In re Robinson's Estate

• Decision Date: 10 May 1940
• Docket Number: 30795.
• Parties: IN RE ROBINSON'S ESTATE. v. SCOTTS BLUFF COUNTY. YALE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONN.,
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

292 N.W. 48

138 Neb. 101

IN RE ROBINSON'S ESTATE.

YALE UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAVEN, CONN., v. SCOTTS BLUFF COUNTY.

No. 30795.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

May 10, 1940

Syllabus by the Court.

1. " Where there are different statutes in pari materia though made at different times, or even expired or repealed and not referring to each other, and though using different language, they shall be taken and interpreted together as one system and as explanatory of each other. Whatever has been determined in the interpretation of one of several statutes in pari materia is a sound rule of interpretation for the others." Beal, Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation (2d Ed.) 351.

2. The legislature must be presumed to have had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject, so that in the construction of a statute the court must consider the pre-existing law and any other acts relating to the same subject, as well as the general policy which such enactments evidence and disclose.

3. It is a well-accepted rule of construction that a legislative act granting powers, privileges or immunities to corporations must be held to apply only to corporations created under the authority of that state over which such state has the power of visitation and control, unless a contrary intent is plainly expressed in the terms of such legislation.

4. " Statutes exempting certain legacies from an inheritance tax should be strictly construed. To be exempt from an inheritance tax, a legacy must come within the strict letter of the statutory exemption." In re Estate of Rudge, 114 Neb. 335, 207 N.W. 520.

Appeal from District Court, Scotts Bluff County; Perry, Judge.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Edward S. Robinson, deceased wherein Yale University filed claim for exemption from payment of inheritance taxes on its interests in certain lands devised to it by the terms of the last will of Edward S. Robinson, deceased. The county court denied the claim for exemption and Yale University appealed to the district court for Scotts Bluff county. The district court of Scotts Bluff county affirmed the levy of inheritance tax, and denied the claim for exemption, and Yale University appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

CARTER, J., dissenting in part.

Wm. Morrow and Russell E. Lovell, both of Scottsbluff, for appellant.

Frank Glebe, of Scottsbluff, and Willard F. McGriff, of Gering, for appellee.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and ROSE, EBERLY, PAINE, CARTER, MESSMORE, and JOHNSEN, JJ.

EBERLY Justice.

In this case, Yale University, a Connecticut corporation, appeals from the decision of the district court for Scotts Bluff county, which denied the appellant's claim for exemption from the payment of inheritance taxes on its interests in certain Nebraska lands devised to it by the terms of the last will of Edward S. Robinson, deceased. These lands, by the terms of the will of the deceased, upon the termination of the life estate created thereby, were given, devised, and bequeathed " to Yale University, of New Haven, Connecticut, to be its absolutely." The intestate died on February 27, 1937, and his will was duly admitted to probate on July 17, 1937. Upon the probate of the will an appraiser for inheritance tax purposes was appointed by the county judge of Scotts Bluff county, who determined that the share of the devised lands taxable to Yale University was $73,786, and that the inheritance tax, if levied, would amount to $7,154.32 with interest at 7 per cent. per annum from February 27, 1937. On February 6, 1939, the county court denied appellant's claim for exemption as an educational institution under section 77-2201, Comp.St. 1929, as revised in 1931 (Laws 1931, ch. 132) and on that basis levied the inheritance tax complained of. On appeal to the district court, that court affirmed the levy of the inheritance tax as against Yale University, and denied its claim of exemption as an educational institution under such section 77-2201, Comp.St.1929, as amended.

Appellant's appeal to this court challenges the correctness of the order thus made on the sole ground that it is a corporation organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes without pecuniary gain, and thus is within the protection of the proviso which was added as an amendment to section 77-2201, Comp.St. 1929, by chapter 132 of the session laws of 1931. This proviso is in the following terms, viz.: " Provided further, that all bequests, legacies, devises, or gifts, to or for the use of any corporation, organization, association or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes, no part of which is owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the owner or user or inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual, or to a trustee or trustees exclusively for such religious, charitable or educational purposes, shall not be subject to any duty or tax, and no such duty or tax shall be assessed or collected after the taking effect of this act irrespective of the time of the death of the decedent or the fact of the pendency of his or her estate."

