In re S.E.
| Decision Date | 18 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | DA 20-0511 |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF: S.E., Respondent and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Submitted on Briefs: September 14, 2022
District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DI-20-39C Honorable John C. Brown, Presiding Judge
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Kristen L Peterson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney, Sean Bowen, Deputy County Attorney Bozeman, Montana
¶1 S.E. appeals the order of the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, committing her to the Montana State Hospital at Warm Springs for a period of up to ninety days. We reverse.
¶2 S.E. presents the following issue for review:
Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it overruled S.E.'s objection and allowed the professional person to testify by telephone in violation of Montana's involuntary commitment statutes?
¶3 S.E. suffers from Bipolar I Disorder. In August 2020, S.E suffered a depressed episode with mood-congruent psychotic features marked by delusions and disorganized thinking. While staying with her mother, S.E. knocked on a neighbor's door and was intent on entering, insisting it was her mother's house. S.E. was taken to the emergency room then brought to Hope House, a mental health facility in Bozeman, due to her disorganized thinking and confusion. The State filed a petition for S.E.'s involuntary commitment.
¶4 The District Court held an initial hearing on August 20, 2020. At that hearing, the District Court appointed a representative of Gallatin Mental Health Center to evaluate S.E. The State requested that the professional person "be allowed to testify remotely," to which S.E. did not object. The District Court ordered that the professional person "may testify by video," and set the hearing on the petition for the morning of August 24, 2020.
¶5 At the hearing on the petition, the State called Amanda Torres, a licensed clinical professional counselor and certified mental health professional in Montana, to testify by telephone, citing "technical difficulties with [the] courtroom" video capabilities. S.E. objected to Torres's appearance by telephone on the grounds that it violated her right to cross-examine witnesses, asserting that "the ability to effectively cross examine witnesses" depended on "the ability to see their reactions to things and for the . . . [fact-finder] to also see the witnesses." S.E. clarified she objected to a telephone appearance, but not video. She suggested rescheduling the hearing for the afternoon or next day to wait for functional video.
¶6 In response, the State asserted that it requested Torres "be allowed to appear remotely at the initial hearing," but was "fine" with moving the trial to the afternoon. The District Court found S.E.'s objection "reasonable," but nevertheless overruled it and allowed Torres to testify by telephone because "I think it's a different standard that applies where there's . . . technical issues that prevent the witness from appearing by video."
¶7 The State called Torres, its only witness, to testify by telephone. Torres testified regarding the circumstances leading to S.E.'s commitment. Torres also testified concerning her remote video evaluation of S.E. earlier that morning prior to the commitment hearing. During Torres's evaluation, S.E.'s mood was depressed, and she was confused about the circumstances surrounding her emergency detention at the Hope House. At one point, S.E. mistakenly believed she was at the Hope House because she had been speeding, and at another she incorrectly believed she was in Washington. S.E. acknowledged a previous mental health diagnosis. Torres drafted a report based on her evaluation of S.E. in which she noted S.E. did not present an imminent danger of bodily harm to herself or to others. Based on her evaluation and her review of S.E.'s records, Torres believed that S.E. was suffering from Bipolar I disorder and that S.E. was experiencing a depressed episode with psychotic features marked by delusions and disorganized thinking. Torres testified that she believed S.E. was substantially unable to care for her own basic needs of safety, health, food, or shelter given that she was divorced from reality and lacked any plan to care for herself if she were released at that time. Further, Torres noted that S.E. had not improved since she was detained at the Hope House and that release at that time would place her in danger. Torres also testified that her opinion as to S.E.'s mental disorder was based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
¶8 S.E. testified that she wanted to go home and she could take care of herself if the petition were dismissed. She also testified that she had previously used social services for food stamps and that she knew how to access that kind of a program.
¶9 Based on the testimony presented, the District Court found that S.E. suffered from a mental disorder and required commitment. Relying on Torres's testimony, the District Court found that S.E. was substantially unable to provide for her own basic needs of health, safety, or shelter. The District Court noted that less restrictive treatment options were not available because of S.E.'s condition at the time and her refusal to take medications, though the District Court did not order S.E. be involuntary medicated. The District Court ordered that S.E. be involuntarily placed at Montana State Hospital for a period of up to ninety days.
¶10 This Court reviews a district court's civil commitment order to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct. In re B.H., 2018 MT 282, ¶ 9, 393 Mont. 352, 430 P.3d 1006. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or we have a definite and firm conviction upon review of the record that the court otherwise erred. In re C.K., 2017 MT 69, ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 127, 391 P.3d 735. Strict adherence to the involuntary commitment statutory scheme is required, considering the utmost importance of the rights at stake. In re S.D., 2018 MT 176, ¶ 8, 392 Mont. 116, 422 P.3d 122. We exercise de novo review when deciding questions of law such as whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied relevant statutes. In re N.A., 2021 MT 228, ¶ 8, 405 Mont. 277, 495 P.3d 45 (citation omitted).
¶11 Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it overruled S.E.'s objection and allowed the professional person to testify by telephone in violation of Montana's involuntary commitment statutes?
¶12 S.E. argues that the District Court committed reversible error when it allowed Torres to testify by telephone over S.E.'s objection and contrary to the statutory mandates for ordering an involuntary commitment. The State contends that the District Court did not err in allowing Torres to appear by telephone because the involuntary commitment statutes do not explicitly prohibit such testimony, and that regardless, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure authorized Torres's testimony by telephone under the circumstances.
¶13 Title 53, chapter 21, part 1, MCA, addresses "Treatment of the Seriously Mentally Ill." In a trial or hearing on a petition for involuntary commitment, the respondent's presence is required unless waived. Section 53-21-126(1), MCA. Similarly, the court-appointed professional person must "be present for the trial and subject to cross-examination." Section 53-21-126(3), MCA. Other involuntary commitment statutes also emphasize the importance of physical presence in these proceedings. See § 53-21-101(4), MCA ( the involuntary commitment statutes "ensure that due process of law is accorded any person coming under the provisions of this part"); 53-21 -115(2), (4), MCA (guaranteeing the right "to be present, to offer evidence, and to present witnesses in any proceeding concerning the person" and "to cross-examine witnesses"); § 53-21-116, MCA (titled "Right to be present at hearing or trial - assignment of counsel," and guaranteeing "[t]he person alleged to be suffering from a mental disorder and requiring commitment has the right to be present . . . at any hearing or trial"); § 53-21-119(2), MCA ("The right of the respondent to be physically present at a hearing may also be waived by the respondent's attorney and the friend of respondent with the concurrence of the professional person and the judge upon" specific factual findings).
¶14 Section 53-21-140, MCA, provides an exception to the requirement of physical presence, authorizing "the use of two-way electronic audio-video communication, allowing all of the participants to be observed and heard by all present" during hearings conducted under chapter 21. Section 53-21-140(1), MCA. Specifically, § 53-21-140(3)(c), MCA, authorizes this method of communication in a hearing on an involuntary commitment petition at the court's discretion. However, two-way electronic audio-video communication "may not be used" in this hearing "if a respondent or patient, the respondent's or patient's counsel, or the professional person objects." Section 53-21-140(5)(b), MCA. "May not" is mandatory; therefore, the respondent's objection forecloses the district court's discretion to permit the professional person's testimony via two-way electronic audio-video communication. In re N.A., ¶ 12 (citing Van Der Hule...
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