In re Quantz, Habeas Corpus No. 3836.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1952
• Docket Number: Habeas Corpus No. 3836.
• Parties: In re QUANTZ.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

106 F. Supp. 557

In re QUANTZ.

Habeas Corpus No. 3836.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

Decided June 2, 1952.

James J. Laughlin, for petitioner.

Charles M. Irelan, U. S. Atty., and Joseph M. Howard and Joseph F. Goetten, Asst. U. S. Attys., for respondent.

STEPHENS, Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit:

The petitioner, Walter J. Quantz, after a trial before a judge and jury in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, was convicted of the crime of abortion and sentenced to imprisonment. He applied to the District Court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis; the application was denied. He then made application to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to be allowed to appeal in forma pauperis; that application was denied. Quantz then filed a petition in the District Court for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that petition was denied. Quantz then presented a petition to me for a writ of habeas corpus. I denied that petition because it appeared that Quantz had failed to apply for relief by motion, as required by § 2255, Title 28, U.S.C., to the court which sentenced him, and because it did not appear that the remedy by motion would be inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Quantz then filed a motion in the District Court, pursuant to § 2255, to vacate the sentence imposed upon him in the criminal proceeding; that motion was denied. Quantz next filed a petition in the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus; that petition was denied. Quantz then filed applications in the District Court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis from the order denying the motion to vacate sentence and from the order denying the last mentioned petition for a writ of habeas corpus; those applications were allowed and the appeals were noted. Quantz then filed applications in the Court of Appeals for leave to prosecute those appeals in forma pauperis; those applications were allowed and those appeals are presently pending. Quantz moved the Court of Appeals for an immediate hearing of such appeals and for the furnishing at the expense of the United States of a stenographic transcript of the proceedings at the criminal trial; that motion was denied.

Quantz has now presented a petition to me, for the second time, for a writ of habeas corpus. In view of the previous proceedings in the District Court and the disposition thereof, I entertained the present petition — notwithstanding that in the ordinary course such a petition addressed to an individual judge of the Court of Appeals is denied, the appropriate procedure being to address the same to the District Court or to one of its judges. Brosius v. Botkin (1940), 72 App.D.C. 29, 110 F.2d 49. Upon the ground, among others, that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus fails to state facts which entitle Quantz to the issuance of a writ, the Government opposes the same. The question thus raised is whether or not, assuming the truth of well-pleaded allegations of the petition, they show that there was in the criminal proceeding such a denial of a right or rights guaranteed a defendant in a criminal case by the Constitution as to deprive the District Court of jurisdiction to impose sentence. That is the sole question before me. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L. Ed. 830 (1941). Even if I should find error in the conduct of the criminal proceeding, I cannot under a petition for a writ of habeas corpus collaterally attacking the jurisdiction of the District Court in that proceeding, set the judgment aside unless the error reaches the level of a deprivation of some right guaranteed by the Constitution. Matters of error not reaching such a level are for determination in an appellate, not in a habeas corpus, proceeding. Smith v. United States (1950), 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192.

Counsel for Quantz urged that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be considered in connection with a transcript of the criminal proceeding. The Government opposed. After hearing argument on that subject, I reached the view that in the absence of a transcript of the criminal proceeding I could not satisfactorily pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of the petition for a writ. Therefore, acting under § 753 of Title 28, U.S.C., I ordered the court reporter to transcribe the criminal proceeding at the expense of the United States and to deliver the transcript to me; that has been done. In determining the sufficiency of the allegations of the petition for a writ, I have treated the full contents of the transcript as a part of the petition for the writ.

The allegations of the petition, supplemented by the transcript, are to the following effect:

1. The trial judge, in the presence of the jury, evidenced spleen and hostility against Quantz' counsel, at the outset by chiding him concerning tardiness in attendance upon the court, and throughout the trial by the nature and manner of the trial judge's rulings. Particular reference is made in this connection to pages 44, 45, 46, 58, and 72 of the transcript.

2. The trial judge refused to allow counsel for Quantz to make certain offers of proof. Particular reference in this connection is made to pages 48, 49, 58, 59, and 94 of the transcript. Those portions of the transcript show the following: There was denial of cross-examination by counsel for Quantz in which it was sought to obtain admissions by the prosecutrix, Miss Helen L. Aldrich,¹ that she had had an improper relationship with a Mr. Bladen. An offer to make proof of this was also denied. An attempt was made by counsel for Quantz to bring out on cross-examination of Miss Aldrich that the same Mr. Bladen was responsible for her pregnancy. Also counsel for Quantz sought to develop on cross-examination that persons other than the defendant were connected with the abortion testified to by Miss Aldrich. The trial judge ruled that the questions related to an immaterial subject. The trial judge also rejected an offer of proof, stating, however, that he understood what was being offered so that there was no need of discussing it. An attempt was made by counsel for Quantz on cross-examination of Miss Aldrich to develop that she had asked Quantz to write a letter to her husband, that Quantz had written such a letter, and that Miss Aldrich herself had later heard from her husband. That was objected to by the Government and the trial judge sustained the objection upon the ground that the questions related to an immaterial matter. Counsel for Quantz then asked Miss Aldrich what conversation she had had with Quantz regarding writing her husband. The Government again objected and the trial judge sustained the objection upon the ground of immateriality. At that point counsel for Quantz sought to make an offer of proof and to come to the bench to do so. The trial judge forbade this.²

3. The trial judge excluded relevant cross-examination. Particular reference in this connection is made to pages 36, 48, 52, 53, 58, 70, and 93 of the transcript. Those portions of the transcript show the following: Counsel for Quantz sought to develop upon cross-examination that Miss Aldrich had had previous miscarriages or abortions; that the conduct of Miss Aldrich with the Mr. Bladen above mentioned was improper; that Miss Aldrich either herself completely disrobed, or was completely disrobed by Quantz, at the time of the performance of the abortion testified to by her; that Miss Aldrich had had a first abortion in January...