In re S.K.K., A06A1258.

• Citation: 280 Ga. App. 877,635 S.E.2d 263
• Decision Date: 02 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. A06A1258.,A06A1258.
• Parties: In the Interest of S.K.K. et al., children.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

280 Ga. App. 877

635 S.E.2d 263

In the Interest of S.K.K. et al., children.

No. A06A1258.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 2, 2006.

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C. Jean Bolin, Attorney at Law, Robert Baer, Attorney at Law, Craig Pearson, Public Defender's Office, Hinesville, for appellant.

Claira Mitcham, Assistant District Attorney, John Durden, District Attorney, for appellee.

RUFFIN, Chief Judge.

Fifteen-year-olds S.K.K. and H.E.A. were each charged with first degree arson, four counts of attempted murder, and criminal trespass. Following a hearing, the juvenile court initially denied the State's request to transfer the cases to superior court pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-30.2. Thereafter, the juvenile court granted the State's motion to reconsider and transferred the case to superior court. S.K.K. and H.E.A. appeal, alleging that the evidence failed to support the transfer. S.K.K. also argues that the juvenile court erred by failing to offer reasons in support of the transfer in its order. H.E.A. further alleges that the lower court's ruling should be reversed because criminal prosecution in the superior court is too severe. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-30.2, a juvenile court may transfer a case to an appropriate court if, in its discretion, it determines that

there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . [t]he child committed the delinquent act alleged; . . . [t]he child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; . . . [t]he interests of the child and the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint and the transfer be made; and . . . [t]he child . . . [w]as at least 15 years of age at the time of the alleged delinquent conduct.¹

We hold that under the circumstances of this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring this case to superior court.

1. S.K.K. and H.E.A. allege that the evidence does not support the transfer of the case to the superior court because reasonable grounds did not exist to believe that they committed the delinquent acts. "The function of the appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether there was some evidence to support the juvenile court's determination. Determinations of a juvenile court made on an exercise of discretion, if based upon evidence, will not be controlled by this court."²

At the transfer hearing, a sheriff's deputy testified that he had a verbal altercation with S.K.K. regarding the deputy's 15-year-old stepdaughter, April, who lived with the deputy, his wife, and three other children. April testified that later that week, while she was out of town, S.K.K. and H.E.A. told her during a telephone conversation that they were going to "burn your mother f-cking house down." H.E.A. warned April to "please don't come home."

That same night, April's mother was awakened by the smell of smoke and managed to get herself and three children out of their burning trailer. The police responded to the emergency call at approximately 1:30 a.m. and found the trailer engulfed in flames. April's stepfather and another police officer ran into the burning trailer, not realizing that the children had already escaped.

An officer testified that he observed S.K.K. and H.E.A. standing in the road near the trailer soon after he responded to the emergency call. According to the officer, they were the only civilians present in the area other than the family that lived in the trailer. Finally, H.E.A.'s sister testified that she smelled "gas" when H.E.A., S.K.K., and another male returned to her trailer between 12:30 a.m. and 1:00 a.m.

Thus, we find that there was evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that there were reasonable grounds to believe that S.K.K. and H.E.A. committed the alleged delinquent acts.³

2. S.K.K. and H.E.A. also argue that the juvenile court erred in determining that the interests of the children and community merited a transfer to superior court. We disagree.

Although there was some evidence that at least one of the children would benefit from treatment, the State did not seek the transfers based on claims that they were not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system, and the juvenile court did not rely on that ground in its transfer orders. Instead, the State proceeded based upon the seriousness of the crimes and under the theory that the interests of the community far outweighed the interests of the children. And

[a] juvenile court may transfer to the superior court a juvenile who is amenable to treatment if the juvenile court finds that the amenability factor is outweighed by the interests of the community in treating the child as an adult. In such cases, the State is not required to prove non-amenability to treatment, and the transfer order need not reflect why the child is not amenable. Instead, the order must balance the child's interest in treatment in the juvenile system, including but not limited to his amenability to treatment, against the community's interest in treating the child as an adult.⁴

During the transfer hearing, the juvenile court commented on the severity of the crimes alleged, describing them as "reprehensible" and "heinous." The court went on to say that "[t]he only thing this [c]ourt struggles with at this point is that you are juveniles, and that an adult court system is extremely severe, and that there's no rehabilitation at that point."

In its initial order, the juvenile court denied the transfer, finding that it was not in the interest of the children or the community to transfer the cases because there was evidence that S.K.K. could benefit from treatment and that juvenile programs are more successful at rehabilitating children and because of the "severity of criminal prosecution in the adult [s]uperior [c]ourt." Thereafter, the court granted the State's motion to reconsider and transferred the cases to superior court, finding that the interests of the community and the children required the transfer. Specifically, the court concluded that because of the children's ages, there would be insufficient time for the juvenile system to provide adequate treatment in a secure facility and that the children would be provided sufficient treatment if tried and convicted in superior court under the Georgia Youthful Offender Act of 1972.⁵

We conclude that there was evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that the children's interest in treatment in the juvenile system was...