In re R.B., 15–019.

Decision Date07 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 15–019.,15–019.
Citation126 A.3d 496
CourtVermont Supreme Court
Parties In re R.B., O.B. and K.C., Juveniles.

Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Appellant Father.

Michael Rose, St. Albans, for Appellant Mother.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Jody Racht, Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for Appellee.

Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, SKOGLUND and ROBINSON, JJ.

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1. Mother appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights in R.B., O.B., and K.C. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights in O.B. and K.C.1 We affirm.

¶ 2. R.B. was born in September 2008; O.B. in December 2009; and K.C. in September 2011. In August 2012, the Department for Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition alleging that the children were in need of care or supervision (CHINS) because they were without proper parental care. Several days later, the parties stipulated, and the court found, that the children were CHINS. The court transferred temporary legal custody of the children to father's mother subject to a conditional custody order.

¶ 3. Following an August 28, 2012 hearing, the court issued a disposition order that established a concurrent permanency goal of reunification with parents or adoption. The court adopted DCF's case plan with the exception of the recommendation that the children be placed in DCF custody. Parents proposed that the children be placed in the temporary custody of father's cousin Kristin Hall and her wife Tammy Hall pursuant to a conditional custody order. The Halls had four children and lived in a four bedroom house. DCF did not support the placement because the Halls could not obtain a license due to the number of children that they would have in the home. DCF also indicated that it had not yet had the opportunity to do a home study and evaluate the home.

¶ 4. The court concluded that placing the children with the Halls pursuant to a conditional custody order was in the children's best interests. See 33 V.S.A. § 5318(e) ("Whenever the Court orders the transfer of legal custody to ... a relative ..., such orders shall be supported by findings regarding the suitability of that person to assume legal custody of the child and the safety and appropriateness of the placement."). The court found it best to place the children with relatives if possible, and determined that the Halls could take proper care of the children, at least in the short run, while work was done on the disposition plan.

¶ 5. In mid-December 2013, DCF moved to terminate parents' rights.2 Parents subsequently moved to enforce their right to have parent-child contact. They asserted that Kristin Hall was not cooperating with visitation and asked the court to order her and DCF to follow the terms of the CCO, which called for parents to have consistent parent-child contact. The court indicated that if visitation continued to present a problem, it would consider this issue at the TPR hearing.

¶ 6. In April 2014, the court held a two-day termination hearing. The court had not issued a decision by mid-October 2014, and at that time, the guardian ad litem and attorney for the children requested a status conference to address several issues that had arisen since the TPR hearing. DCF also filed a motion, renewing the request made in its TPR petition that custody and guardianship of the children be transferred to DCF. DCF indicated that this would enable it to assist the adoptive parent in the adoption process. Additionally, as set forth in an attached affidavit, DCF stated that it would be better able to address concerns that had arisen about the children's current placement with Ms. Hall, concerns that had become known to DCF subsequent to the TPR hearing.3

¶ 7. The court did not directly respond to these requests, but instead issued its TPR decision on November 10, 2014. It found as follows. Mother suffers from rare disorders known as Munchausen's disorder and Munchausen's disorder by proxy. Munchausen's disorder by proxy is potentially fatal to the children of a parent who suffers from the disorder. It is an extremely unusual disorder, and it often takes a long time before medical providers become aware that their minor patients have a parent suffering from the disorder.

¶ 8. Mother had little or no insight into her disorders. She had been successful at times in manipulating health care providers to treat nonexistent symptoms as to which there was no medical evidence. Mother's conditions prevented her from parenting the children safely, and the children were at grave risk of physical harm if they were left in mother's care without around-the-clock, eyes-on, supervision. Treatment for mother's condition is extremely difficult and generally involves years of psychotherapy. This is particularly true for patients like mother who lack insight into their condition. The court could not find that mother was likely to recover from these disorders at any particular time. It found no reasonable probability that mother could resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time.

