In re Opinion of Justices

• Decision Date: 01 July 1903
• Citation: 97 Me. 590,55 A. 828
• Parties: In re OPINION OF JUSTICES.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

55 A. 828

97 Me. 590

In re OPINION OF JUSTICES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 1, 1903.

(Official.)

State of Maine.

In Senate, March 23, 1903. Ordered, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court are hereby requested to give to the Senate, according to the provisions of the Constitution in this behalf, their opinion on the following questions, viz.:

1. Is so much of the Public Law of Maine for 1895, p. 18, § 1, c. 18, constitutional that reads as follows:

"In case of loss under this policy and a failure of the parties to agree as to the amount of loss, it is mutually agreed that the amount of such loss shall be referred to three disinterested men, the company and the insured each choosing one out of the three persons to be named by the other, and the third being selected by the two so chosen; the award in writing by a majority of the referees shall be conclusive and final upon the parties as to the amount of loss or damage, and such reference unless waived by the parties, shall be a condition precedent to any right of action in law or equity to recover for such loss; but no person shall be chosen or act as a referee, against the objection of either party, who has acted in a like capacity within four months.

"No suit or action against this company for the recovery of any claim by virtue of this policy shall be sustained in any court of law or equity in this state unless commenced within two years from the time the loss occurred."

2. Is section 1, c. 18, of the Public Laws of 1895, constitutional?

In Senate Chamber, March 23, 1903. Read and passed.

Kendall M. Dunbar, Secretary.

By an order passed on March 25th the Senate requested the Justices to give to the Senate by July 1st their opinion upon the questions submitted in the foregoing order, and stated for their information that his excellency Hon. John P. Hill, Governor of Maine, had submitted to the Legislature during the present session a message touching the subject. The commissioners in Maine for promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States had reported to the Governor that the statute in question was deemed to deprive insurers of the right of a jury trial upon the question of the extent of loss or damage arising under Are insurance policies; also that the constitutionality of the statute could well be questioned.

Bills were afterwards introduced in both branches of the Legislature giving the right of trial by Jury on any question of fact, and these bills are now pending on the files of the Legislature.

To the Senate:

The undersigned Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court give the following as their opinion on the questions submitted to the Justices in the foregoing Senate order of March 23, 1903:

The two questions submitted are practically identical, since they both are as to the constitutionality of the same section of the same statute.

In considering the question we confine ourselves exclusively to the statute cited in the Senate order, viz., section 1, c. 18, p. 14, Pub. Laws 1895. We also confine ourselves to the question of constitutionality, ignoring all other questions. The first clause in that section is as follows: "Section 1. No fire insurance company shall issue fire insurance policies on property in this state other than those of the standard form herein set forth, except as follows." Then follow certain exceptions allowed, none of which affect the questions submitted. In the standard form set forth in this section is the clause, cited in the Senate order, stipulating, in effect, that the amount of the loss or damage under the policy shall be determined by three arbitrators instead of by a jury, unless such stipulation be waived.

We assume as too evident for argument or discussion that the words "fire insurance company" in such a statute and in such connection mean incorporated companies or corporations, and are not to be extended beyond them. Again, it not being otherwise stated in the Senate order, we understand we may assume that in none of the charters of domestic fire insurance companies is there any limitation upon the power of the Legislature "to amend, alter, or repeal" their charters, as reserved in Rev. St. 1883, c. 46, § 23. The question submitted is, therefore, narrowed down to this: Is the Legislature inhibited by any provision in the Constitution of the United States or of this state from exercising the power of thus limiting incorporated insurance companies to the issuance of one standard form of fire insurance policy, even though such standard form contain a clause that there shall be no right of action on the policy until the amount of the loss or damage be determined by three arbitrators, or there be a waiver of such clause by both parties? It may be assumed—arguendo only—that by accepting such a fire insurance policy the assured waives any right to a jury trial upon the question of the amount of his loss or damage; but there is no statutory compulsion on fire insurance companies to issue such policies nor upon property owners to accept them.

We do not find in either Constitution, federal or state, any section or clause in terms inhibiting such an exercise of the legislative power over fire insurance companies. While the individual has existence and consequent rights independent of the Legislature, the corporation or incorporated company derives its existence and rights solely from legislative action. The Legislature may refuse to grant any corporate rights or powers whatever, and even existence, or it may grant one only. Until the Legislature acts, these do not and cannot exist. S...