In re R.M.C.

• Decision Date: 21 April 2022
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 21CA0520
• Citation: 514 P.3d 963,2022 COA 46
• Parties: IN RE the Petition of R.M.C. III, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, for the Adoption of E.A.T., a Child, and Concerning J.D.L., Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

514 P.3d 963

2022 COA 46

IN RE the Petition of R.M.C. III, Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

for the Adoption of E.A.T., a Child,

and

Concerning J.D.L., Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0520

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division IV.

Announced April 21, 2022

Hampton & Pigott LLP, Natalie T. Chase, Broomfield, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee

Marquez Law, Jason A. Marquez, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE TOW

¶ 1 In this stepparent adoption proceeding, R.M.C. III (adoptive father) appeals two separate orders dated March 5, 2021, issued by the Morgan County District Court (the adoption court), which vacated a prior order supplementing the adoption decree. J.D.L. (psychological father)¹ cross-appeals the same orders, asserting that the court erroneously denied his request to intervene in the adoption action and to set aside the adoption decree. Psychological father also challenges an April 8, 2021, order denying access to the adoption case file and register of actions.

¶ 2 We hold, as a matter of first impression, that a decree of adoption does not vitiate a prior allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) to a nonparent. Rather, the court that issued the prior order retains jurisdiction related to the nonparent's APR. We also hold that the nonparent is not entitled to receive notice of, and participate in, the adoption proceeding. Consequently, we affirm the orders.

I. Background

¶ 3 Mother and A.R. (biological father) had E.A.T. (child) in 2015. In 2017, mother married psychological father. They separated shortly thereafter and mother began living with adoptive father. In 2019, psychological father filed for dissolution of marriage in the El Paso County District Court (the domestic relations court). In August 2020, the domestic relations court orally entered a decree dissolving the marriage and announced permanent orders, though neither the decree nor the permanent orders were reduced to writing at that time.²

¶ 4 In October 2020, before the written decree and permanent orders were entered in the dissolution of marriage case, adoptive father filed a petition in the adoption court for stepparent adoption. Mother and biological father consented to the adoption. Psychological father was not given notice of the adoption petition.

¶ 5 Three weeks later, the domestic relations court entered the written decree and permanent orders finding, as relevant to this case, that psychological father was the child's psychological parent and granting him parenting time.

¶ 6 Shortly thereafter, the adoption court entered an adoption decree. The court also entered a supplemental order, finding that

• the court had jurisdiction;

• psychological father had been previously granted parenting time through an action in El Paso County;

• there was no "scientific or biological" basis for psychological father to be "the actual psychological father of the minor child";

• because of the adoption, mother and adoptive father are parents who get to make parenting and visitation decisions; and

• psychological father would be permitted no further contact or parenting time with the child.

¶ 7 One month later, mother and psychological father appeared in the domestic relations court on a motion regarding parenting time. The domestic relations court recognized that an adoption decree had been entered, making adoptive father the legal father. The court also acknowledged that, as a result of the adoption decree, there was "a competing order indicating that [psychological father was] to have no contact." But the domestic relations court concluded that it had original and continuing jurisdiction over the parental responsibilities concerning the child and denied modifications to the parenting time schedule set forth in the permanent orders.

¶ 8 Psychological father filed a motion in the adoption court to intervene in the adoption action. He asserted that the domestic relations court had previously entered permanent orders naming him the child's psychological parent and allocating certain "parental rights." He further argued that, after the adoption court had entered the adoption decree, the domestic relations court had entered another order that, among other things, reaffirmed its jurisdiction over the parental responsibilities concerning the child.

¶ 9 Psychological father also filed a motion in the adoption court to set aside the adoption decree. He asserted that, as a psychological parent, his rights "are equivalent to the rights of a legal parent." He argued that he had "a protected liberty interest because he was granted parental rights" and was thus entitled to — but did not — receive notice of the stepparent adoption before the decree had been entered; therefore, his "parental rights" had been terminated without due process.

He further contended that he was entitled to relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)-(3), (5).

