In re Ryan's Estate

• Decision Date: 06 May 1913
• Citation: 156 S.W. 759,174 Mo. App. 202
• Parties: In re RYAN'S ESTATE.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

156 S.W. 759

174 Mo. App. 202

In re RYAN'S ESTATE.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 6, 1913.

1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 180) — ALLOWANCES TO SURVIVING CHILDREN — MINOR CHILD OF DIVORCED WIFE — "WIDOW."

Rev. St. 1909, by section 114 provides for certain allowances to a widow in addition to dower for the subsistence of herself and her family, by section 115 that if such provision shall not be on hand the court shall make a reasonable allowance to her to supply such deficiency, by section 116 that she may take personal property not exceeding $400, by section 119 that, in case of the death of a father leaving no widow but minor children under 16, such children shall be entitled to the allowances that the wife would have had if she had survived her husband, and that in case a widow should die leaving minor children they should be entitled to the same allowances as the mother was entitled to take at the death of her husband. Section 120 gives the widower the same rights in his deceased wife's estate that she took in his estate under sections 114, 115, and 116, and section 8057 provides that nontechnical words shall be taken from their ordinary sense, unless such sense is repugnant to the legislative intent, or to the context. A minor son surviving decedent, a divorced woman whose husband was living, applied for allowances under section 119. Held, that the word "widow" signified a woman who has lost her husband by death and has not married again, and that, in view of the context, the correlative rights of widows and widowers in the estates of a deceased husband or wife, and the policy of subsequent legislation, while deceased was not a "widow," the meaning of the word could be enlarged to meet the legislative intent, and that the minor child was entitled to such allowances as if deceased had been a widow.

2. STATUTES (§ 208) — CONSTRUCTION — MEANING OF LANGUAGE — PARTICULAR WORDS.

It is the duty of the courts in construing statutes to interpret particular words by reference to the context so as to effect the legislative intent as shown by the entire enactment, if such may be fairly ascertained, rather than to declare the precise meaning of the words standing alone.

3. STATUTES (§ 225) — CONSTRUCTION — STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA.

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together.

4. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 180) — ALLOWANCES TO MINOR CHILDREN — CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.

Rev. St. 1909, § 119, providing that when a widow shall die leaving minor children they shall be entitled to the same allowances she was entitled to take at the death of her husband, is an exemption statute, and therefore designed to afford a sure support for such minors, and in determining such right the legislative knowledge that a divorced wife who remains unmarried until death may hold that relation with respect to minor children may be considered.

5. PARENT AND CHILD (§ 3) — SUPPORT OF CHILD — LIABILITY OF PARENT.

A minor child surviving his divorced mother is entitled to support from his surviving father, and the minor child of a deceased father is entitled to the support of his mother though she be divorced from her husband, unless such child is possessed of independent means in its own right.

6. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 178) — ALLOWANCES TO SURVIVING MINOR CHILDREN — STATUTES.

Under Rev. St. 1909, § 119, providing that when a widow dies leaving minor children they shall be entitled to the same allowances as she was entitled to take at the death of her husband, such children are entitled to those rights in the estate of the deceased mother without regard to her interest in the estate of her deceased husband.

7. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 174) — CONSTRUCTION — REMEDIAL STATUTES.

Statutes entitling minor children to certain allowances out of the estates of their deceased father or mother, though not in entire consonance with the common law, are highly remedial in character and are to be construed so as to carry out the spirit and purpose intended by the Legislature; but it is the duty of the court as the case may require to enlarge or restrain the meaning of words employed to the end of effectuating the legislative intent.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Hugo Grimm, Judge.

In the matter of Johanna Ryan, deceased. From the denial of allowances to Philip Ryan, a minor child of deceased, the minor by his guardian and curator appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Thomas D. Cannon, of St. Louis, for appellant. George W. Lubke, Jr., and George W. Lubke, Sr., both of St. Louis, for respondent.

NORTONI, J.

