Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruef

• Decision Date: 08 November 1902
• Docket Number: 36.
• Parties: UNION PAC. R. CO. v. RUEF et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

120 F. 102

UNION PAC. R. CO. v. RUEF et al.

No. 36.

United States Circuit Court, D. Nebraska.

November 8, 1902

John N Baldwin and Edson Rich, for complainant.

C. J Smyth and E. P. Smith, for defendants.

Before MUNGER and McPHERSON, District Judges.

McPHERSON District Judge.

This is a bill in equity brought against the defendants asking that they be enjoined from in any manner interfering with complainant's property, its business, or with its employes. The complainant is a corporation of the state of Utah. The defendants are all citizens of the state of Nebraska, excepting three, one of whom is a citizen of Wyoming, one of Illinois, and one of the state of Ohio. But these three having entered a general appearance, the court must enter such decree as the pleadings and evidence require. The complainant is engaged in the operation of a railway extending from in Iowa, through Nebraska, with lines extending in or through five other states.

The material allegations of the bill are that at Omaha the complainant for many years has maintained shops for the repair of its engines, cars, and equipment. To keep said shops going, as well as the road, it is now, and for a long time has been, necessary to employ in said shops various classes of employes, such as boiler makers, blacksmiths machinists, car repairers, car wheelmen, painters, helpers, and others. In June, 1902, or about that date, a large number of the boiler makers, machinists, and blacksmiths, theretofore in the employ of the company at its various shops, went out on what is commonly called a 'strike.' Thereupon it became necessary to employ others to take the places of those on a 'strike' to do the work in the shops as aforesaid. That the defendants, comprising in part the parties formerly at work in the shops in Omaha, together with others, since going out on said strike, have carried on a system of attack on complainant, and upon the parties at work in the shops, which attacks have been so persistent that the company has been compelled to employ guards at its own expense, endeavoring to protect its property and its employes in the shops. It is also alleged that the defendants, with others, have conspired to intimidate and terrorize those now in the service in the shops, to prevent them from working, and thereby prevent the motive power from being kept in condition to perform sufficient service, and particularly prevent the engines from being repaired, so that the company cannot get its freight, passenger, and mail trains over the road as required for proper and efficient service. And, to intimidate and terrorize the employes, a picket line is established at and near the said shops. Those now in its employment are cursed and reviled, and all manner of indecent language is hurled at them. The wives and children of the present shopmen are subjected to indecent language, and are threatened with bodily harm to those still in the shops at work. The pickets will follow the workmen as they leave the shops, and assault and knock down those now at work. These and other indecencies and brutalities are charged against those now on the strike and confederates towards those who seek to work in the shops, but they need not now be stated more in detail. But it is alleged that many of the employes have been so terrorized that they have quit work, and that the company has not only been put to great, and otherwise unnecessary, expense on account thereof, but that complainant's trains carrying freight and passengers, and particularly trains carrying the United States mails and interstate business, have been impeded and delayed, and its business hampered, damaged, and its service materially interfered with; and it is alleged that these things are to continue, as threatened by defendants and their confederates.

A restraining order as prayed was issued. The case was set down for hearing at an early day, as to whether a temporary injunction should issue. It was then ordered that the evidence should be taken before examiners, the same to be taken in shorthand and then transcribed. All this has been done, and the case fully argued.

The impression seems to prevail among many men, otherwise informed, that the issuance of injunctions is confined to the federal courts, while the state courts do not recognize 'government by injunction' as it is termed. There is no other fallacy so generally entertained by a reading people, and occasionally by lawyers. But if all cases similar to this were presented with the high purpose that has been displayed by counsel on both sides in the case at bar we would have but little denunciation of the courts, and hear less about 'government by injunction.' Although counsel have so nearly agreed as to what the lau is, thereby making substantial controverted questions in the case at bar questions of fact, it is incumbent upon us to each state both the law and the facts of the case as we understand them.

And this duty is the more obligatory because counsel have agreed that this hearing shall result in a final decree. The right to the great writ of injunction is precisely the same in the federal court as in the state court. But this court, before it can exercise jurisdiction, must have a case between parties of diverse citizenship, or this court must have a case presenting a 'federal question.' A federal question is presented in this case, because of the allegations that it is the purpose of defendants to impair the powers of the complainant to serve the public in carrying interstate commerce and in carrying the United States mail. And in both instances the amount involved must be in excess of $2,000. But under the stipulations of the parties, and the undisputed evidence, this court takes jurisdiction on both grounds, and, the jurisdictional amount being involved, the question of how this case should be considered, and how decided, is precisely the same, whether in one court or another.

