected to the delay in transportation following the ex parte order, but she conceded that, after excluding the intervening weekend, the hearing was held within 72 hours of Gabriel's arrival at API. The master commented that he had been told that API had been routinely refusing to acceptpatients referred for involuntary evaluation,³ and on review, the superior court noted that the delay was possibly caused by an API policy to delay accepting patients when its capacity had been reached.

Gabriel filed timely objections to the master's report, and the superior court affirmed the master's approval of API's requests as to both commitment and medication. Gabriel now appeals, arguing that the delay in the hearing violated the 72–hour statutory deadline for a commitment hearing and his constitutional right to due process of law, and that the order for involuntary medication was entered in error.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply our independent judgment to the interpretation of the Alaska Constitution and the mental health commitment statutes.⁴ We also apply our independent judgment to determine if a pending controversy is moot.⁵

IV. DISCUSSIONA. Violation Of The Statutory Deadline For A Commitment Hearing Was Not Plain Error.

After a person is detained by a police officer and brought to an evaluation facility, a physician and a mental health professional must conduct an emergency evaluation within 24 hours.⁶ If warranted, the mental health professional may apply for an ex parte order authorizing hospitalization for a full evaluation.⁷ If authorized, the full evaluation must be completed within 72 hours.⁸

The 72–hour time limit is referenced in different parts of the commitment statutes. Alaska Statute 47.30.715 states that “[w]hen a facility receives a proper order for evaluation, it shall accept the order and the respondent for an evaluation period not to exceed 72 hours.” Later in the same section, the statute states that the court shall set a time for a commitment hearing “within 72 hours after the respondent's arrival.” ⁹ In addition, AS 47.30.725(b) states:

Unless a respondent is released or voluntarily admitted for treatment within 72 hours of arrival at the facility or, if the respondent is evaluated by evaluation personnel, within 72 hours from the beginning of the respondent's meeting with evaluation personnel, the respondent is entitled to a court hearing to be set for not later than the end of that 72–hour period.

Finally, under AS 47.30.805(a), computation of the evaluation period does not include “Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, or any period of time necessary to transport the respondent to the treatment facility.”

Gabriel C. argues that the evaluation period begins to run immediately after the court issues an order authorizing an evaluation, even when the order authorizes transportation to another facility. But this argument is not consistent with the language of the statute. As noted above, AS 47.30.715 states that the “evaluation period” for a full evaluation begins to run when the evaluation facility accepts “the order and the respondent.” This language implies that the “evaluation period” does not begin until after the court issues its order authorizing hospitalization for a full evaluation. And both AS 47.30.715 and AS 47.30.725(b) refer to the respondent's “arrival” at the facility where the evaluation is to be conducted. We thus interpret these statutes to require that, if the ex parte order authorizes the respondent's transportation to another facility for evaluation, the 72–hour period begins upon the respondent's arrival at that facility.

In this case, the 72–hour deadline did not begin to run until Gabriel's arrival at API. But there is no dispute that the commitment hearing was actually held more than 12 hours after the statutory deadline.

In the superior court, Gabriel did not argue that his hearing was held more than 72 hours after his arrival at API. So we review this issue for plain error.¹⁰ A plain error involves an “obvious mistake” that is “obviously prejudicial.” ¹¹ Here, the violation of the statutory deadline would not have been obvious to the master who held the commitment hearing. After excluding the intervening weekend, the hearing was held on the third day following Gabriel's arrival at API, and his attorney conceded that it did not appear that the State had exceeded the deadline following his arrival at that facility.¹²

We likewise conclude that Gabriel suffered no obvious prejudice from this delay. Gabriel does not dispute that the superior court had a sufficient basis for the order of involuntary commitment. So Gabriel likely would have been confined for the same period, even if the hearing had been held 12 hours earlier.

However, the commitment statutes also suggest that a respondent must be transported to an evaluation facility without delay. For example, under AS 47.30.710(b), the mental health professional who performs the initial emergency examination may be required to arrange for the patient's hospitalization “on an emergency basis.” ¹³ Under AS 47.30.715, after an evaluation facility receives an ex parte order for evaluation, “it shall accept the order and the respondent for an evaluation period not to exceed 72 hours.” ¹⁴ Taken together, these provisions evidence a legislative intent that the respondent who is subject to an emergency ex parte order must be transported immediately to the nearest evaluation facility so that the 72–hour evaluation period can begin without delay.

In this case, the record does not establish the cause for the delay in Gabriel's transportation. But it is clear to us that the legislature did not intend to authorize these evaluations to be delayed simply because the nearest designated evaluation facility is filled to capacity.

In its brief on appeal, the State attached a Uniform Administrative Order stating that, if a respondent cannot be transported to an evaluation facility within 24 hours of the ex parte order, the State is required to file a status report with the court that issued the order. The assigned judicial officer may then take any necessary action. And at oral argument, the State conceded that this action could include an evaluation by qualified personnel at another facility. There may be other alternatives. But we take this opportunity to stress that the assigned judicial officer should not hesitate to take appropriate action to expedite an evaluation if the respondent cannot be transported to the initially designated facility without delay.

B. The Delay In The Commitment Hearing Did Not Violate Due Process.

Gabriel also contends that the delay in this case violated his constitutional right to due process of law. We apply a three-part balancing test to determine what process is due, including: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; and (3) the State's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens of additional procedural requirements.¹⁵

We have previously recognized that involuntary commitment is a “massive curtailment of liberty” that cannot be imposed without due process protections.¹⁶ On the other hand, many other jurisdictions have allowed delays more substantial than Gabriel endured for an evaluation of a...