In re R. W. Woolley
| Decision Date | 09 April 1875 |
| Citation | 74 Ky. 95 |
| Parties | In re R. W. Woolley. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
March 18th, 1874, this court affirmed the judgment of the Louisville Chancery Court in the case of Reamer and others v. Gray, &c.* At the request of R. W. Woolley, who was the attorney for Gray, the time was extended by the chief justice to the 4th day of June to enable him to prepare and file a petition for a rehearing of the appeal. On that day, on motion of Woolley, further time was given him to have the petition printed. At the same time he sued out a writ of certiorari to supply a diminution of the record. On the 27th of June the petition was presented and filed by Woolley in open court.
Having reason to suppose that the court regarded portions of the petition as insulting and scandalous, Woolley determined to present an amended or supplemental petition "denying that he intended to be disrespectful, and withdrawing all which the court deemed offensive."
This fact was communicated to the members of the court, and for that reason the petition was considered and acted upon, and no action taken with regard to the scandalous and offensive matter which it contained.
The motion for a rehearing was overruled on the 1st day of July, and immediately after the order overruling it was directed to be entered Woolley presented in the shape of a statement the supplemental petition or statement which it had previously been intimated to the members of the court he desired to file. Upon examination this paper was found to be altogether different in character from that which the court had reason to expect. It was regarded as an aggravation of the original offense, and on the 2d of July a rule was issued against Woolley requiring him to show cause why his authority to act as an attorney and officer of this court should not be revoked, and he otherwise punished for the contempts committed by the filing of the petition and statement.
On the 8th day of September, 1874, the time at which the rule was made returnable, Woolley filed his response. This was not deemed satisfactory, and an order was then made allowing the respondent to be heard orally upon these propositions:
First — As to whether he is guilty of the alleged contempts.
Second — As to the regularity of the proceedings against him.
Third — As to the power of this court in the premises.
At the instance of his counsel the matter was set for hearing on the 8th day of October last.
Appreciating the delicacy of the position in which it is placed, the court has given to this matter the most serious consideration. Its conclusions will now be announced.
Respondent insists that the rule is not sufficiently specific; that it does not specifically aver or state the language deemed disrespectful and insulting, and does not in terms set out the charges and imputations regarded as offensive.
These objections are attempted to be supported by cases in which the alleged contempts were brought to the notice of the court by information. In most of them the acts were done or the words spoken or written out of court. In all such cases the proceedings are in the nature of penal prosecutions, and of course it is proper and generally essential that the information shall state facts constituting a contempt.
But when the offense is committed in the presence of the court notice to the offender is not usually essential (7 Wallace, 372); and it is indifferent in such a case whether the offensive language be spoken openly or presented to the court in a written or printed argument. In Ex parte Secombe ( an attorney, for acts committed in the presence of the court, was disbarred without notice of the proceeding and without being heard in his defense, and yet the supreme court held that the order disbarring him was not void, as it necessarily would have been if notice had been essential under the circumstances to give the district court jurisdiction.
Woolley's offenses were committed in the presence of the court. The petition for a rehearing is not a pleading, but an argument addressed to the court and to the individual members of the court. His statement was in most respects personal to himself and was intended to be so considered. The petition was the counsel's argument in support of the motion for a rehearing, and the counsel, and not the client, is responsible to the court for the character of the argument and for the insinuations, imputations, and charges which the petition may contain. Written or printed arguments, whether in the shape of briefs or petitions for a rehearing, are filed in open court, are signed by counsel, and are addressed to the court just as oral arguments are addressed, and to incorporate into such arguments contemptuous, scandalous, or insulting matter is to commit in open court an act constituting a contempt.
By the rule recognized by the supreme court in Secombe's case respondent was not technically entitled to notice at all. But regarding that rule as of doubtful propriety, and not wishing to be instrumental in introducing it into the practice of the courts of this state, we caused him to be notified to appear, and offered him such opportunities to be heard as he and his counsel desired.
The object in citing him to appear was not to enter into an inquiry as to whether at some time or place out of court he had, by acts or words spoken, written, or printed, committed a contempt of the court, but to afford him an opportunity to purge the contempt committed in court by explanation, apology, or retraction, or, in case of his refusal or failure to do so, to allow him to show cause why punishment should not be inflicted.
As no inquiry as to the facts of the transaction or transactions was to be made, an information conforming to the rules of criminal pleading was altogether unnecessary.
The precedent of Lord Cottingham in the case of Lechmere Charlton (2 Milne & Craig, 317) was followed in this case. Charlton, who was a barrister, addressed to the master of the rolls a letter relating to a matter pending before him. He also wrote to the lord chancellor a letter touching the same subject.
The lord chancellor directed an order to be made requiring him to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt.
The order stated "that one of the masters of the court had received a letter directed to him and signed `E. L. Charlton,' containing matter scandalous with respect to the said master, and an attempt improperly to influence his conduct in the matter pending before him; and that his lordship had received a letter addressed to himself, dated Ferdale's Hotel, Palace Yard, 9th November, 1836, and signed `E. L. Charlton,' acknowledging that he, the said E. L. Charlton, was the writer of the said letter dated the 24th of October, 1836; and also the affidavit of Joseph Parkes, proving the said letters to be of the handwriting of Edmund Lechmere Charlton, being read, his lordship, upon taking said matter into consideration, and deeming the conduct of the said Edmund Lechmere Charlton therein a contempt of this court, doth think fit, and so orders, that the said Edmund Lechmere Charlton, having personal notice hereof, do show cause unto this court the 22d day of November, instant, why he should not be committed to the Fleet for his said contempt, and that he do then personally attend this court."
It will be observed that this order does not set out the language contained in the two letters; that it does not explain the character of the improper attempt to influence the master, nor in what the "scandalous matter" consisted; yet it was deemed sufficient by the lord chancellor to warrant him in committing Charlton, who was a member of parliament, to prison.
Afterward a committee of privilege, which was raised by the House of Commons upon Charlton's application, after a thorough investigation of the matter, reported that they were "of opinion that Mr. Charlton's claim to be discharged from imprisonment by reason of privilege of parliament ought not to be admitted."
The order of this court requiring the respondent to show cause is as specific as that in Charlton's case. It is in these words:
The papers containing the disrespectful and insulting language are named, and the attention of respondent called to the fact that the contempt consisted in the matter addressed through those channels to the court.
When he appeared he was heard, without restriction as to time, as to his guilt, as to the...
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