In re Rowley's Estate

• Decision Date: 07 August 1934
• Docket Number: 25142.
• Citation: 178 Wash. 460,35 P.2d 34
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In re ROWLEY'S ESTATE. v. TALBOTT. FARMERS' STATE BANK OF UNIONTOWN

35 P.2d 34

178 Wash. 460

In re ROWLEY'S ESTATE.

FARMERS' STATE BANK OF UNIONTOWN v. TALBOTT.

No. 25142.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 7, 1934

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Whitman County; R. L. McCroskey, Judge.

In the matter of the estate of Isabella Rowley, deceased. From an order overruling a motion to set aside and vacate a decree admitting a will to probate and appointing Walter S. Talbott as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Isabella Rowley, deceased, the Farmers' State Bank of Uniontown appeals.

Affirmed.

Stotler & Voorhees, of Colfax, for appellant.

Hanna Wilkinson & Evans, of Colfax, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling a motion to set aside and vacate a decree admitting a will to probate and appointing an administrator with the will annexed.

The matter comes Before us on a bill of exceptions, which presents the following state of facts: In July, 1932 Isabella Rowley, a resident of the state of Iowa, commenced an action, cause No. 18321, in the superior court for Whitman county against Farmers' State Bank of Uniontown. The action was for money due under an implied contract arising out of the conversion of certain collateral securities deposited by Mrs. Rowley with the bank. After the action had been commenced, Mrs. Rowley died, testate, in, and a resident of, Keokuk county, Iowa. Her will, however, did not name an executor. It later appeared that Mrs. Rowley left no property in the county of her residence, and her will has never been probated in that county, or elsewhere in Iowa, so far as the record here discloses. It also appears that Mrs. Rowley left no property in the state of Washington other than the claim asserted by her in her action against the bank.

Upon application to the probate department of the superior court for Whitman county, Mrs. Rowley's will was admitted to probate therein and Walter S. Talbott, a resident of that county, was appointed administrator with the will annexed. The administrator duly qualified and thereafter an order was entered in the pending action, No. 18321, substituting him as plaintiff therein. The bank then appeared specially in the probate proceeding and moved to quash and vacate the decree admitting the will to probate and appointing the administrator. The motion being overruled, the bank took an appeal.

The question presented to this court is whether the cause of action pending in Whitman county at the time of the nonresident plaintiff's death in another state constituted property in this state sufficient to give the local court jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of the decedent's estate. The appellant bank insists that the court was without jurisdiction to make the appointment, and rests its contention upon Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1376, which reads:

'Wills shall be proved and letters testamentary or of administration shall be granted:

'(1) In the county of which deceased was a resident or had his place of abode at the time of his death.

'(2) In the county in which he may have died, or in which any part of his estate may be, he not being a resident of the state.

'(3) In the county in which any part of his estate may be, he having died out of the state, and not having been a resident thereof at the time of his death.'

In answer to appellant's contention the respondent administrator asserts that his rights fall squarely within subdivision (3) of the above statute.

The question Before us narrows itself to a single proposition; that is, whether the situs of the property represented by the cause of action in process of litigation must, for present purposes, be considered to be located at the domicile of the decedent or whether it is to be considered to be located at the domicile or residence of the debtor.

Generally speaking, the situs of personal property follows the domicile or person of the owner, and, undoubtedly, the law of the domicile governs the distribution of the estate of a decedent. Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash. 334, 86 P. 560, 10 Ann. Cas. 20; In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615; 11 R. C. L. p. 445, § 548. But that principle does not always apply in determining the location of assets for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the court for their administration. It is well settled that, for the purpose of establishing a basis for administration, simple contract debts are considered as having their situs at the domicile of the debtor. 11 R. C. L. p. 71, § 67.

In Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U.S. 654, 3 S.Ct. 417, 418, 27 L.Ed. 1068, it was said: 'The general rule of law is well settled that for the purpose of founding administration, all simple contract debts are assets at the domicile of the debtor; and that the locality of such a debt for this purpose is not affected by a bill of exchange or promissory note having been given for it, because the bill or note does not alter the nature of the debt, but is merely evidence of it, and therefore the debt is assets where the debtor lives, without regard to the place where the instrument is found or payable.' This statement of the rule has been incorporated into the opinions in many subsequent cases.

In 3 Schouler on Executors and Administrators (6th Ed.) p. 1725, § 1468, is stated the rule and the reasons therefor, in these words: 'Last domicil affords the suitable principal forum for procuring credentials of authority and settling the estate of a deceased person. But inasmuch as the collection of credits and effects, the payment of debts, the distribution of the residue, and the final settlement of the estate, are of universal convenience, the courts of one country or State do not feel compelled to wait until those of another have acted, nor to submit domestic claims to foreign jurisdictions; but, aside from the deceased person's last domicil, and a principal probate appointment, any competent local and ancillary appointment is procurable, on the suggestion that property requiring administration lies within the local jurisdiction. In other words, locality of personalty belonging to the estate of a deceased person (to say nothing of local real property) may confer a local probate jurisdiction regardless of the consideration of his last domicil. This general doctrine is amply recognized in the statutes of England and the several United States which relate to probate jurisdiction. Inasmuch as public law treats the gathering in of a dead person's property as a matter of mutual convenience to creditors kindred, and the State or sovereign, statutes now in force in most civilized States or countries provide expressly for administration upon the estates of persons who die resident abroad, leaving property to be administered within the domestic jurisdiction. In such a case, the grant having no...