The following are some of the cases by the federal judges on the circuit in which the writ of injunction has been issued, some in cases of physical violence to employes, some in cases of injury to property, and others were cases of intimidation to and terrorizing of employes, but without actual physical violence, and some of the cases were those of habeas corpus, where the only question was as to the power to have issued the injunction. Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (C.C.) 54 F. 730, 19 L.R.A. 387, by Judge Taft; Coeur D'Alene Consol. & Min. Co. v. Miners' Union of Wardner (C.C.) 51 F. 260, 19 L.R.A. 382, by Judge Beatty; U.S. v. Elliott (C.C.) 64 F. 27, by Judge Phillips; Casey v. Typographical Union (C.C.) 45 F. 135, 12 L.R.A. 193, by Judge Sage; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Unions Nos. 1 and 3 (C.C.) 90 F. 608, by Judge Hammond; U.S. v. Sweeney (C.C.) 95 F. 434, by Judge Rogers; Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 218, of Cleveland, Ohio, of Iron Molders' Union of North America (C.C.) 110 F. 698, by Judge Wing; Blindell v. Hagan (C.C.) 54 F. 40, by Judge Billings; U.S. v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council (C.C.) 54 F. 994, 26 L.R.A. 158, by Judge Billings; Elder v. Whitesides (C.C.) 72 F. 724, by Judge Parlange; Wire Co. v. Murray (C.C.) 80 F. 811, by Judge Sage; Mackall v. Ratchford (C.C.) 82 F. 41, by Judge Goff; Southern R. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union No. 14 (C.C.) 111 F. 49, by Judge Hammond; U.S. v. Haggerty (C.C.) 116 F. 510, by Judge Jackson; Allis Chalmers Co. v. Reliable Lodge (C.C.) 111 F. 264, by Judge Kohlsaat; U.S. v. Weber (C.C.) 114 F. 950, by Judges Simonton and McDowell; U.S. v. Agler (C.C.) 62 F. 824, by Judge Baker; U.S. v. Kane (C.C.) 23 F. 748, by Judge Brewer; In re Reese (C.C.) 98 F. 984, by Judge Thayer; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (C.C.) 60 F. 803, by Judge Jenkins.

And the following are some of the decisions of the federal appellate courts on the different phases of injunctions against 'strikers' and 'boycotters': Hopkins v. Stave Co., 28 C.C.A. 99, 83 F. 912, Eighth circuit appeals, Judge Caldwell dissenting; Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C.C.A. 209, 63 F. 310, 25 L.R.A. 414, Seventh circuit appeals; Hagan v. Blindell, 6 C.C.A. 86, 56 F. 696, Fifth circuit appeals; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 Sup.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092; In re Reese, 47 C.C.A. 87, 107 F. 942.

And the following are some of the decisions of the state courts involving like questions, and questions akin to them, although some of them were not injunction cases: Com. v. Shelton, 11 Va.Law J. 324; In re Crump's Case, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620, 10 Am.St.Rep. 895; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 A. 890, 3 Am.St.Rep. 23; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307, 9 Am.St.Rep. 689; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077, 35 L.R.A. 722, 57 Am.St.Rep. 443; Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, 32 S.W. 1106; Beck v. Protective Union (Mich.) 77 N.W. 13, 42 L.R.A. 407, 74 Am.St.Rep. 421.

In the Michigan case just cited a long list of state cases are cited. It is not necessary to set them forth again in detail, as the opinion in that case gives them. See, also, Murdock v. Walker, 25 A. 492, 152 Pa. 595, 34 Am.St.Rep. 678; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 A. 559, 59 Am.Rep. 710; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 A. 814; Barr v. Trades Council, 30 A. 881, 53 N.J.Eq. 111.

The English decisions are all cited in the opinions in the foregoing cited cases, as are the text-books by Story, Eddy, Moses, Pomeroy, and others.

I have cited these authorities as being in part those which sustain the authority and the duty to issue writs of injunction against violence to persons, against violence to property against interference to business, against intimidation, and against the rights of contract and liberty. These authorities cannot be...