In re Roberts

• Decision Date: 21 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. S112505.,S112505.
• Citation: 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 458,36 Cal.4th 575,115 P.3d 1121
• Parties: In re Orlando ROBERTS, on Habeas Corpus.
• Court: California Supreme Court

31 Cal.Rptr.3d 458

36 Cal.4th 575

115 P.3d 1121

In re Orlando ROBERTS, on Habeas Corpus.

No. S112505.

Supreme Court of California.

July 21, 2005.

Donald Specter, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Quentin, for Petitioner Orlando Roberts.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Frances T. Grunder, Assistant Attorney General, and Julie L. Garland, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent the People.

Frederick R. Bennett, Los Angeles, and Christine Zarifian, for Los Angeles Superior Court as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent the People.

Rita Coyne Federman, Charles A. Piccuta, San Luis Obispo; Dawn N. Pilimanu; Kathryn Houck, Fresno; and William S. Bateman, for San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Monterey County Superior Court, Kings County Superior Court and Solano County Superior Court as Amici Curiae.

GEORGE, C.J.

In Los Angeles County, nearly 30 years ago, petitioner Orlando Roberts was convicted of first degree murder and other offenses and was sentenced, under the sentencing scheme then in effect, to an indeterminate term of life in prison. As is typical of the majority of persons convicted in that county and other counties containing major metropolitan areas, since his commitment to state prison petitioner has been incarcerated at several locations in less populous counties within the state.

Petitioner has been the subject of periodic evaluations by the Board of Prison Terms (Board) to determine his suitability to be placed on parole, and repeatedly has been found unsuitable for parole. As a consequence, petitioner has filed numerous petitions seeking a writ of habeas corpus to overturn the Board's findings of parole unsuitability and to obtain a parole date. Generally, petitioner has filed his habeas corpus petitions in a court within the county in which he then was incarcerated. Recently, the courts that have received his petitions have directed that petitioner file them in a court within another county.

We granted review to resolve an issue involving the procedural framework within which the courts consider habeas corpus petitions that challenge the Board's finding of parole unsuitability or denial of a parole date. Under the procedure generally applicable to habeas corpus petitions, the court in which such a petition initially is filed — within certain guidelines and with respect to various types of claims — has discretion to adjudicate the case or, in the event the court determines that resolution is more appropriate in another venue, to transfer the case for resolution to a court in another county. Of course, the court in the second county has similar discretion to transfer the petition.

As might be anticipated, when a habeas corpus petition raises a claim, such as a challenge to the denial of parole, that has not been addressed in our prior decisions directing resolution of particular types of claims by a court in a county having a particular connection with the petitioner, the courts of the various counties and appellate districts have not always agreed which is the most appropriate court to adjudicate the claim. In that situation, the court that initially receives the petition frequently has ordered that it be refiled by the petitioner or directly transferred for resolution in another court. In some instances, repeated transfers have been made, with consequential delay in the adjudication of petitions and discordant relations between the courts in the affected counties.

Therefore, we decide in the present case whether a habeas corpus petition challenging the Board's finding that petitioner was unsuitable for parole should be filed in and adjudicated by a court within the county where petitioner was convicted and sentenced or instead in a court within the county where he currently is incarcerated. As we shall explain, we conclude that such a petition for writ of habeas corpus must be filed in, and addressed by, the superior court in the county where petitioner was convicted and sentenced. Although the conclusion we reach on this procedural point is contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeal, it is unnecessary to reverse the judgment of that court, because we do not disturb that court's determination that the petition should properly be denied on the merits.

I

In 1976, petitioner Orlando Roberts and an accomplice committed a home invasion robbery in which they shot two elderly victims, one fatally. In Los Angeles County Superior Court, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187), attempted murder (Pen.Code, §§ 664, 187), and robbery (Pen.Code, § 211), finding true the enhancement allegations that during the commission of the offenses a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)), that petitioner personally used a firearm (Pen.Code, § 12022.5), and that he committed great bodily injury (Pen.Code, § 12022.7).¹

In February 1977, petitioner was sentenced in the Los Angeles County Superior Court under the indeterminate sentencing law then in effect to life in prison with the possibility of parole, with a minimum period of seven years' incarceration. (Former §§ 190, 1168, 3046, repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p. 5140; see fn. 6, post.) In 1978, the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal in Los Angeles affirmed the judgment against petitioner, and this court denied his petition for review.

Since that time, on at least eight occasions at regularly scheduled parole consideration hearings, petitioner has sought a parole date from the Board. On each occasion the Board has denied his application, finding petitioner unsuitable for parole primarily because of the nature of the offenses, petitioner's refusal to accept responsibility and insistence that he falsely was implicated in the crimes by his accomplice, and his prior conviction of manslaughter while a juvenile.²

In May 1999, petitioner filed in San Diego County Superior Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws and cruel and unusual punishment entitled him to have his prison term fixed as provided in the indeterminate sentencing scheme in effect at the time of his offenses. The superior court stayed proceedings on the petition while similar litigation was pending before that court in other cases. In April 2002, the court lifted the stay and, in a lengthy order, denied on the merits petitioner's request for relief on habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a "motion for rehearing." The court deemed the motion to be a motion for reconsideration, denied it, and in reliance upon In re Sena (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 836, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 22 (Sena) also directed petitioner to file any additional habeas corpus petitions challenging a determination of his unsuitability for parole in the county in which he had been convicted and sentenced —that is, either in the Los Angeles County Superior Court or the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal.

Meanwhile, petitioner had been transferred to Chuckwalla Valley State Prison in Riverside County. In March 2002, the Board conducted a hearing and again found petitioner unsuitable for parole.

In October 2002, petitioner, as directed by the San Diego County Superior Court, filed in Los Angeles — this time in the Second Appellate District of the Court of Appeal — an original habeas corpus petition alleging that he was entitled to have a primary term fixed under the indeterminate sentencing law. The appellate court decided the petition on the merits "to spare petitioner from being bounced back and forth" between the two appellate districts and denied relief on the ground that a primary term could not be fixed prior to a determination that petitioner was suitable for parole. Expressly disagreeing with Sena, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 836, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 22, the Court of Appeal also advised that the proper venue for a habeas corpus petition challenging a determination of unsuitability for parole lies in the county and corresponding appellate district in which an inmate was incarcerated at the time of the denial of parole.

Petitioner subsequently filed in this court a petition denominated a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the determinations of the Court of Appeal that he was ineligible to have a primary term fixed prior to a finding of suitability for parole and that he was required to file any petition based upon the denial of parole suitability in the venue in which he was incarcerated. We ordered that petitioner's petition be refiled nunc pro tunc as a petition for review, and thus deemed it timely. We granted review and limited the issue to be briefed and argued to the determination as to which court is the proper venue to adjudicate a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of parole.

II

A

To provide context for our discussion, we briefly trace the history of the procedural rules governing the choice of an appropriate venue to entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Prior to its revision in 1966, the California Constitution conferred original habeas corpus jurisdiction upon the superior court of the county in which a criminal defendant was incarcerated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, former § 5; Griggs v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 341, 344, 128 Cal.Rptr. 223, 546 P.2d 727 (Griggs).) Following that revision, the California Constitution extended jurisdiction over original habeas corpus matters to all superior courts in this state. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.) As a result, "there is now no territorial limitation on the power of a superior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus relief." (Griggs, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 346, 128 Cal.Rptr. 223, 546 P.2d 727, fn. omitted.) Moreover, because article VI, section 10 "grants identical original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to both the Court of Appeal and the superior court, it follows that the 1966...