In re Peet's Estate

• Citation: 79 Iowa 185,44 N.W. 354
• Parties: IN RE PEET'S ESTATE.
• Decision Date: 30 January 1890
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

79 Iowa 185

44 N.W. 354

IN RE PEET'S ESTATE.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 30, 1890.

Appeal from district court, Jones county; J. D. GIFFEN, Judge.

Proceeding in probate, in which Matilda Peet, as widow of J. M. Peet, deceased, seeks an allowance for support under the provisions of the statute. The estate of J. M. Peet, at his death, consisted of upwards of $30,000, mainly of notes and real estate. By the terms of his will the petitioner was to receive, while she remained his widow, the interest of $3,000. All of the remainder of his property was bequeathed to his children. The provisions of the will in favor of the wife are as follows: “Before my marriage to my present wife, Matilda Peet, I made an agreement with her wherein provision was made for her out of my property, which antenuptial contract was filed and recorded in the office of the recorder of Jones county, in book 44, page 477; and I direct that my son William G. Peet pay to her the interest upon the money annually or oftener, as she may call for it, during the life-time of my said wife, as provided in said antenuptial contract. And I give and bequeath to my said wife, Matilda Peet, during her life, in case she remains my widow, the interest upon three thousand dollars, said interest to be paid to her as above directed, unless she shall marry again, and in such case the same shall cease, and she shall not be entitled to anything thereafter.” The following is the antenuptial contract referred to: “Article of agreement, made and concluded this 3rd day of July, A. D. 1877, by and between James M. Peet, of Fairview, Jones county, Iowa, party of the first part, and Matilda Weaver, of Anamosa, Iowa, party of the second part, witnesseth: That in consideration of a promise of marriage by and between said parties it is hereby mutually agreed by and between said parties that during their marriage neither party shall, in any manner, be restricted in the control or disposition of their property, both real and personal, which they have or may hereafter acquire; and either may execute deeds of conveyance without the consent or signature of the other, the same as if unmarried. And said second party, in consideration of aforesaid, hereby agrees to claim no right of dower or homestead in or to any property which shall belong to the estate of said party of the first part at the time of his decease, provided she shall survive him. And said first party, in consideration of the promise aforesaid, hereby agrees that in case said second party shall survive said first party said second party shall be allowed and paid out of the estate of said first party, by his executors or heirs, the interest on the sum of three thousand dollars, ($3,000;) which interest shall be paid annually from and after my decease during the widowhood of said second party.” Other facts as to the health and financial condition of the petitioner appear in the record, which may be referred to in the opinion. The foregoing statements are sufficient for the main question in the case. The district court made an allowance of $800 to the petitioner. The executor appeals.Ezra Keeler and J. W. Jamison, for appellant.

Remley & Ercanbrack, for appellee.

GRANGER, J.

1. The question is first presented as to the right of the court to make any allowance because of the contract and the provisions of the will. The effect claimed for them is that they divest the court of any authority to make an allowance, under the provisions of the Code, § 2375, even though the facts, under other circumstances, would require it. In other words, as to the petitioner, they supersede the purpose of the statute. It is very manifest that the testator's purpose in the will was to carry out the terms of the antenuptial agreement, and that the limitations of the will as to the right of the petitioner are no greater than a fair construction of the agreement will warrant. To a clear understanding of appellant's claim, and the language of the agreement, relied on for its support, we quote a clause in his argument, which includes the language of the contract: “Our position is that the contract, in express terms, gives the right to dispose of all the property that he then owned or might afterwards acquire, and such right is given in the following clause of the contract: ‘During their marriage neither party shall in any manner be restricted in the control or disposition of their property, both real and personal, which they have or may hereafter acquire, and either may execute deeds of conveyance without the consent or signature of the other, the same as if unmarried.’ ” It is then urged that the right of disposition includes a right to dispose of it by will, and, as we infer, such being the effect of the contract, the will must receive that construction. This leads us directly to a construction of the contract as bearing on the point. We think a fair consideration of the question involves a consideration of other language in the contract than that quoted; but without other language it is exceedingly doubtful if it would bear the construction claimed for it. It must be understood that contracts designed to divest the wife of the benefits of the statutes in her favor, after the death of her husband, and especially a statute providing for a necessary support, immediately following such death, must not be of doubtful interpretation, but specific and certain as to such intent. In...