¶ 9. The court explained that child service agencies had been involved in parents' lives since May 2010 when mother and father were living in Tennessee. There were reports at that time about illicit drug use and sales, nutritional neglect, and medical maltreatment of the children by mother and father. The parties moved to Vermont in May 2011 where they lived in a mobile home with father's mother. There were a variety of significant problems at that time that affected the children's safety. Mother was not obtaining necessary mental health treatment and parenting education. The housing that parents provided for the family was not adequate. The home was consistently dirty and severely cluttered to the point that it presented a physical danger to the children. Despite requests by social workers to address the problem, parents were often unable or unwilling to devote the time necessary to provide adequate and safe housing. Parents also lacked adequate transportation for themselves and the children, and they lacked natural supports in the community to ensure that the family's needs were met.

¶ 10. The court found that in her interactions with service providers and social workers mother displayed scattered and unfocused thinking and communications regarding her needs and the children's needs. Neither parent was able to ensure that the children received the medical care, treatment, and support that they needed. Mother was unable to care for the children alone. Mother also regularly reported health problems with the children that were either grossly exaggerated or completely false, and sought unnecessary medical treatment for the children and herself for the imagined health problems that she reported. Mother displayed emotional detachment from the children that affected her ability to parent. Mother had great difficulty understanding and following through with recommendations and plans intended to help her cope with parenting the children. Additionally, mother functioned at the emotional and intellectual level of a pre-teen. She had difficulty understanding day-to-day matters and had significant mood swings.

¶ 11. The court found that in the year following the disposition plan neither parent had resolved the very significant issues identified by DCF and neither could resume caretaking responsibilities for the children. Father was unwilling or unable to take over responsibility for the children's medical care and appointments and ensure that recommendations and plans provided by DCF were implemented. As of the date of the TPR hearing, father continued to live with mother and had not developed the parenting and other skills needed to care for the children safely. It would be impossible, the court explained, for father to care for mother, protect the children, meet all of their needs, and support the family. Father was unemployed at the time of the hearing, although he was receiving some money for his work as a caretaker for mother. The parties received state benefits, which were barely sufficient to meet their financial needs.

¶ 12. The court reiterated that if father decided to live separately from mother he did not possess the skills necessary to parent three young children. During their relationship, mother had been the children's primary caretaker and father was generally out of the house working. The children had been in the custody of a relative with a CCO since the disposition order. Father had some contact with the children since then, but his contact was not consistent, and his relationship and connection with the children was not strong. Father's inconsistent contact was due to a combination of his own failure to exercise his contact rights consistently and also to difficulties with the custodian's schedule that were outside his control. Nevertheless, the reality was that at the time of the TPR hearing father had not acquired the skills or created the conditions under which he could successfully assume sole responsibility for the care of the children in a reasonable period of time. The court noted that father had not spent even one week with all three children on his own.

¶ 13. Based on these and other findings, including a finding that the children were well-adjusted to their current living situation, the court concluded that both parents had stagnated in their ability to parent and that termination of their rights was in the children's best interests. The court explained that the children had not had consistent contact with mother or father and they did not have a significant relationship with either parent. They had adjusted well and were settled in their new community. Neither parent could resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable period of time. Neither had played a constructive role in the children's lives, nor had they provided emotional support and affection that was so important for the children's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • In re A.M.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 16 Octubre 2020
    ...guardianship petition.¶ 23. Parents lack standing to make claims on behalf of the petitioners. See In re R.B., 2015 VT 100, ¶ 19, 200 Vt. 45, 126 A.3d 496 (explaining that "[t]he only question presented with respect to parents is whether the court erred in terminating their residual parenta......
  • In re A.M.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • 16 Octubre 2020
    ...guardianship petition. ¶ 23. Parents lack standing to make claims on behalf of the petitioners. See In re R.B., 2015 VT 100, ¶ 19, 200 Vt. 45, 126 A.3d 496 (explaining that "[t]he only question presented with respect to parents is whether the court erred in terminating their residual parent......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT