In re Platz

• Decision Date: 28 April 1913
• Docket Number: 2400
• Citation: 42 Utah 439,132 P. 390
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: In re PLATZ

132 P. 390

42 Utah 439

In re PLATZ

No. 2400

Supreme Court of Utah

April 28, 1913

In the matter of the disbarment of Arthur A. Platz.

JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT.

W. D Riter, E. A. Walton and Bismark Snyder, Grievance Committee of State Bar Association, for petitioners.

Arthur A. Platz, in pro. per.

FRICK J. McCARTY, C. J., STRAUP, J., concurring.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

On the 11th day of October, 1910, one Arthur A. Platz, who hereinafter will be designated respondent, upon presentation of a certificate of admission from the Court of Appeals of Maryland, was duly admitted to practice in this court as an attorney and counselor at law. On July 22, 1912, the grievance committee of the State Bar Association filed specific charges against respondent in which said committee set forth that he, upon moral grounds, was an unfit, unsafe and improper person to be permitted to be intrusted with the powers of an attorney at law, and hence asked that he be disbarred. A citation was duly issued and served on respondent, and on the 7th day of October, 1912, he filed his answer in which he either denied or attempted to explain said charges. On the 15th day of said month the matter was, by this court, referred to Charles Baldwin, Esq., with directions to hear the testimony and to report findings of fact and conclusions of law. On January 25, 1913, the testimony taken at the hearing and the findings and conclusions of the referee were duly returned to and filed in this court. We shall not set forth the charges preferred, nor the evidence adduced in their support. Neither shall we set forth the findings of fact. We refrain from doing so in this case for the reason that no one could be benefited by setting them forth; neither can anyone be injured by withholding them from publication in this opinion, since the charges, together with all the evidence and the findings as well, are and will remain on file in this court. The referee made the following conclusion of law:

"From the facts found by the referee it is concluded that the said Arthur A. Platz has violated his oath and his duties as an attorney and is morally unfit to be a member of the bar of this court and should be permanently disbarred therefrom."

At the hearing in this court the respondent, in form, excepted to the findings of fact; but his objections in fact were all directed to the foregoing conclusion of law.

We have very carefully read and considered all of the evidence adduced, both in support of and against the charges, and we are firmly convinced that both the findings of fact and conclusions of law based thereon are not only supported by the evidence, but are established beyond a reasonable doubt. In our judgment the evidence, which is contained in more than 300 typewritten legal cap pages, leaves no room for doubt that the respondent's acts and conduct were such as make him morally an unfit, unsafe, and improper person to be intrusted with the powers of an attorney at law, and hence he should be disbarred. In arriving at this conclusion we are not unmindful of respondent's argument advanced at the hearing that merely to suspend him would be sufficient punishment. This contention entirely ignores the real purpose of disbarment proceedings. In such proceedings, where the specifications, as in this case, directly charge the attorney with acts and conduct which clearly are to the effect that he does not possess the necessary attributes of honesty, integrity, and fidelity to entitle him to continue to practice his profession, the purpose of disbarring him from following the vocation of an attorney at law is not to punish him, but it is to protect "the public from prejudice by removing grossly improper persons from participation in the administration of the law." ( Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S.Ct. 569, 27 L.Ed. 552.) In such cases courts have no right, out of mere sympathy, to shut their eyes to gross moral delinquencies and merely suspend the offender for a short time, after which he may again practice his natural propensities upon an innocent and confiding public. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of the courts to at once remove the offender from the roll of honor and to protect the public as far as possible from being exposed to his natural propensities. To do otherwise would be to condone the wrong and lower the standard of professional integrity, honesty, and fidelity, which we have neither the right nor the disposition to do.

Nor is respondent's assertion relevant that there are some others practicing at...