In re Peterson
Decision Date | 31 October 2007 |
Docket Number | No. F049876.,F049876. |
Citation | 156 Cal.App.4th 676,67 Cal.Rptr.3d 584 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | In re Laci D. PETERSON, Deceased. Principal Life Insurance Company, Plaintiff, v. Scott L. Peterson, Defendant and Appellant; Sharon Rocha, as Administrator, etc., Defendant and Respondent. |
Geragos & Geragos, Los Angeles, Matthew J. Geragos and Eugene Patterson Harris, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.
Moorad, Clark & Stewart and Adam J. Stewart, Modesto, for Administrator, Defendant and Respondent.
Probate Code section 252 provides that when the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy "feloniously and intentionally kills" the person whose life is insured, the beneficiary "is not entitled to any benefit under the ... policy ..., and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent." (Ibid.) Appellant is the named beneficiary of a $250,000 life insurance policy insuring the life of his late wife, Laci Peterson. On November 12, 2004, a jury found appellant guilty of the first degree murder of Laci Peterson, and on March 16, 2005, the San Mateo County Superior Court entered a commitment judgment of death in appellant's criminal trial. That judgment is presently on appeal in the California Supreme Court.
The present appeal is from a judgment in a civil action awarding the life insurance proceeds to the Estate of Laci Peterson (the Estate).1 The insurer, Principal Life Insurance Company (Principal), brought an interpleader action (see Code Civ. Proc, § 386) alleging that both appellant and the Estate claimed to be entitled to the life insurance proceeds. Principal asked for an order discharging it from any liability to appellant or to the Administrator of the Estate, and directing appellant and the Administrator to litigate between themselves their claims to the proceeds of the life insurance policy. Principal, appellant and the Administrator stipulated to the entry of such an order. The insurance policy proceeds were deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, and Principal was dismissed from the action.
The Administrator then moved for summary judgment. She asked the court to take judicial notice of appellant's criminal conviction. The court did so, without objection. Appellant opposed the motion by arguing that "[t]he evidence in the Request for Judicial Notice presented by the Estate utterly fails to meet the requisite burden of proof.". Appellant relied on subdivision (b) of Probate Code section 254, which states: (Prob.Code, § 254, subd. (b).) The only additional evidence presented by appellant was a declaration from his attorney stating that appellant's criminal conviction was on appeal.
The superior court granted the Administrator's motion for summary judgment. Its order granting the motion stated that the Administrator "has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [appellant] did feloniously and intentionally murder his wife, Laci D. Peterson, and as such he is not entitled to collect the benefits of her life insurance policy." The court then entered a judgment directing the Clerk of the Stanislaus County Superior Court to pay to the Administrator the life insurance proceeds Principal had deposited with the Clerk.
On his appeal from this judgment appellant again argues that the Administrator failed to meet her burden under Probate Code section 254, subdivision (b) to show that appellant feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent. As we shall explain, we agree with the trial court that in the absence of any conflicting evidence, appellant's criminal conviction for the first degree murder of his wife was substantial and uncontradicted evidence that he feloniously and intentionally killed her. Summary judgment was therefore properly granted in favor of the Administrator.
The Administrator's motion presented the following facts, which were not disputed by appellant. Principal Life Insurance Company issued a "flexible premium variable universal life" insurance policy dated June 25, 2001 in the face amount of $250,000. The policy named Laci Peterson as the insured and appellant as the beneficiary. In November of 2004 a jury found appellant guilty of murdering Laci Peterson.
Appellant's opposition to motion presented a September 8, 2005 declaration of his attorney Mark J. Geragos stating that appellant's criminal conviction was on appeal.
In support of the motion the Administrator filed a request for judicial notice asking the court to take judicial notice of certain documents from appellant's criminal case (San Mateo Superior Court case No. SC-5550A). These were certified copies of: (1) the jury's December 13, 2004 penalty verdict fixing appellant's penalty at death; (2) the jury's November 12, 2004 verdict finding appellant guilty of the first degree murder of Laci Peterson; (3) the jury's November 12, 2004 verdict finding to be true the special circumstance that appellant "has in this case been convicted of at least one crime of murder of the first degree and one or more crimes of murder of the first or second degree;" (4) the jury's November 12, 2004 verdict finding appellant guilty of the murder of Baby Conner Peterson; (5) the court clerk's minutes of the March 16, 2005 proceedings (at which appellant was sentenced to death); and (6) the court's March 16, 2005 "Commitment Judgment of Death." As we have already mentioned, the court did take judicial notice of these documents, without any objection from appellant.
On appellate review of an order granting summary judgment (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 88 P.3d 517; in accord, see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 1; see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849-855, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493, & Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)
This action is an interpleader action brought by Principal. "Any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity against whom double or multiple claims are made, or may be made, by two or more persons which arc such that they may give rise to double or multiple liability, may bring an action against the claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims." (Code Civ. Proc, § 386, subd. (b).) (City of Morgan Hill v. Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 361, fn. omitted.) (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42-43, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 711; see also 4 Witkin Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, §§ 216-237, pp. 280-298, & Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) §§ 2:470-2:497, pp. 78-85.)
The first phase of this interpleader action was resolved by an order, stipulated to by all parties, that Principal be discharged from any liability to either of the defendants and dismissed from the action, and that appellant and the Administrator "will settle or litigate amongst themselves the [sic ] respective rights and claims to proceeds under the Policy...." (See also Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Broderick (1925) 196 Cal. 497, 238 P. 1034 [ ].)
"When the right of interpleader and discharge has been established ..., the trial of the issues between the conflicting claimants proceeds on the original and any...
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