In re Oldfield's Estate
| Decision Date | 14 December 1912 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Estate of EDWARD A. OLDFIELD, deceased. v. WM. TROWBRIDGE, Executor, Appellant NANCY BOWIE |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Carroll District Court--HON. M. E. HUTCHINSON, Judge.
Reversed.
Chas E. Helmer, for appellant.
Brown McCrary, for appellee.
THE facts are stated in the opinion.--Reversed.
Edward A. Oldfield, a resident of Carroll, Iowa died testate December 2, 1910, and the defendant, Wm. Trowbridge, was later appointed executor of his estate. On January 11, 1911, the plaintiff filed two claims against the estate, and later a petition was filed which embodied the two claims. The first count of the petition alleged a promise of marriage and a breach thereof during the lifetime of the deceased, and asked damages on account thereof in the sum of $ 5,000, and the second count averred that in 1893 the plaintiff went to work for deceased on his farm at his instance and request and under an express agreement so to do; that plaintiff continued in the employment of deceased "from September, 1893, to September, 1910, except when temporarily away on a visit, and that the reasonable value of said services during all of said time was $ 5.00 per week." Plaintiff alleged that payments had been made to her from time to time during said period, aggregating about $ 230, and she asked judgment for her services in the sum of $ 3,975. There was a denial of the allegations of the petition, and the defendant further pleaded that whatever breach there was of the agreement to marry occurred more than two years prior to the commencement of this action, and is barred by the statute of limitations. And, as to count 2 of the petition, the defendant alleged that all of said claim which accrued prior to five years before the commencement of this action is also barred by the statute. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict was returned for the plaintiff for $ 5,000. This verdict was reduced $ 4,749.00 by the court, and plaintiff's claim therefor was allowed. The defendant appeals.
I. The plaintiff alleged that she went to work for the deceased under an express agreement that she should do so, and, as there is no direct evidence of such agreement, the appellant contends that plaintiff is not entitled to recover on that branch of her case. It is the rule in this state that, where the pleadings are based on an express agreement alone, no recovery can be had on a quantum meruit. Hunt v. Tuttle, 125 Iowa 676, 101 N.W. 509; Leonard v. Leonard, Adm'r, 134 Iowa 131, 111 N.W. 409.
Direct evidence of such an agreement for employment is not necessary, however. If from all of the facts and circumstances appearing in the case it can fairly be said that there must have been such an agreement, it is sufficient.
In 1893 the plaintiff's husband was living and she had five minor children. She then and at the time she went to work for the deceased lived with her children, and, so far as the record shows, with her husband also, in Mondamin, Harrison county. Oldfield was then living on a farm in Sac county, with his wife and family, consisting of several children, and it was to that farm that the plaintiff went in the fall of 1893, leaving her family in Mondamin. Plaintiff was in no way related to the deceased, nor does it appear that they had been acquainted prior to 1892, or that their relations were unusually friendly or intimate at the time that she went to work for him. As we understand the record, plaintiff lived in the house with the Oldfield family from the fall of 1893 until some time in the year 1894, when Oldfield brought her children to her from Mondamin, and thereafter she and her children lived in a small house on the farm for a number of years. Plaintiff's husband died in 1894, but whether before or after the children were taken to the plaintiff in Sac county does not appear. It will be presumed, however, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, that plaintiff's husband had the children with him, and, at least, assisted in their care until his death, and it will also be presumed that plaintiff was at work away from home for the common good of the family, and this because the law will not presume that she had deserted either her husband or her children. The record shows conclusively that plaintiff went to the Oldfield farm for the purpose of working, and that from the first she did do heavy manual labor and soon became of great value to deceased as a laborer. She worked in the fields, took care of stock, and performed any other work there was to do on the farm.
It is a general rule that the fact that one is found doing service for another is prima facie evidence of an employment. 26 Cyc. 1410; Perry v. Ford, 17 Mo.App. 212. And we think the circumstances surrounding the parties and their relationship as practical strangers raise the presumption that the plaintiff went to work for the deceased under an express agreement. It will be observed that there are no allegations in the petition that there was an express agreement as to the compensation that should be paid for such services.
II. There was no error in overruling the defendant's motion to strike out all evidence relative to services rendered prior to five years before the commencement of this action. The evidence as a whole tended to show that the service was continuous for the entire time up to at least within a year or two of the commencement of this action with the exception of...
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