In re N.A.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 19-0706 |
| Citation | 405 Mont. 277,495 P.3d 45 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: N.A., Respondent and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Kristen L. Peterson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K Plubell, Appellate Services Bureau Chief, Bree Gee, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Cory J. Swanson, Broadwater County Attorney, Townsend, Montana
¶1 N.A. appeals the order of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County, committing her to Montana State Hospital at Warm Springs for a period of up to ninety days. We reverse.
¶2 N.A. presents the following issue for review:
Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it allowed testimony by video conferencing at the commitment hearing over N.A.’s objection.
¶3 N.A. suffers from unspecified schizophrenia
. On October 1, 2019, N.A. told her psychiatrist that she was experiencing increased depression with suicidal thoughts and auditory hallucinations. On her psychiatrist's recommendation, N.A. went to St. Peter's Hospital in Helena, where she was evaluated by a certified mental health professional after reporting the same concerns. Based on these concerns, N.A. was voluntarily admitted to the Hays Morris House in Butte on October 1. Upon discharge on October 4, N.A. informed staff that she would commit suicide by slitting her wrists if she left Hays Morris. This conversation led to the State's petition for N.A.’s involuntary commitment that same day. The petition alleged that N.A. presented an imminent risk of harm to herself based upon her statements of suicidality.
¶4 The District Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the petition for October 11. At the onset of the hearing, the State informed N.A. of its intent to call four witnesses, including Ashley Post (Post), a licensed clinical social worker with the Western Montana Mental Health Center. The State proposed to have Post testify by Vision Net (a two-way electronic audio-video communication system). N.A. objected on Confrontation Clause grounds. The prosecutor representing the State indicated that The State further explained that Post's absence stemmed from a concern about being away from her office in case of an emergency. N.A. did not withdraw the objection, but indicated that, if the District Court wished to proceed, N.A. would not seek to continue the hearing. The District Court overruled the objection, relying on its interpretation of Montana's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the State's presentation of §§ 53-21-140(1) and 53-21-140(3), MCA. The State did not alert the District Court of any other subsection of § 53-21-140, MCA.
¶5 The State proceeded to call Post to testify by Vision Net. Post testified regarding the circumstances that led to N.A.’s involuntary commitment. Post also testified concerning her evaluation of N.A. the day before the commitment hearing. During Post's evaluation, N.A. presented delusional thoughts
that her brothers tried to overdose her and that one of her brothers held her captive for a year. N.A. informed Post that, while she had expressed suicidal thoughts on October 4, she did not feel suicidal on October 10. Post drafted a report based on her evaluation of N.A. In her report, Post noted that N.A. was inconsistently taking her mental health medications, but that it remained unknown whether N.A. was able to provide for her own basic needs. Post's report also reflected her opinion that N.A. was an imminent threat of injury to herself or others and required a placement that allowed involuntary medication for N.A.’s psychiatric stabilization. Based on her evaluation and her review of N.A.’s records, Post testified that she believed N.A. remained suicidal and would potentially deteriorate without further treatment. Post also testified that her opinion as to N.A.’s mental disorder was based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
¶6 Three other witnesses were present and testified after Post. N.A.’s brother and N.A.’s sister-in-law testified to their observations of N.A.’s behaviors over the previous two years and offered their general opinions that N.A. was unable to care for herself. The State also offered testimony from the county's fire chief. The fire chief testified regarding an instance eight months prior in which N.A. called in a false report of a fire, thereby raising his concerns over decreasing the limited pool of first responders for other potential fires.
¶7 Based on the testimony presented, the District Court found that N.A. suffered from a mental disorder and required commitment. The District Court further found that, based upon the testimony of N.A.’s brother and N.A.’s sister-in-law, N.A. was substantially unable to provide for her own basic needs. Relying upon Post's testimony, the District Court found that an imminent threat of injury to N.A. and others existed and that N.A.’s recent behaviors, including her failure to consistently take her medications, created difficulties in protecting her life and/or health. The District Court noted that less restrictive options were unavailable because other inpatient treatment facilities could not provide involuntary medication for N.A. The District Court ordered that N.A. be involuntarily placed at Montana State Hospital in Warm Springs for a period of up to ninety days.
¶8 This Court reviews a district court's civil commitment order to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law are correct. In re B.H. , 2018 MT 282, ¶ 9, 393 Mont. 352, 430 P.3d 1006. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or we have a definite and firm conviction upon review of the record that the court otherwise erred. In re C.K. , 2017 MT 69, ¶ 10, 387 Mont. 127, 391 P.3d 735. Strict adherence to the involuntary commitment statutory scheme is required, considering the utmost importance of the rights at stake. In re S.D. , 2018 MT 176, ¶ 8, 392 Mont. 116, 422 P.3d 122. We exercise de novo review when deciding questions of law such as whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied relevant statutes. In re Mental Health of O.R.B. , 2008 MT 301, ¶ 14, 345 Mont. 516, 191 P.3d 482.
¶9 Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it allowed testimony by video conferencing at the commitment hearing over N.A.’s objection.
¶10 N.A. argues that the District Court committed reversible error when it allowed Post to testify by Vision Net over N.A.’s objections. The State does not contest that the District Court erred but contends that such error was harmless and does not warrant reversal.
¶11 It is well established that when construing a statute, it must be read as a whole and no term should be isolated from the context of the statute. Eldorado Coop Canal v. Hoge , 2016 MT 145, ¶ 18, 383 Mont. 523, 373 P.3d 836. The intent of the legislature is to be determined from the plain language of the statute. In re J.J. , 2018 MT 184, ¶ 13, 392 Mont. 192, 422 P.3d 699. If the intent can be determined from the plain language of the statute, a court may not go further and apply any other means of interpretation. In re J.J. , ¶ 13.
¶12 Title 53, chapter 21, part 1, MCA, regulates several aspects of the State's treatment of the seriously mentally ill. Among those regulations, § 53-21-140, MCA, regulates the use of two-way electronic audio-video communications during any hearing conducted under chapter 21. Pertinently, § 53-21-140(3), MCA, enumerates the following proceedings which may be conducted by electronic communications at the court's discretion:
Subsection (5) provides that two-way electronic audio-video communications "may not be used" in either "an initial hearing provided for by § 53-21-122, MCA, if the professional person objects" or "in a hearing referred to in subsections (3)(b) through (3)(g) if a respondent or patient, the respondent's or patient's counsel, or the professional person objects." Section 53-21-140(5)(a)-(b), MCA. Courts construing legislative use of the phrase "may not" have consistently held that the phrase is mandatory. Van Der Hule v. Mukasey , 2009 MT 20, ¶ 11, 349 Mont. 88, 217 P.3d 1019.
¶13 The District Court erred in allowing Post to testify by Vision Net. While the plain language of § 53-21-140(3), MCA, undoubtedly provides a court discretion in allowing or disallowing the use of electronic communications in certain proceedings, § 53-21-140(5), MCA, just as undoubtedly curtails that discretion.1 If the respondent, patient, or their counsel objects, the district court's discretion is terminated, and the court may not allow testimony by electronic audio-video communication. N.A. objected to Post's testimony. Upon objection, the District Court had no discretion to allow Post to testify remotely. Allowing Post to testify violated the plain and unambiguous language of the statute.
¶14 The State contends...
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...of law such as whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied relevant statutes. In re N.A., 2021 MT 228, ¶ 8, 405 Mont. 277, 495 P.3d 45 (citation DISCUSSION ¶11 Whether the District Court committed reversible error when it overruled S.E.'s objection and allowed the professio......