In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, Master Docket No. 86-2229 (E.D. Pa. 9/6/2000)
| Decision Date | 06 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | Master Docket No. 87-1258.,Master Docket No. 87-3227.,Master Docket No. 87-1190.,Master Docket No. 86-2229. |
| Parties | IN RE: PAOLI RAILROAD YARD PCB LITIGATION THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: Narcise v. SEPTA, et al., Williams v. SEPTA, et al., Stanbach v. SEPTA, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
The only pending motion remaining in the above-captioned cases, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, is now ripe for decision.1 Plaintiffs were workers at the Paoli Railroad Yard. Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that they have suffered from a variety of severe and unusual illnesses as a result of their exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), used in the transformers of train cars which these Plaintiffs serviced and maintained in the Paoli Railroad Yard. The Complaints in these cases seek monetary damages and medical monitoring from the railroad defendants that employed Plaintiffs based on claims arising under state tort law and the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA").2 Since the filing of Defendants' summary judgment motion, the last of the railroad defendants, SEPTA, has settled with Plaintiffs.3 As a result, no FELA claims remain in these cases. Plaintiffs' tort claims against the remaining defendants — Solutia, Inc. (f/k/a Monsanto, defendant in all three cases) and General Electric (defendant in Narcise and Williams) — are governed by Pennsylvania common law, just like the claims of the residential plaintiffs, which have already been adjudicated.4 For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
"Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, reveal no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wragg v. Comcast Metrophone, 18 F. Supp.2d 524, 526 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, all facts, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 527; Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 885 F. Supp. 694, 707 (E.D.Pa. 1995).
To obtain summary judgment relief, the moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Coregis Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 24 F. Supp. d 475, 477 (E.D.Pa. 1998). The non-moving party then must go beyond the mere allegations of the pleadings, and, from the evidence of record, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine disputed issue for trial.5 Stickney v. Muhlenberg College TIAA-CREF Retirement Plan, 896 F. Supp. 412, 417 (E.D.Pa. 1995); see also Coregis, 24 F. Supp.2d at 477. In deciding whether an issue is genuine, "the court's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 482. Summary judgment must be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Plaintiffs are pursuing five types of claims against the three remaining defendants: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability, including failure to warn and defective design; (3) fraud, including fraudulent concealment; (4) infliction of severe emotional distress (negligent and intentional)6; and (5) punitive damages.7 In addition, Helen Narcise has a loss of consortium claim.
As this Court has previously observed, "[p]roof of causation is a necessary element in a products liability action as well as in a negligence action." Burton v. Danek Medical, No. Civ. A. 95-5565, 1999 WL 118020, *2 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 1, 1999). Accordingly, a defendant cannot be held liable on a theory of negligence, strict product liability, or misrepresentation unless a causal relationship is established between the defendant's product and the plaintiff's injury. Id.
Under Pennsylvania law, unequivocal medical testimony is necessary to establish the causal connection in cases where there is no obvious causal relationship between the accident and the injury.8 Niklaus v. Vivadent, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 94, 96 (M.D.Pa. 1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1409 (3d Cir. 1993).
"[S]uch testimony is needed to establish that the injury in question did, with a reasonably degree of medical certainty, stem from the [complained of] act." . . . [U]nder some rare circumstances, Pennsylvania law may allow a personal injury case in which there is no obvious causal relationship to be submitted to a jury on the basis of causation testimony presented by a qualified expert other than a medical doctor.
Expert medical testimony on causation requires the witness to offer expert medical testimony on the injury itself and the relationship between the injury and the alleged cause. Consequently, an expert offered by plaintiffs on the issue of causation in this case must be an expert in diagnosing, and in determining the cause of, [the] injuries [at issue].
Id. (citations omitted). The instant matter clearly falls in the category of cases requiring expert medical testimony. Accordingly, the issue raised by Defendants is whether the expert testimony offered by Plaintiffs is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the issue of causation.
Defendants argue that this Court's exclusion of Dr. Sherman's testimony leaves these Plaintiffs without any individualized proof of medical causation. In response, Plaintiffs submit that the record evidence that the Paoli workers were exposed to PCBs, combined with Dr. Nisbet's and Dr. Melvyn Kopstein's expert testimony is sufficient to establish a likelihood that the cancers of Mr. Narcise and Stanbach, and the illnesses of Mr. Williams, were caused by PCBs. (Pls.' Supplemental Mem. at 22.) However, Defendants point out that neither Dr. Kopstein nor Dr. Nisbet can fill this causation gap.
Defendants explain that Dr. Kopstein testified only that there was an opportunity for exposure and was never offered by Plaintiffs as an expert on medical causation. As for Dr. Nisbet, Defendants submit that he never offered any opinion as to the PCB exposure of John Narcise and Charles Stanbach or the causes of their alleged injuries. And although Dr. Nisbet did provide a specific opinion on the exposure of Andre Williams, he did not express an opinion on causation.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Under this Rule, the trial judge acts as a "gatekeeper" to ensure that any and all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997). Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the proffered witness must be an expert; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact. Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806.
Under the first requirement, the witness must be qualified as an expert. See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741. An expert can be qualified by a broad range of knowledge, skills, training, education, or experience. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Paoli I"), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991). A witness who does not possess sufficient knowledge of the subject matter is not qualified to offer an expert opinion. Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1056 (3d Cir. 1997).
In the instant action, Plaintiffs have now taken the unique position of offering Drs. Nisbet and Kopstein, experts who have been previously identified by Plaintiffs for purposes of providing evidence of Plaintiffs' exposure to Defendants' PCBs, as medical causation experts.9 Federal courts that have applied the Third Circuit Paoli standards in the face of deciding whether similarly proffered experts are qualified to opine on the medical cause of a plaintiff's injury have ruled in favor of precluding such testimony.
For example, in Poust v. Huntleigh Healthcare, 998 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.J. 1998), the court held that Robert Benowitz, an engineer proffered by the plaintiff as an expert, was qualified to provide an opinion as to alleged defects in the design of a pneumatic compression device that was used during the plaintiff's back surgery, but found that he was not qualified to opine on medical causation. In that case, the court reviewed Mr. Benowitz's background and found that his areas of expertise included (1) hospital and health safety, and (2) medical devices — use, safety and design. In addition, Mr. Benowitz served as a safety consultant, a position in which he investigated electro-mechanical equipment incidents, conducted medical safety testing and provided consulting services to healthcare institutions. Based on the above, the New Jersey federal court found that Benowitz was qualified to provide an opinion on the subject of the alleged defects in the design of the medical device; however, the court also determined that the expert had no experience, education, or training which would qualify him to render an opinion as to the medical cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 492-93.
Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991), is...
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