This proceeding originated in the probate court and subsequently found its way by appeal to the circuit court. It involves the question of the right of a minor under 16 years of age to allowances of absolute property out of the estate of its deceased mother who at the time of her death was not a widow but rather a divorced woman. The circuit court denied the right to the allowances for the reason the mother of the minor child was not a widow at the time of her death, and the guardian and curator representing the minor prosecutes the appeal here.

It appears Johanna Ryan died in the city of St. Louis on the 17th day of September, 1910, leaving a minor son, Philip Ryan, aged seven years, as her only surviving child. Mrs. Ryan left a small estate consisting of personal property which is in the hands of her administrator, appointed by the probate court of the city of St. Louis. Though Mrs. Ryan was unmarried at the time of her death, she was not a widow in the usual sense of that term for the reason she had been divorced a few years before by virtue of a decree of the circuit court, and the care and custody of the minor child, Philip Ryan, was awarded to her. It appears, too, that her prior husband, William F. Ryan, father of the child Philip, who was born in lawful wedlock, survived her and is still living. The guardian and curator of the little child, Philip, presented an application to the probate court in proper form for the allowances out of his mother's estate which the statute awards to a widow out of the estate of her deceased husband. But it is said the probate court denied the application, and on appeal it appears the circuit court did so as well for the reason Johanna Ryan, the mother of Philip, was not a widow at the time of her death. The statute conferring the right to allowances as absolute property on minor children under 16 years of age in the mother's estate purports to do so "in case a widow shall die" leaving such minor children. See section 119, R. S. 1909. In denying the right to the allowances prayed for, the court proceeded on the theory that the word "widow" refers alone to a woman who has lost her husband by death and has not married again, and that therefore, though the little child was under 16 years of age when his mother died, no right accrued to him under the statute because she was a divorcee and not a widow. There can be no doubt that the word "widow" signifies "a woman who has lost her husband by death and is not married again." It is so defined in Webster's New International Dictionary. Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines a widow as "an unmarried woman whose husband is dead." Black's Law Dictionary and also Anderson's Law Dictionary define the word "widow" as "a woman whose husband is dead and who is not married again." The word "widow" is defined by a standard authority in the law as: "A wife that outlives her husband; one whose husband is dead and who remains unmarried." See 40 Cyc. 934. All of these authorities concur to the effect that the word "widow" implies that a subsisting married relation should be severed by the prior death of the husband and not by a divorce decree. Therefore, though it appears, as it does, that Johanna Ryan had not remarried after the divorce and though she continued to be a single woman at the time of her death, she was not a widow.

But be this as it may, it is the duty of the court, in construing statutes, to interpret particular words by reference to the context so as to effectuate the intention of the lawmakers as reflected by the entire enactment, if such may be fairly ascertained, rather than to declare the precise meaning of the word standing alone. In this view, we believe the word "widow," employed in the second clause of the statute here involved, was intended to impart a broader meaning than that above defined. But it is urged the statute (section 8057) commands that in the construction of all statutes words other than those of technical import should be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense, and therefore we must regard the word "widow" as intending no more than that which the dictionaries define it to mean. It is true the section of the statute referred to so reads, but its command is conditioned as follows in express words: "Unless such construction be plainly repugnant to the intent of the Legislature, or of the context of the same statute." From this it appears that we are not required to accord the word "widow" its usual meaning if such meaning be plainly repugnant to the intent of the Legislature or of the context of the same statute, and we believe it is.

There are several statutes touching upon the rights here involved and they are therefore in pari materia. Because of this they should all be considered together to the end of ascertaining therefrom the obvious intent of the lawmakers. Those statutes are as follows: "In addition to dower, the widow shall be allowed to keep as her absolute property a family Bible and other books, not to exceed two hundred dollars; all the wearing apparel of the family, her wheels, looms and other implements of industry; all yarns, cloth and clothing made up in the family for their own use; all grain, meat, vegetables, groceries and other provisions on hand and provided and necessary for the subsistence of the widow and her family for twelve months; her household, kitchen...