In re Self

• Decision Date: 10 October 2001
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 01-0758.
• Parties: In the MATTER OF Diane SELF, wife of and William Self as Owners of Aluminum Hull Skeeter Motor Vessel, Hull Identification No. STE22499E898, Praying for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

172 F.Supp.2d 813

In the MATTER OF Diane SELF, wife of and William Self as Owners of Aluminum Hull Skeeter Motor Vessel, Hull Identification No. STE22499E898, Praying for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability

Civil Action No. 01-0758.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Alexandria Division.

October 10, 2001.

Edwin A. Ellinghausen, III, Charles L. Chassaignac, IV, Porteous Hainkel et al, New Orleans, LA, for Diane Self, William J. Self.

John T Bennett, Bennett Bennett & Bennett, Marksville, LA, for Michael D. Davis.

David R. Frohn, Robin A. Anderson, Frohn & Thibodeaux, Lake Charles, LA, for Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, Skeeter Products, Inc.

RULING

LITTLE, Chief Judge.

Before the court is a motion [Doc. No. 20] to alter or amend judgment filed by the following parties: Diane Self, William J. Self (the "Selfs" or "Vessel Owners"), Yamaha Motor Corporation ("Yamaha"), and Skeeter Products, Inc. ("Skeeter"). The motion seeks to amend a ruling of this court, dated 18 July 2001. The ruling granted Michael D. Davis's ("Davis") motion to lift the Order Restraining the Prosecution of Claims. This court granted Davis's motion pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 181-189 ("the Limitation Act") and the "savings to suitors" clause, ("the Suitor's Clause"), 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). The parties filing the motion to alter or amend judgment rely on Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") for relief. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a boating accident that occurred on 28 October 2000, on the Red River, which flows through Rapides Parish, Louisiana. The Selfs, owners of a motor vessel manufactured by Skeeter and powered by a 200 horsepower motor manufactured by Yamaha, took Davis on a boating excursion on the Red River. As William J. Self piloted the boat upstream on the Red River, the vessel suddenly veered sharply to starboard, causing Davis to be jetisoned from the vessel. Davis suffered severe physical injuries when struck by the motor's propeller.

On 27 March 2001, Davis initiated a civil suit in the Ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides, Louisiana, naming the Selfs and Yamaha as defendants. Although Davis did not name Skeeter as a defendant, Davis alleged Skeeter to be at fault in the complaint. On 30 April 2001, the Vessel Owners filed a complaint in this court for exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Limitation Act. On 2 May 2001, in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, we enjoined the state court claims pending resolution of the underlying admiralty action. On 8 May 2001, to ensure the Vessel Owners' right to litigate the issue of liability in the admiralty proceeding, Davis filed the following stipulations with this court:

1. This court has full and exclusive jurisdiction to determine the value of the vessel, the value of its freight, the value of any limitation fund which may be necessary and any other matter pertaining to values;

2. This court has full and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether petitioners have the right to exoneration from limitation of their liability to respondent, Michael D. Davis;

3. Any claim of res judicata based on judgment in any other Court, with respect to any issue of exoneration from and limitation of liability is reserved to this court, is waived by respondent;

4. Respondent will not seek to enforce any judgment exposing petitioners to liability in excess of the ultimately determined limitation fund, whether by enforcement against petitioners themselves or by enforcement against any third parties entitled to indemnity or contribution from petitioners;

5. All other pertinent portions of the stipulation executed by Michael D. Davis alternatively pled in support of this demand to lift the Stay and/or Restraining Order.

On 18 July 2001, on the basis of the above-outlined stipulations, this court granted Davis's motion to lift the restraint on prosecution of claims. Subsequently, Yamaha and Skeeter (collectively, the "Claimants") and Vessel Owners filed the current motion to alter or amend the court's 18 July 2001 order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the FRCP. The Vessel Owners maintain that this court erred in dissolving the restraint on prosecution of claims for two reasons: (1) Davis's failed to stipulate to the value of his claim; and (2) Davis did not assert himself to be the sole claimant. Alternatively, Claimants contend the court miscued because Yamaha and Skeeter did not sign or agree to Davis's stipulations or enter into their own stipulations. We now address the merits of this motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e).

