In re Opinion of the Justices

• Citation: 266 Mass. 583,165 N.E. 900
• Parties: In re OPINION OF THE JUSTICES.
• Decision Date: 27 March 1929
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

266 Mass. 583

165 N.E. 900

In re OPINION OF THE JUSTICES.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

March 27, 1929.

Opinion of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court in response to questions submitted by the Senate and the House of Representatives. Questions answered.

The order submitting questions is as follows:

‘Whereas, There is pending before the General Court a bill entitled ‘An Act imposing a general graded tax on personal incomes,’ printed as Appendix A, in House Document No. 1075, a copy of which is hereto annexed; and

‘Whereas, Doubt exists as to the constitutionality of said bill if enacted into law; therefore be it

‘Ordered, That the opinions of the Honorable the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court be required on the following important questions of law:

‘1. In imposing taxes on incomes, may the general court, conformably to the provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, provide for the grading of said taxes in respect to the amount of income received?

‘2. May the General Court, conformably to the provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, impose graded taxes on incomes substantially as provided in section 3 of said bill?

‘3. Would any provision of said section 3 contravene the Constitution of the United States?

‘4. Assuming that said bill would be construed to provide for a tax on gross income derived from interest on ioans secured by mortgage of real estate, may the General Court conformably to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of the Commonwealth, authorize such a tax and continue in force existing provisions of law taxing the mortgagee's interest as real estate?’

Section 3 of the proposed law, as above referred to, is as follows:

‘Section 3. There shall be assessed, levied, collected and paid for each taxable year by every inhabitant of the commonwealth a tax upon net income as hereinbefore defined and computed at the following rates, after deducting the credits provided in section five:

‘On the first five thousand dollars of taxable income or any part thereof, one per cent;

‘On the next five thousand dollars of taxable income or any part thereof, one and one half per cent;

‘On the next fifteen thousand dollars of taxable income or any part thereof, two per cent;

‘On all taxable income in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars, three per cent.

‘The tax imposed hereby shall apply only to income received by individuals who are at the time of receipt inhabitants of the commonwealth except as provided in the case of fiduciaries by section ten and in the case of partnerships by section fourteen, and shall not apply to income when received by corporations while acting otherwise than in a fiduciary capacity, nor to the income of property of an unincorporated association or organization when such property is exempt from taxation under clause seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth or thirteenth of section five of chapter fifty-nine. Income received by an unincorporated association, partnership or trust the beneficial interest in which is represented by transferable certificates of participation or shares, which is the measure of a tax under chapter sixty-three shall be taxable under this chapter after distribution in the hands of the distributees, but only to the extent actually distributed.’

To the Honorable the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court respectfully submit these answers to the questions of an order adopted by the Senate on March 6, 1929, and by the House of Representatives on March 7, 1929, and transmitted to us on March 15, 1929, a copy whereof is hereto annexed.

[1] These questions relate to a bill entitled ‘An Act imposing a general graded tax on personal incomes.’ The fundamental inquiry is whether, under the Constitution of the Commonwealth, a tax may be laid on incomes graded as to rate according to the amount of income received by the taxpayer. It is plain from the discussions in advisory opinions hitherto rendered and from decided cases that no such tax on incomes can be laid under the general taxing power conferred by chapter 1, § 1, art. 4, of part 2 of the Constitution. An income tax is a tax on property and under this constitutional mandate must be proportional and reasonable. Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607, 84 N. E. 499;Id., 208 Mass. 616, 94 N. E. 1043;Id., 220 Mass. 613, 619-627, 108 N. E. 570;Perkins v. Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 276, 115 N. E. 411; Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 531, 532, 116 N. E. 904 (L. R. A. 1917F, 806).

The inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to the point whether a tax on incomes graded as to rate according to the amount of income received by the taxpayer is permissible under article 44 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth. That Amendment, so far as here material, is in these words: ‘Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the general court to impose and levy a tax on income in the manner hereinafter provided. Such tax may be at different rates upon income derived from different classes of property, but shall be levied at a uniform rate throughout the commonwealth upon incomes derived from the same class of property. The general court may tax income not derived from property at a lower rate than income derived from property, and may grant reasonable exemptions and abatements.’ The first sentence confines the exercise of the otherwise ample power to levy income taxes within limitations specified thereafter in the Amendment. The second sentence restricts that power to the imposition of a ‘uniform rate throughout the commonwealth upon incomes derived’ from the same kind of property, although permitting different rates on income derived from different kinds of property. This is more circumscribed than the limitation on the power to tax conferred on the Congress by article 1, § 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, to the effect simply that ‘all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.’ Those words have been held to exact only a geographical uniformity. Billings v, United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282, 34 S. Ct. 421 (58 L. Ed. 596). The words of Amendment 44 exact also geographical uniformity, but permit variation from intrinsic uniformity as to rates only with respect to reasonable classifications of property as to sources of income. A further intrinsic variation in rates is permitted by the third sentence to the extent that income not derived from property may be taxed at a lower rate than income derived from property, and to the extent also that reasonable exemptions may be made. Thus permissible differences in rates of taxation on incomes are mentioned. Except in these particulars the tax must be ‘at a uniform rate throughout the commonwealth.’ These words not only confer power to levy a tax on incomes at rates not uniform, but confine and limit variation from uniformity within strictly defined bounds. Under these words ‘property’ may be classified for the purpose of establishing different rates upon the income derived therefrom. But nothing in the Amendment authorizes the classification of the owners of property or of taxpayers for the same purposes. These two classifications are radically and inherently different. Power to make one classification cannot be inferred from power to make the other classification. If it had been intended that there might be differences in rates based upon differences in amounts of income received by the taxpayers, as well as upon differences in sources of income received by the taxpayers, it would have been simple to express that purpose in article 44 of the Amendments. No words of that article can be stretched to include that variation from the ‘uniform rate.’ The omission of such words is significant. The Legislatures of the political years 1914 and 1915, which proposed article 44 of the Amendments, and the people of the Commonwealth in 1915, who ratified and approved it, were not unfamiliar with taxes graded as to rates and progressively increasing in proportion to the amount of property involved. Such graded rates by way of an excise on legacies and inheritances were established by St. 1907, c. 563, § 1 (not required to be uniform or proportional because an excise instead of a property tax, chapter 1, § 1, art. 4, of part 2 of the Constitution of Massachusetts), and have continued to be a part of our system of taxation since that time. See now G. L. c. 65, § 1; Pratt v. Dean, 246 Mass. 300, 307, 309, 140 N. E. 924;Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, ...