Appellant insists on the general rule repeatedly announced by this court, that, where the words of a statute are plain, direct and unambiguous, no interpretation is needed to ascertain their meaning; a mere reading will suffice. Stoppert v. Nierle, 45 Neb. 105, 63 N.W. 382; State v. Heupel, 114 Neb. 797, 210 N.W. 275, 48 A.L.R. 728; State v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 71 Neb. 320, 99 N.W. 36, 100 N.W. 405, 102 N.W. 1022, 106 N.W. 767; In re Estate of Bayer, 116 Neb. 670, 218 N.W. 746.And further insists that it is the duty of the court to discover, if possible, the legislative intent from the language of the act (State v. City of Lincoln, 101 Neb. 57, 162 N.W. 138); and that the statute under consideration is so clear and unambiguous on its face as to preclude any construction whatever by the trial court. Shamp v. Landy Clark Co., 134 Neb. 73, 277 N.W. 802; State v. First State Bank of Alliance, 122 Neb. 502, 240 N.W. 747, 79 A.L.R. 576.As applied to the instant case, appellant's contention obviously ignores the situation where two or more statutes are each clear and unambiguous, and each includes in whole or in part the subject-matter involved, but their terms are mutually inconsistent or conflicting. Likewise, no account is taken of the inherent limitation to which legislative power is properly subjected.

As to the first situation suggested, the rule has been authoritatively expressed in the following language, viz.: " Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired or repealed, and not referring to each other, and though using different language, they shall be taken and interpreted together as one system and as explanatory of each other. Whatever has been determined in the interpretation of one of several statutes in pari materia is a sound rule of interpretation for the others." Beal, Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation (2d Ed.) 351. See, also, Campbell v. Youngson, 80 Neb. 322, 114 N.W. 415; Updike v. City of Omaha, 87 Neb. 228, 127 N.W. 229, 30 L.R.A.N.S., 589.

The legislature must be presumed to have had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject, so that in the construction of a statute the court must consider the pre-existing law and any other acts relating to the same subject, and especially passed at the same session of the legislature. Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93, 175 N.W. 531, 7 A.L.R. 1688.

There is, however, another principle by which general words of a statute are limited in order that the law may conform to legislative intent. Judge Sutherland thus expresses this view: " An act of parliament provided that the premiums paid on life insurance in certain companies might be deducted from the assessment for the income tax. A later statute extended this privilege to any person insured ‘ in or with any insurance company existing on the first day of November, 1844, ' or in or with any insurance company registered pursuant to a certain act. It was held that the words in italics did not include a foreign insurance company in existence on the date specified. Lord Esher, M. R., in course of his opinion, said: ‘ Now, supposing the words " any insurance company" stood alone, and there were nothing else in the section to modify the view which one would take of their meaning, would it or would it not be right to say that those words in an English act of parliament would include all foreign insurance companies, wheresoever they might be? What is the rule of construction which ought to be applied to such an enactment, standing alone? It seems to me that, unless parliament expressly declares otherwise, in which case, even if it should go beyond its rights as regards the comity of nations, the courts of this country must obey the enactment, the proper construction to be put upon general words used in an English act of parliament is, that parliament was dealing only with such persons or things as are within the general words and also within its proper jurisdiction, and that we ought to assume that parliament (unless it expressly declares otherwise), when it uses general words, is only dealing with persons or things over which it has properly jurisdiction. It has been argued that that is so only when parliament is regulating the person or thing which is mentioned in the general words. But it seems to me that our parliament ought not to deal in any way, either by regulation or otherwise, directly or indirectly, with any foreign person or thing, which is outside its jurisdiction, and, unless it does so in express terms so clear that their meaning is beyond doubt, the courts...