In re Rheinstein
| Decision Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | PM-149-22 |
| Citation | 173 N.Y.S.3d 693 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF Jason Edward RHEINSTEIN, an Attorney. (Attorney Registration No. 4331344) |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Monica A. Duffy, Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department, Albany (Michael K. Creaser of counsel), for Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department.
Jason Edward Rheinstein, Saverna Park, Maryland, respondent pro se.
Before: Garry, P.J., Lynch, Aarons, Ceresia and Fisher, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION
Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 2005, the same year he was admitted in Maryland, where he formerly practiced law. By January 2020 order, respondent was disbarred by the Court of Appeals of Maryland based upon sustained disciplinary charges that, among other things, he failed to provide competent representation to clients, advanced frivolous claims and contentions, acted unfairly to opposing parties and counsel, failed to respect the rights of third persons and committed professional misconduct by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, along with conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice ( Attorney Grievance Commn. v. Rheinstein, 466 Md. 648, 223 A.3d 505 [2020], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 370, 208 L.Ed.2d 94 [2020] ).1 Respondent subsequently failed to provide notice of his disbarment to this Court and the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (hereinafter AGC) within 30 days following the imposition of that discipline, as was required by Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters ( 22 NYCRR) § 1240.13(d).
AGC now moves to impose discipline upon respondent pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters ( 22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 and Rules of the Appellate Division, Third Department (22 NYCRR) § 806.13 based upon his established misconduct and disbarment in Maryland. Respondent opposes the motion, raising factors in mitigation, as well as invoking all three of the available defenses to AGC's motion (see Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [ 22 NYCRR] § 1240.13 [b]). Respondent has also filed seven cross motions, requesting, among other things, that this Court take judicial notice of various exhibits, which cross motions are largely opposed by AGC.2 The parties have also been heard at oral argument on their cross motions.
Upon consideration of the facts, circumstances and documentation before us, we conclude that respondent has not established any of the available defenses to the imposition of discipline in this state. Contrary to respondent's arguments, he has not demonstrated "that the procedure in [Maryland] was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process" (Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [ 22 NYCRR] § 1240.13 [b][1]). Our review of the parties’ submissions confirms that respondent was provided ample notice of the charges against him in Maryland and was properly found guilty of charges based upon allegations originally set forth in the February 2016 petition of charges. Specifically, the petition – which alleged, among other things, that respondent engaged in misconduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" (Maryland former Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4[c] ) – stated that respondent had misled the court during a December 2011 hearing by making unsubstantiated and prejudicial accusations against another party. Significantly, these same allegations were cited in the later decisions by the Maryland Hearing Judge and Maryland Court of Appeals in finding respondent guilty of the above disciplinary rule. Therefore, we are unpersuaded by respondent's contention that he was found guilty of misconduct for which he was not properly charged.
We further note that respondent was given numerous extensions and opportunities to comply with discovery demands that had been served upon him in April 2016. Rather than cooperating or seeking a protective order, however, respondent engaged in a relentless campaign to delay the disciplinary hearing and avoid providing discovery by means of, among other things, the filing of numerous unsuccessful motions and pursuing two futile removals of his disciplinary proceeding to federal court, both of which were then remanded as wholly lacking in merit. The June 2019 order sanctioning respondent for his longstanding noncompliance with discovery demands by, among other things, entering a default, striking respondent's answer, deeming the averments in the petition of charges to be admitted and precluding respondent from calling witnesses was entered after respondent was provided with due notice and an opportunity to be heard. Respondent was provided the opportunity to file numerous ultimately-unsuccessful motions and he also pursued appeals of the June 2019 sanction order as well as the June 2020 disbarment order.
Our review of the record further fails to support respondent's contention that there was an infirmity of proof in the Maryland proceedings due to, among other things, the fact that the sanctions order precluded him from introducing evidence in his defense (see Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [ 22 NYCRR] § 1240.13 [b][2]). As already noted, the June 2019 sanctions order which, among other things, struck respondent's answer has been deemed to be an appropriate exercise of discretion. Accordingly, respondent's resulting admission of all allegations in the petition of charges constituted legitimate evidence establishing the charged misconduct (see Matter of Marquis, 192 A.D.3d 83, 86, 138 N.Y.S.3d 42 [1st Dept. 2020] ), as thoroughly detailed in the factual findings of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which are not open to challenge in the context of the subject motion (see Matter of Ambe, 182 A.D.3d 695, 696, 121 N.Y.S.3d 423 [3d Dept. 2020] ). Thus, to the extent that respondent urges reliance on facts or extraneous matters of his choosing outside the record in the Maryland proceeding, we are unpersuaded (see Matter of Hallock, 37 N.Y.3d 436, 442, 159 N.Y.S.3d 385, 180 N.E.3d 549 [2021] ).
As for the remaining defense invoked by respondent, we disagree with his assertion that the misconduct for which he was disciplined in Maryland does not constitute misconduct in New York (see Rules for Attorney Discipline Matters [ 22 NYCRR] § 1240.13 [b][3]). To the contrary, the five disciplinary rules that the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that respondent violated are identical or substantially similar to Rules of Professional Conduct ( 22 NYCRR 1200.0 ) rules 1.1(a); 3.1(a); 3.4(c); 4.4 and 8.4(a), (c) and (d). Accordingly, we conclude that respondent's defenses to the motion are unpersuasive and, therefore, his misconduct is deemed established.
Turning our attention to the issue of the appropriate disciplinary sanction (see Matter of...
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