In re P.L.
| Decision Date | 29 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-1036.,09-1036. |
| Citation | 778 N.W.2d 33 |
| Parties | In the Interest of P.L., Minor Child, O.L.-V., Father, Appellant, State of Iowa, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Matthew R. Metzgar of Rhinehart Law, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Katherine S. Miller-Todd, and Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorneys General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and David Dawson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Jessica Knoll, Sioux City, for mother.
Marchelle Denker of Sioux City Juvenile Office, Sioux City, Guardian Ad Litem for minor child.
Gerald Denney, Niobrara, NE, for Santee Sioux Nation.
In this case, we must decide if the juvenile court was correct in terminating a father's parental rights. In our de novo review of the record, we determine the juvenile court properly terminated the father's parental rights. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father's parental rights should be terminated.1 The father appealed and our court of appeals reversed the judgment of the juvenile court. The State asked for further review, which we granted.
This case gives us the opportunity to review the analytical framework used by Iowa courts to determine whether a court should terminate a parent's parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116 (2009).2 In the last three decades, the most consistent framework applied by the courts in this state in deciding whether to terminate a parent's parental rights was first to determine if the State had proved an enumerated ground contained in section 232.116(1).3 See, e.g., In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 2002); In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994); In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1986). If the State has proved an enumerated ground, the court then determined whether the decision to terminate was in the best interest of the child. See, e.g., In re K.M., 653 N.W.2d at 605-06; In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d at 400; In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d at 574. Although we believe this framework is somewhat consistent with the statute, we believe we must slightly modify our analysis to better conform to the terms of the statute.
Originally, the termination-of-parental-rights statutes were found in chapter 232 of the Iowa Code. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 232.48 (1975). In 1976 the legislature enacted new statutes relating to the termination of parental rights. 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1229. These statutes repealed the termination provisions in chapter 232 of the Code in favor of new termination provisions. See id. ch. 1229, § 38 (). The code editor codified these new termination provisions in chapter 600A. See Iowa Code §§ 600A.1-.9 (1977). Thus, chapter 600A became the exclusive mechanism for terminating a parent's parental rights. Id. § 600A.3. Chapter 600A did not distinguish between terminations in anticipation of a private adoption or terminations by the State after a juvenile court made a finding that a child was in need of assistance. Chapter 600A required that if a juvenile court found the child to be in need of assistance and its order was in force at the time of the filing of the termination petition, then the termination petition must be filed with the juvenile court making that determination. Id. § 600A.5(2).
Chapter 600A contained seven grounds for termination. Id. § 600A.8. Chapter 600A also contained a section stating that the paramount consideration in interpreting chapter 600A was the welfare of the child. Id. § 600A.1. Based on these provisions, our court developed an analytical framework for deciding a termination case under chapter 600A. The court had to decide if an enumerated ground for termination was proved, and if one was, the court next had to determine whether the termination was in the best interest of the child. See In re B.L.A., 357 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1984) (); Klobnock v. Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Iowa 1981) ().
Around the time Iowa enacted chapter 600A, scholars began questioning the best-interest standard used by courts to terminate parental rights. Professor Wald of Stanford University wrote the seminal article on the subject in April of 1976. Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1976) [hereinafter "Wald Article"]. Professor Wald's thesis was that the best-interest test, as used in statutes such as Iowa's, provided little or no guidance for the court in deciding when to terminate a parent's parental rights. Id. at 631. Because of the lack of guidance, a judge's decision to terminate usually reflected each judge's own "folk psychology," leading to excessive and potentially discriminatory removals. Id. at 650. Many times the best-interest test allowed judges to make decisions based on their own value system rather than on those values held by society or approved by legislative enactment. Id. Moreover, application of the best-interest test frequently allowed a child to be lost in the foster care system because the judge could not make or implement a timely decision on the child's permanent placement. Id. at 626-27.
To remedy this problem, Professor Wald proposed that states enact new statutes with specific standards outlining when the state should intervene to protect a child, under what conditions a child should be removed from the home, and what services should be provided to the family so that the child could be reunited with the family. Id. at 637-38. He also proposed if the court could not return the child to the family in the time outlined in the standards, the court should terminate the parent's parental rights so the child has a permanent placement as soon as possible. Id. Of course, his proposal provided specific exceptions that would allow a court not to terminate a parent's parental rights even if the standards were proved. Id. at 638. In summary, Professor Wald concluded termination should be the norm after a child has been in foster care for a given period unless termination would be harmful to the child under one of the specific exceptions contained in his proposal. Id. at 690. Professor Wald's premise was that the discretion the decision makers had under the best-interest test should be limited by making the laws specific as to when the state could intervene to terminate a parent's parental rights. Id. at 639. He included his proposal in statutory form in the appendix to his article. Id. at 700-06. At least one author has referred to Professor Wald's proposal as the "Model Child Placement Code." Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 Stan. L.Rev. 423, 450 n. 129 (1983).
In 1978 the legislature revisited the statutes dealing with termination of parental rights as part of a comprehensive revision of the juvenile justice laws. 1978 Iowa Acts ch. 1088. The legislature adopted a termination-of-parental-rights statutory scheme for children in need of assistance consistent with Professor Wald's proposed model act. See id. ch. 1088, §§ 60-67 (). The legislature left the law regarding terminations for a child not adjudicated in need of assistance under chapter 600A unchanged, but required that terminations involving a child adjudicated in need of assistance be conducted pursuant to the provisions of chapter 232. Id. ch. 1088, § 94 (). Although the legislature has amended the statute since its adoption in 1978, its analytical framework remains the same today. To terminate a parent's parental rights under chapter 232, the court must first determine if one of the grounds enumerated in section 232.116(1) exists. If a ground exists, the court may terminate a parent's parental rights. Iowa Code § 232.116(1). In determining whether to terminate a parent's parental rights, the court must apply section 232.116(2). Section 232.116(2) provides:
In considering whether to terminate the rights of a parent under this section, the court shall give primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child. This consideration may include any of the following:
a. Whether the parent's ability to provide the needs of the child is affected by the parent's mental capacity or mental condition or the parent's imprisonment for a felony.
b. For a child who has been placed in foster family care by a court or has been voluntarily placed in foster family care by a parent or by another person, whether the child has become integrated into the foster family to the extent that the child's familial identity is with the foster family, and whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster family. In considering integration into a foster family, the court shall review the following:
(1) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining that environment and continuity for the child.
(2) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court determines that the child has...
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