In re Perkins

• Decision Date: 02 April 1900
• Citation: 100 F. 950
• Parties: In re PERKINS, Deputy U.S. Marshal.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

100 F. 950

In re PERKINS, Deputy U.S. Marshal.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina.

April 2, 1900

PURNELL District Judge.

T. W Dewey, a United States commissioner, issued a criminal warrant, offense not set out in record, and mailed the same to the deputy marshal at Greenville, N.C. Respondent was absent from his place of residence in another part of the district on official duty. The warrant not being executed the commissioner addressed a postal card to the deputy marshal, concerning the wording of which there is some dispute, to which the deputy marshal replied: 'Your pert card to hand. I will have to tell my self-adopted boss 'Study your official duties, and let your warrants come through the proper channel.' Are you aware there are other commissioners in my district, and that deputy marshals are under the United States marshal's orders, and not under Mr. Dewey's? ' The commissioner issued a rule on respondent, setting forth the above reply, and requiring the deputy to show cause why he should not be attached and punished for contempt, or otherwise dealt with according to law. On the day set for hearing, the deputy marshal appeared with counsel and filed his answer. In the answer the failure to execute the warrant is explained because it had not been docketed in the marshal's office at Raleigh, as required by the regulations of the department of justice; his instructions not to execute criminal warrants until so docketed; his attendance as a witness under subpoena at the district court, and executing an order of said court in taking into possession property at Washington, N.C., in a bankruptcy proceeding, under an order of the district court and instructions of his chief, the marshal of the district. The explanation of the failure to execute the warrant seems to have been full and satisfactory, but the commissioner held the defendant's answer insufficient to purge him of the contempt as 'misbehavior of an officer of the court in his official transactions,' and adjudged him guilty on the correspondence set forth, exclusively, as showing disrespect and contempt of the commissioner's court. In the answer respondent, admitting the writing of the card set forth, says he 'offers as an excuse for writing the same that the said commissioner wrote him a postal card threatening to report him for nonperformance of duty if he did not explain his failure to execute the warrant, and the card was written while smarting under the threat'; that 'he regrets writing the same, and withdraws any reflection or intention of being disrespectful or disobedient to the court or its orders'; that 'he has great respect for the court, and it is always his pleasure to uphold its dignity.' He then explains his failure to answer the second letter of the commissioner, which is immaterial. The commissioner holds the answer 'neither sufficient, sincere, nor bona fide, and the facts therein contained as a justification and excuse were offered under compulsion, and not voluntary or sincere.' He therefore adjudges respondent guilty of contempt, and imposes a fine of $50 or 15 days in jail. From this judgment respondent appealed.

This is a novel proceeding, and might be disposed of summarily, but an investigation of questions involved may be of benefit in many ways. The law relating to contempts in the courts of the United States is often lost sight of, if understood, and confused with the law in other jurisdictions, differing in many essential particulars, restricted by legislation and diverse decisions. The law of contempt in the federal courts is section 725, Rev. St., and the many decisions, generally uniform, construing its provisions. The section is as follows:

'The said courts shall have power to impose and administer all necessary oaths, and to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority: provided, that such power to punish contempts shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any such officer, or by any party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts.'

This section is section 17, c. 20, Act Sept. 24, 1789 (the 'Judiciary Act '), as amended by Act March 2, 1831. From an examination of the first-mentioned act, it will be readily seen the words 'the said courts' in the statute mean the courts established under the preceding sections of the act, i.e. the supreme court, the circuit courts, and the district courts. The amendatory act, above quoted, has been construed as limiting the power of the circuit courts and the district courts to three classes of cases, where there has been misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, where there has been misbehavior of any officer in his official transactions, and where there has been disobedience to any order, process, or command of the court. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 512, 22 L.Ed. 208. Mr. Justice Field in this opinion says:

'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject they became possessed of this power.' This section (section 725, Rev. St.) is held to apply to the circuit and district courts, and doubt expressed as to its application to the supreme court; and a contempt of court is a crime against the United States, which, if willful, may be prosecuted by indictment. U.S. v. Jacobi, 4 Am.Law T. Rep. 148, Fed. Cas. No. 15,460. A trial by jury is not a right, but contempts may be punished summarily. In re Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 9 Sup.Ct. 699, 33 L.Ed. 150; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 10 Sup.Ct. 424, 33 L.Ed. 802. The decisions on the subject as to what is a contempt of c

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