In re Rhinelander's Estate

• Decision Date: 04 March 1943
• Citation: 47 N.E.2d 681,290 N.Y. 31
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re RHINELANDER'S ESTATE.

290 N.Y. 31

47 N.E.2d 681

In re RHINELANDER'S ESTATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 4, 1943.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Proceedings in the matter of the account of Helen G. Rhinelander and another, as executors of Philip Rhinelander, deceased. From a decree of the Surrogate's Court, Howell, S., settling an intermediate account of the executors of Philip Rhinelander, deceased, construing a paragraph of the will and allowing a claim of Alice Jones against the estate, Adelaide R. Thomas and another, as special guardian, appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and from an order of the Appellate Division, 264 App.Div. 607, 36 N.Y.S.2d 105, which modified on the law and the facts, and affirmed as modified, the decree of the Surrogate's Court, Alice Jones appeals. The modification consisted of providing that the claim of Alice Jones be rejected as illegal and invalid and the Appellate Division directed that the matter be remitted to the Surrogate's Court for entry of decree accordingly.

Order Appellate Division insofar as it modified decree of Surrogate's Court reversed and decree of Surrogate's Court affirmed.

CONWAY, J., dissenting. Robert P. Smith and Ione P. Barrett, both of White Plains, and Randall I. Cohen, of New Rochelle, for appellant.

Frederick E. Weinberg, of New York City, for George Ungar, special guardian for Phyllis M. Rhinelander et al., infants, respondents.

Stephen J. McTague, of New York City, for Helen G. Rhinelander et al., as executors, respondents.

Hyman R. Friedman, of New York City, for Adelaide R. Thomas, respondent.

DESMOND, Judge.

On an executors' accounting in this estate, there came up for determination the claim of appellant Alice Jones, which claim had been allowed by the executors, but was objected to by certain legatees, who are respondents here. Alice Jones had been from 1924 to 1929 the wife of Leonard Rhinelander, son of the deceased. Leonard Rhinelander died in 1936. The claim here litigated bases itself on the terms of an agreement made in 1930 in Nevada between Alice Jones, Leonard Rhinelander and the testator. The agreement, among other things, required Leonard Rhinelander to pay his former wife, claimant-appellant Alice Jones, $3,600 a year, for her support, as long as she should live. Subjoined to that writing was a promise signed by Philip Rhinelander, father of Leonard, in these words: ‘I hereby guarantee each and every of the payments required to be made in the above agreement by the party of the first part (his son Leonard) to the party of the second part (claimant Alice Jones), and this obligation shall be binding upon my heirs, executors and administrators.’ The objections by the legatees to the allowance of the claim of Alice Jones were on two grounds: ‘First, that the terms of this guaranty agreement did not carry its obligation beyond the guarantor's death and, second, that the whole agreement was illegal because of its connection with a Nevada divorce proceeding. There was a trial of these objections before the Surrogate, and he dismissed the objections and allowed the claim, ruling against the objectants as to both the above-stated grounds. In the Appellate Division there was a unanimous modification and a direction for rejection of the claim ‘as illegal and invalid.’ The rationale of the Appellate Division's decision was stated thus in that court's opinion: ‘When the facts and circumstances are examined and the cloak of formal words and phrases is removed, it clearly appears that the agreement was a contrivance to make that appear to be legal which had an unlawful purpose, i. e., to develop an ineffective Nevada decree of divorce into one which bore the badge of general full faith and credit.’ 264 App.Div. 607, 609, 36 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108. We proceed to an examination of this question of illegality, taking into account the terms of the written agreements, the relationships of the parties and the improtant circumstances revealed by the testimony before the Surrogate.

The agreements so held by the Appellate Division to be tainted and corrupt were made in 1930, but an examination of their full history takes us six years farther back. Leonard Rhinelander, son of the testator, and Alice Jones were married in October, 1924. They separated after one month and never lived together again. Instead the husband, in November, 1924, sued for an annulment. His suit was defeated. In 1929 the wife sued her husband's father (testator here) for alienation of affections, accusing the father of wrongfully causing the estragement. Later in the same year the husband betook himself to Nevada where he brought a suit for divorce on the ground of curelty. Service of the process in that suit, on the wife who remained in New York, was by publication and mailing, only. The decree of divorce which the Nevada court thereupon awarded to the husband in December, 1929, contained no provision whatever for the wife's support and maintenance, nor had any such provision been made, by the husband elsewhere or in any manner, for such support. Two months later (February, 1930), the wife, to enforce her claim of a right to be maintained at the expense of her husband, and notwithstanding the outstanding Nevada decree dissolving the union, sued Leonard Rhinelander in New York for a separation. Soon afterwards and while these two New York suits were pending against the father and the son, respectively, conversations began between attorneys representing the three parties to those suits. These conversations produced, in time, the agreement which the Appellate Division has held to be illegal. We think it important here to emphasize these unquestioned facts: That when these 1930 negotiations began the parties had been separated for about six years, that Leonard Rhinelander was then living in Nevada and had been awardeda judgment of divorce by the courts of that state, that in the getting of that divorce there had been no concert or collusion between husband and wife, that the wife was not receiving any support from the husband, and that the wife was asserting claims against her husband (for alimony) and his father (for damages for alienation of affections) in the New York courts.

The agreements now before us were drawn in New York City by a lawyer who represented both the Messrs. Rhinelander. They were signed first by claimant, then by Mr. Rhinelander, Sr., both these signings taking place in New York City; Leonard Rhinelander then signed the papers in Nevada. Delivery of the agreements, however, was not made until after claimant, through her attorney, had made a formal appearance and intervention in the Nevada suit in which Leonard Rhinelander had obtained his divorce decree, and after claimant had petitioned for, and been awarded, a modification of that decree incorporating therein in provisions of the agreements, already signed but not delivered, for her future support and maintenance.

The provisions of the agreements may be summarized thus: First it is recited that the parties have separated, that they desire to settle forever their property rights and that claimant wishes to apply to the Nevada courts to reopen the divorce decree either in order to have it modified to include a support provision, or in order to put in a defense in the action. Then we find a provision for the payment to her by her former husband of a sum for counsel fees, and $3,600 ($3,800 under certain circumstances) a year for life for her support, these payments to be made on and after she should do any one of these three things: Reopen the divorce decree and successfully defend the suit, or reopen the decree and obtain a modification thereof by way of a provision for her support, or petition for, but be refused by the court, a reopening of the decree. Claimant on her part covenanted to discontinue the two actions pending in New York against the Messrs. Rhinelander, to deliver to Mr. Rhinelander, Sr., a release of any liability for the alleged alienation of affections and a release of her rights to share in the son's estate, and to waive and release any right to use the name of Rhinelander. The agreement by the elder Rhinelander to guarantee all the payments prmised by his son has already been described herein. After the Nevada court had reopened its decree on claimant's motion and had modified it by including as a term thereof the above summarized agreements for claimant's support, the agreements executed by the father and son were delivered to her. She thereafter regularly (before and after the death of Mr. Rhinelander, Jr. in 1936) received from Mr. Rhinelander, Sr., the moneys due her under the agreements until, after the death of the elder Rhinelander in 1940, the payments stopped. In its opinion the Appellate Division quotes undisputed testimony which is to the effect that, regardless of the words of the agreement, the real intent of the parties was that the agreements would not have been delivered had not the Nevada decree been reopened on claimant's appearance and petition, and the agreement for support written into that decree. We accept that statement in the Appellate Division's opinion as being in the nature of a...