In re RC
| Decision Date | 26 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-01-4525.,1-01-4525. |
| Citation | 338 Ill. App.3d 103,272 Ill.Dec. 795,788 N.E.2d 99 |
| Parties | In the Matter of R.C., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Treatment (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. R.C., Respondent-Appellant). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William E. Coffin, Managing Attorney, Jeff M. Plesko, Director, Patricia Werner, Staff Attorney, and William Conroy, Managing Attorney, Legal Advocacy Service, Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, Chicago, for Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle and Peter Maltese, of counsel), for Appellee.
The State filed a petition seeking involuntary medication of Randall C. On a date set for trial, this troubled respondent asked for appointment of an independent expert. The trial court, deciding that the request was made for the purpose of delaying the trial, denied the request. The question we must answer is whether the trial court had discretion to deny the request for appointment. We conclude it did not.
Following a jury trial pursuant to a petition seeking involuntary medication of respondent, a patient at Chicago-Read Mental Health Center (Chicago-Read), the jury found respondent subject to involuntary medication with psychotropic drugs for a period not to exceed 90 days. Respondent contends: (1) the trial court's order for involuntary administration of medication must be reversed because he was denied his statutory right to the appointment of an independent expert, and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We reverse and remand.
On August 31, 2001, Dr. Usha Kartan, a psychiatrist employed at Chicago-Read, filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County asserting that respondent required psychotropic medication but refused to take the medication when offered by the hospital staff. In the petition, Dr. Kartan noted a court had ordered involuntary administration for respondent on June 2, 2001, for a period of 90 days. Respondent told staff members he was planning to stop the medication after the 90 days expired, because there was nothing wrong with him and he did not need it. According to Dr. Kartan, respondent, even on medication, was grandiose, flighty, isolative, and withdrawn. He exhibited poor hygiene, impaired judgment and extremely poor insight. Respondent had "clearly improved" while on court-ordered medication. Due to his thought disorder, respondent was unable to give informed consent and thought he did not need medication.
Prior to the hearing on the petition, on October 19, 2001, respondent appeared pro se before the trial court and requested that the court order an independent examination of respondent by a psychiatrist. The court denied the request.1
At the hearing on November 27, 2001, Dr. Kartan testified she had been treating respondent since September 5, 2000, when he was transferred to her unit at Chicago-Read. He had been hospitalized since September 1999 and "several times" prior to 1999. Dr. Kartan said she attempted to evaluate respondent every day Monday through Friday, whenever he cooperated with her. Respondent had no family contacts, and his father had lost contact with him since 1981. In Dr. Kartan's opinion, based on her evaluations, review of medical records, and discussions with other doctors, respondent suffered from a mental illness. The diagnosis was paranoid schizophrenia, continuous in nature, with a history of poly-substance abuse. Respondent first had been diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1972.
According to Dr. Kartan, respondent exhibited both positive symptoms, including delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized thinking, and negative symptoms interfering with his functioning.
Dr. Kartan saw a reduction in respondent's symptoms while he was on court-ordered medication, but an increase in severe symptomology when the involuntary medications expired.
Dr. Kartan said respondent's current hospitalization was his twenty-third Department of Mental Health (Department) hospitalization. She had seen significant improvement in respondent's illness while he was on medication, and she wanted to offer services to him with the goal of his discharge. Respondent became upset in the past when they discussed his discharge and said there was no place for him in the community. Respondent told Dr. Kartan the State had placed him in a rat-infested place to live. Dr. Kartan said she believed an appropriate place could be found for respondent if he was discharged. Respondent refused to discuss medications and side effects with her because he believed that he was not ill and that Dr. Kartan did not have a license to treat him. In Dr. Kartan's opinion, respondent did not have the capacity to make a decision about his medical treatment because of acute psychosis.
On cross-examination, Dr. Kartan testified respondent had never voluntarily agreed to take medication, other than the time medication was court-ordered. Since 1972, respondent had been in the care and custody of the Department of Mental Health, off and on. Since that time, he would "relapse" and be hospitalized on almost a yearly basis.
Respondent testified that he did not want to take medication against his will. He said he had been hospitalized at Chicago-Read for seven weeks, and the hospital wanted to involuntarily discharge him against his will. He said he was hospitalized in Elgin Mental Health Center for six months. During that time, he was not taking medication and refused medication. After he was transferred to Chicago-Read, respondent was offered medication once, and he said "no comment." On cross-examination, respondent testified he was hospitalized in Elgin because he was accused of sexually assaulting a young girl, but he was found not competent to stand trial.
After hearing arguments on both sides, the jury found respondent subject to involuntary treatment. The court entered an order providing that for a period not exceeding 90 days, Dr. Kartan was permitted to administer the following medications to respondent: Zyprexa, Depakote, Thorazine, Prolixin, Cogentin, Zoloft, Ativan, and Klonopin. The order also specified the range of doses for the medications. Respondent asked the trial court to stay the order. The court denied the request.
Although not discussed by the parties, we must address the issue of mootness. The trial court's order, the basis for respondent's appeal, expired on February 27, 2002, 90 days after it was entered. Even if moot, we may consider this case under the exception recognized in In re Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d 482, 234 Ill. Dec. 215, 702 N.E.2d 555 (1998), and In re Jennifer H., 333 Ill.App.3d 427, 266 Ill. Dec. 776, 775 N.E.2d 616 (2002). In re R.K., 338 Ill.App.3d 514, 520, 271 Ill.Dec. 954, 786 N.E.2d 212 (2003). Where a case involves "an event of short duration that is capable of repetition, yet evading review," it may qualify for review even if it otherwise would be moot. Jennifer H., 333 Ill.App.3d at 430, 266 Ill.Dec. 776, 775 N.E.2d 616. In such a case, the appellate order is in the nature of an advisory ruling. Jennifer H., 333 Ill.App.3d at 430, 266 Ill.Dec. 776, 775 N.E.2d 616; In re R.K., 338 Ill.App.3d at 520, 271 Ill.Dec. 954, 786 N.E.2d 212. Here, respondent's history of mental illness makes it likely that he will be subject to involuntary treatment again. Therefore, we have authority to consider the respondent's appeal under the mootness exception in Barbara H. and Jennifer H. In re R.K., 338 Ill.App.3d at 520, 271 Ill.Dec. 954, 786 N.E.2d 212
.
Section 3-804 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-804 (West 2000)) provides for an independent examination of a respondent in admission, transfer, and discharge proceedings. Section 3-804 states:
405 ILCS 5/3-804 (West 2000).
A respondent in a hearing for involuntary administration of medication may request that a court order an independent examination. Section 2-107.1 of the Code, which governs the administration of authorized involuntary treatment, incorporates section 3-804 with the following language:
405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(2),(3) (West 2000).
On October 19, 2001, respondent appeared pro se before the trial court and requested that the court...
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