In re Pfiffner's Guardianship
| Decision Date | 16 April 1946 |
| Docket Number | 26935 |
| Citation | 194 S.W.2d 233 |
| Parties | In re PFIFFNER'S GUARDIANSHIP. v. PHILLIPS SLUGGETT |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
'Not to be reported in State Reports.'
Maurice P. Phillips, of St. Louis, for appellant.
Edward J. Houlihan, of St. Louis, for respondent.
Glendy B. Arnold, of St. Louis, amicus curiae.
This proceeding originated in the Probate Court of the City of St Louis upon the application of John T. Sluggett, Jr., for the allowance of an attorney's fee in the sum of $ 1,000 out of the estate of Betty Jean Pfiffner, a minor. The probate court denied the application, whereupon Sluggett appealed to the circuit court, where Maurice P. Phillips was appointed guardian ad litem of the minor.
Upon the trial in the circuit court, Sluggett was allowed the sum of $ 500 for his services, and the defendant minor, acting by and through her guardian ad litem, thereupon appealed to this court, where the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Sluggett v. Phillips, Mo.App., 178 S.W.2d 458. Upon the second trial, Sluggett was allowed the sum of $ 750, and the defendant minor has again appealed to this court.
The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion on the first appeal.
Marguerite Pfiffner, a widow, died on July 3, 1937, leaving as her sole heirs at law her two daughters, Margaret, twenty-one years of age, and Betty Jean, four years of age, each possessed of an undivided one-half interest in the estate, but with certain additional rights accruing to Betty Jean by reason of her minority. Margaret was thereafter appointed administratrix of her mother's estate, which consisted chiefly of thirty-five pieces of real estate, most of which was encumbered by deeds of trust, or subject to liens for taxes or both. There was pending a suit brought by one Mary Agnes Byrnes involving a claim to all the decedent's real estate; and during the early course of the administration a fifth-class claim of $ 3,600 was allowed a certain creditor, upon whose petition the administratrix was ordered to take charge of all the real estate.
Following the death of the mother, Betty Jean, the minor, remained continuously in the custody of her sister, Margaret; and on March 25, 1940, by an order entered of record in the probate court, Margaret was appointed guardian of Betty Jean's person and estate. The appointment was made upon the application of Margaret, who, three days earlier, had employed Sluggett as her attorney. She had previously been represented by another attorney in relation to her duties as administratrix, but following her appointment as Betty Jean's guardian, Sluggett was her sole counsel and legal adviser, both as administratrix and as guardian, and also in her individual capacity.
Sluggett's application for the allowance of a fee covers the period of his services from March 25, 1940, the date of Margaret's appointment as guardian, to March 16, 1942, the date of the filing of his application in the probate court.
After his appointment by the circuit court as guardian ad litem of the minor, Phillips filed an answer on the minor's behalf in which he asserted, in substance, that Sluggett's action in representing Margaret both individually and as administratrix as well as in her capacity as guardian was in conflict with the duty which an attorney representing a guardian owes directly to the ward from whose estate he seeks a recovery for his services; that Margaret's several capacities placed her in conflicting positions as between herself and Betty Jean, and thereby obliged Sluggett to advise her in such conflicting positions; and that in undertaking to represent Margaret in her conflicting positions, Sluggett failed to serve the best interests of the minor.
The respects in which he had allegedly failed to serve the best interests of the minor were that instead of obtaining for the minor the homestead to which she was entitled in property known as 7707 Vermont Avenue in the City of St. Louis, he had caused the same to be sold to satisfy the fifth-class claim which had been allowed against the mother's estate; that he had failed to obtain for the minor any other allowance to which she was entitled under the law; that he had failed to obtain an accounting for rents which Margaret had collected from the homestead between the date of the mother's death and the time of the sale of the property; and that he had failed to obtain a proper allowance for the minor out of the mother's estate, or from Margaret, to compensate the minor for the loss she had sustained and for the gain which had accrued to Margaret in having the assets thus derived applied on debts which could not be properly charged against the homestead proper, all to Margaret's enrichment individually.
The first opinion sets out in considerable detail the services that Sluggett had rendered the guardian for which he sought to be compensated out of the minor's estate.
Reviewing the evidence, this court held that most of the services for which Sluggett claimed the right to be compensated had been rendered in connection with matters involving conflicting interests between the guardian and her ward, and that as to matters in which there had been such conflicting interests, the minor's estate was not chargeable with a fee for his services. The court pointed out that there was clearly a conflict of interests with respect to the minor's homestead rights in the proceedings whereby the homestead property was mortgaged and eventually sold to pay the mortgage, and also in the case of the making and approval of Margaret's final settlement as administratrix of the mother's estate.
The court concluded, however, that there had been no conflict of interests as to Sluggett's services in the prosecution of an action upon a promissory note against one Frank Byrnes, in which action there had been a recovery for the minor of $ 768.75; nor as to services in the preparation and presentation of papers in the probate court for the renewal of deeds of trust and the sale of properties whereby there was realized for the minor about $ 800; nor as to services in the procuring and dismissal of the suit brought by Mary Agnes Byrnes, and revived against the administratrix, in which Mary Agnes Byrnes had alleged that the deceased had not been the real owner of the several pieces of real property included in her estate, but had merely held title thereto as a straw party.
But even though it was found that Sluggett had rendered services for the guardian in which there was no such conflict of interests as to bar him from the allowance of a fee out of the minor's estate, his evidence showed only the value of his services as a whole, and did not undertake to fix the value of the particular items of service for which he was entitled to be compensated. For this reason this court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, whereupon Sluggett amended his application by striking therefrom the allegations respecting those items of service as to which this court had held that there had been conflicting interests as between the guardian and her ward. The second trial was then had upon such amended application, and resulted, as has already been indicated, in the allowance of a fee of $ 750 to be paid and satisfied out of the minor's estate.
Challenging our decision on the first appeal which sustained Sluggett's right to be compensated out of the minor's estate for those particular services rendered the guardian as to which the court found there had been no conflict of interests between the guardian and her ward, the basis of defendant's contention on this appeal is that the conflict of interests was inherent in the employment, and incapable of separation as between those services which did, and those which did not, adversely affect the minor's interest. In other words, it is argued that the employment was improper from the outset; that the rule which bars an attorney from representing clients occupying adverse positions does not contemplate that the rule shall be limited in its application to the precise matters in which such hostility may appear, but extends so far as to exclude employment at all whenever matters of adverse interest will arise in connection with the employment; and that when an attorney, notwithstanding the presence of adverse interests, undertakes nevertheless to represent both parties, the penalty to be paid for such undertaking is that he shall forfeit his entire compensation.
The whole trouble, of course, grows out of the fact that in appointing Margaret to be guardian of her minor sister's estate, every one concerned lost sight of the fact that her own interests and those of her minor sister were substantially unequal and conflicting. However the significance of such conflict of interests was only revealed by subsequent events; and viewing the situation as it undoubtedly appeared at the time of the appointment, it is easy to understand why neither court nor counsel took note of the circumstances which might have been thought sufficient to disqualify her.
So far as concerns her appointment as guardian of her minor sister's person, it was entirely natural and proper that she should be appointed in view of the fact that she was the nearest surviving relative and upon the mother's death had voluntarily assumed the responsibility of the minor's care and custody. Nor is there the least suggestion in the record that the minor's personal well-being has been neglected in her hands. But notwithstanding the ties of blood which made her the natural and proper choice for appointment as guardian of the minor's person, it would now seem, in the light of subsequent experience, that her conflicting property interests might well have...
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