In re Reese

• Decision Date: 15 January 1900
• Citation: 98 F. 984
• Parties: In re REESE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

98 F. 984

In re REESE.

United States Circuit Court, D. Kansas, First Division.

January 15, 1900

W. H Rossington, David Overmyer, and Oliver T. Boaz, for petitioner.

J. H Richards, William C. Perry, C. E. Benton, and Morris Cliggitt, for respondent.

THAYER Circuit Judge.

This is a proceeding by habeas corpus to secure the release of John P. Reese, who was committed for an alleged contempt in disobeying an order of injunction that was issued by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, Third division. By virtue of an oral agreement of counsel, the case has been submitted for decision upon a written stipulation as to one issue of fact; also upon the petition for the writ, the return thereto, and the annexed exhibits. By these pleadings and exhibits, the following facts are disclosed, which are undisputed:

On June 13, 1899, the Western Coal & Mining Company, a corporation of Missouri, filed a complaint in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, Third division which may be characterized, in general phrase, as a bill to enjoin the defendants therein named from resorting to threats, intimidation, or scurrilous epithets for the purpose of preventing miners who so desired from taking service with the coal company, and from resorting to the same means for the purpose of inducing persons already in the coal company's employ to abandon such service. Forty-six persons were made defendants to the bill by name, all of whom were alleged to be citizens and residents of the state of Kansas; and in addition thereto other persons, as it is claimed, were made parties defendant to the bill by the following words of general description in the caption of the complaint, to wit: 'And all members of the United Mine Workers' lodges or unions in Crawford and Cherokee counties, in the state of Kansas, and all members of District No. 14 of the United Mine Workers of America, and all other persons co-operating with them, being citizens of Kansas. ' The opening paragraph of the complaint alleged that the complainant brought its bill against the persons who were specifically named in the caption thereof, their names being again repeated as in the caption; that 'each and all of them are residents and citizens of the state of Kansas, and all members of the United Mine Workers' lodges or unions in Crawford and Cherokee counties, in the state of Kansas, each and all of whom are residents and citizens of the state of Kansas,' and that it brought its bill against 'all members of District No. 14 of the United Mine Workers of America, citizens of the state of Kansas, co-operating with them, whose names are not know to your orator'; and it prayed leave that it might be permitted 'to add thereto the names of such other persons, citizens of Kansas, as may become known, and charge them in apt words as in the premises.' The bill, after setting out in detail the wrongs complained of and threatened, prayed the aid of the court, as a court of equity, 'to the end that said defendants, and each of them, and all other persons co-operating with them, whose names are not known to your orators, and all members of the lodges or unions of the United Mine Workers of America in Crawford and Cherokee counties and state of Kansas, and all other persons conspiring and combining with them,' might be enjoined from committing the various wrongful acts charged in the bill. But it only asked for process of subpoena against those defendants whose names were set forth in the caption of the complaint, as above stated. On July 18, 1899, a temporary injunction was granted, which injunction, as issued and entered of record, was thus entitled, after setting out the name of the court in the usual manner: 'Western Coal & Mining Company, Complainant, vs. W. T. Wright, Robert Gilmore, Hugh Bone, et al., and All Members of the United Mine Workers' Lodges or Unions in Crawford and Cherokee Counties, in the State of Kansas, and All Members of District Number Fourteen of the United Mine Workers of America, and All Other Persons Co-operating with Them, Being Citizens of Kansas, Defendants.' In the body of the order which was made under the aforesaid caption, the prohibition of the court forbidding the doing of certain acts complained of in the bill was addressed to 'the defendants above named, and each of them, and all other persons who have or may combine, confederate, or conspire with said defendants, or either of them.' This order was never served on the petitioner, nor was any attempt made to do so, so far as the case discloses; but on October 20, 1899, the petitioner was cited into court to answer the charge of having disobeyed its provisions, and after due service of such citation, and a hearing before the court, was adjudged guilty of contempt for a violation of the injunction, and was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment for three months. The affidavit upon which the aforesaid citation was obtained stated, among other things, that Reese was a member of the national executive board and one of the organizers of the United Mine Workers of America, and that he was a citizen of the state of Iowa, but was in Crawford county, Kan., when the restraining order was issued, and had been in that state repeatedly since that date, and had aided and abetted striking miners in the unlawful acts complained of in the bill. By a stipulation of counsel made on the hearing of the case at bar, it was agreed, in substance, that the petitioner's attorney, in his argument during the hearing of the contempt proceeding, claimed that the order of injunction ran against citizens of the state of Kansas only, and that the petitioner, being a citizen of the state of Iowa, was not within the terms of the order, and that he could not violate it.

From the foregoing summary of the facts disclosed by the pleadings and exhibits, the conclusion is inevitable that the complainant company intended, when it filed its bill, to exclude as parties to the cause all persons except such as were citizens and residents of the state of Kansas, and that it did not make the petitioner a party defendant to the injunction suit, either by name or by words of general description, he being at the time a citizen and resident of the state of Iowa. In framing the complaint, and in framing the caption to the order of injunction, counsel industriously used language which excludes the idea that any one was intended to be made a party defendant who was not at the time a citizen and resident of Kansas, and they were doubtless influenced to such action by the thought that, if a nonresident of the latter state was named as a party defendant, it might impair the jurisdiction of the court over the other defendants, who were specifically named, within the rule announced in Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315, 10 Sup.Ct. 303, 33 L.Ed. 635, and Id. (C.C.) 38 F. 53, inasmuch as federal jurisdiction was invoked solely on the ground of diverse citizenship. Counsel for the respondent concede, apparently that the petitioner was not a party to the bill for an injunction; but they point to the general language heretofore quoted, which is found in the prayer for injunctive relief and in the body of the injunction, and insist, in substance, that to render the petitioner amenable to the restraining order, and punishable for its violation, it was not necessary that he should have been made a party to the suit in which it was granted, nor that it should appear that he was a citizen of the state of Kansas.

These propositions will be noticed briefly. It will be readily...