¶ 10 On March 5, 2021, the adoption court denied both of psychological father's motions. In denying the motion to set aside the adoption decree, the court ruled that psychological father was not entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding and lacked standing to challenge the adoption decree because he was not a "natural parent" as defined in section 19-1-103(105), C.R.S. 2021. In denying the motion to intervene, the court ruled that the stepparent adoption statute, § 19-5-203(1)(f), C.R.S. 2021, does not provide for intervention by anyone who is not a natural parent; therefore, psychological father did not have an unconditional right to intervene under C.R.C.P. 24. The court also found that, because an order regarding psychological father's parenting time had been entered in the domestic relations court, psychological father had "failed to demonstrate that the stepparent adoption may impair or impede his ability to protect his interest in visitation with the child."

¶ 11 Because the domestic relations court had asserted original and continuing jurisdiction with regard to psychological father's parenting time, however, the adoption court also vacated the supplemental order. The adoption court reiterated that the domestic relations court was the only court that had jurisdiction over psychological father's parenting time with the child and disputes regarding such time should be resolved there.

¶ 12 Psychological father then filed a motion in the adoption court for access to the adoption case file and register of actions. He argued that he needed the case file and register of actions to appeal the orders denying his motions to intervene and set aside the adoption decree.

¶ 13 On April 8, 2021, the adoption court denied psychological father's motion for access to the adoption court file and register of actions. In doing so, the court found that under section 19-5-305, C.R.S. 2021, psychological father does not fall within the class of people permitted to access confidential adoption records.

II. Adoptive Father's Contention

¶ 14 Adoptive father contends that the adoption court erred by vacating the supplemental order. Specifically, he argues that the court's decision was based on an erroneous conclusion that the domestic relations court has continuing jurisdiction to determine psychological father's parenting time. We disagree.

¶ 15 Juvenile courts (including the juvenile divisions of district courts outside of the City and County of Denver) have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning adoption. See § 19-1-104(1)(g), C.R.S. 2021; see also § 19-1-103(89) ; In re C.A.O. , 192 P.3d 508, 510 (Colo. App. 2008). District courts have jurisdiction over domestic relations matters, including APR. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9 ; § 14-10-123, C.R.S. 2021. The district court's jurisdiction in a case, even if continuing, does not preclude the juvenile court from taking jurisdiction in another case involving other issues related to the same child. § 19-1-104(5) ("Where a custody award or an order allocating parental responsibilities with respect to a child has been made in a district court in a dissolution of marriage action or another proceeding and the jurisdiction of the district court in the case is continuing, the juvenile court may take jurisdiction in a case involving the same child if the child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.").

¶ 16 In this case, the domestic relations court was the district court that had original jurisdiction over the APR concerning the child, having entered an APR in the dissolution of marriage action. The adoption court was the juvenile court (or, more accurately, the juvenile division of the Morgan County District Court) that then took jurisdiction over the adoption-related issues in the stepparent adoption action. Thus, both courts properly exercised jurisdiction over certain issues related to the child.

¶ 17 To be sure, nothing in section 19-1-104(5) permitted the adoption court to modify an existing APR to a nonparent. In contrast, that section explicitly contemplates the juvenile court making such modifications in dependency and neglect cases and in juvenile delinquency cases.³

¶ 18 True, as adoptive father points out, the effect of the adoption decree is that he "is entitled to all the rights and privileges and is subject to all the obligations of a child born to" him. § 19-5-211(1), C.R.S. 2021. Further, "[t]he parents [are] divested of all legal rights and obligations with respect to the child." § 19-5-211(2).⁴ But, contrary to adoptive father's contention, this language does not automatically vitiate the domestic relations court's order granting parenting time to psychological father.

¶ 19 Psychological father is not a "parent" for purposes of the adoption statute. The Children's Code defines parent as "either a natural parent of a child, as may be established pursuant to article 4 of this title 19, or a parent by adoption." § 19-1-103(105)(a). At oral argument, psychological father's counsel invoked the language from a different part of the same st...