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

The Vessel Owners and Claimants motion is a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir.1997). Altering, amending, or reconsidering a judgment is an extraordinary measure, which courts should use sparingly. See 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1, p. 124; Fields v. Pool Off-shore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217, at *2 (E.D.La. Feb.3, 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999). The remedy is so extraordinary that the Fifth Circuit has directed that the Rule 59(e) standard "favors denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment." Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993). As such, "the district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration arising under [Rule 59(e)]." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir.1990).

Generally, the grounds for granting a request to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) of the FRCP are as follows: (1) to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which judgment is based; (2) the availability of new evidence; (3) the need to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) an intervening change in controlling law. See e.g., Motiva Enterprises LLC v. Wegmann, 2001 WL 246414, at *2 (E.D.La. March 12, 2001); Clay v. Daichi Shipping, 2000 WL 6269, at *1 (E.D.La. January 5, 2000); 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2810.1, p. 125-27. A Rule 59(e) motion should not be used to relitigate prior matters that should have been urged earlier or that simply have been resolved to the movant's dissatisfaction. See Clay v. Daichi Shipping, 2000 WL 6269, at *1 (E.D.La. January 5, 2000). Also, a motion based on recycled arguments only serves to waste the resources of the court. See Louisiana v. Sprint Communications, Co., 899 F.Supp. 282, 284 (M.D.La.1995). Rulings should only be reconsidered "where the moving party has presented substantial reasons for consideration." Id.; see also, Baustian v. Louisiana, 929 F.Supp. 980, 981 (E.D.La.1996).

This case involves a conflict between the Limitation Act, which provides vessel owners a right to seek limitation of liability in federal court for maritime injuries, and the Suitor's Clause, which grants claimants a right to seek common law remedies outside of the federal admiralty forum. Because this case requires the court to reconcile contradictory statutes, a brief discussion that traces the development of the both the Limitation Act and the Suitor's Clause is warranted.

2. The Limitation Act and the Suitor's Clause

In the mid-nineteenth century, Congress passed the Limitation Act¹ "to encourage ship building and to induce capitalists to invest money in this branch of industry," Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 104, 121, 20 L.Ed. 585, 591 (1871). The Limitation Act achieves this purpose by "exempting innocent shipowners from liability, beyond the amount of their interest." Id. Therefore, when faced with liability for a maritime accident, a vessel owner may file a petition in federal court seeking protection under the Limitation Act. Provided that the accident in question occurred without the vessel owner's "privity or knowledge," the Limitation Act limits the owner's liability to the value of his interest in the vessel and freight. 46 U.S.C.App. § 183(a); See also, Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., Inc. v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir.1992). After the vessel owner deposits with the district court an amount representing the value of the vessel and its freight (the "limitation fund"), the court stays all related claims against the vessel owner pending in state court and directs all potential claimants to file their claims against the vessel owner in the district court within a specified period of time. See 46 U.S.C.App. § 185; Fed. R.Civ.P. Supplemental Rules F(3), F(4); see also, In Re Complaint of Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1988).

Thereafter, in a proceeding known as concursus (emphasis added), the district court, sitting in admiralty without a jury, determines "whether there was negligence; if there was negligence, whether it was without the privity and knowledge of the owner; and if limitation is granted, how the [limitation] fund should be distributed." In re Complaint of Dammers, 836 F.2d at 755.

On the basis of the Limitation Act, therefore, it would appear that federal courts are the exclusive jurisdiction for determining admiralty and maritime claims. The same statute that grants the federal courts exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "save[s] to suitors all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1). The Suitor's Clause embodies a presumption in favor of remedies in the forum of the Davis's choice, including state courts, See Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir.1996), but there is no right to a jury in actions instituted in admiralty, and Davis is enjoined from...