In re Snider
Decision Date | 12 June 1986 |
Docket Number | Adv. No. 85-0319-B1.,Bankruptcy No. 85-00408-B3-5 |
Citation | 62 BR 382 |
Parties | In re David K. SNIDER, Debtor. Vernon B. HILL, Jr. & Ruben R. Pena, Plaintiffs, v. David K. SNIDER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Texas |
Baldemar Cano, Jr., Pharr, Tex., for debtor.
Ruben R. Pena, Jones, Galligan, Key & Pena, Weslaco, Tex., for plaintiffs.
The issue presented is whether the attorney's fees incurred by a former spouse in post-dissolution child custody litigation are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Trial of this matter occurred on March 7, 1986, both sides appeared through their attorneys, presented evidence and post trial memoranda of law.
This Court concludes after analyzing the facts of this case, that plaintiffs have met their burden in proving that the attorney's fees incurred were in the nature of child support and, as such, are non-dischargeable in the amount of $21,500.
Debtor appealed this order to the 13th Court of Civil Appeals of the State Court which affirmed the ruling in favor of Karen Flores. Debtor then filed a writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court which was dismissed on May 1, 1985.
Debtor, father possessory conservator, filed a petition under Chapter 11 of title 11 of U.S.C. on January 17, 1985. The case was converted to a Chapter 7 case by court order signed on February 27, 1986. On May 8, 1985 Vernon Hill, Jr. & Ruben R. Pena commenced this adversary proceeding styled a complaint to determine non-dischargeability of debt seeking a judgment that the $21,500. in attorneys fees incurred in the custody battle and expressly ordered by the state court were non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Debtor argues that the total amount of the fees are dischargeable or alternatively, that the fees for an appeal, costs of transcript and writ to the Texas Supreme Court are dischargeable.
A threshold issue in any contested matter or adversary proceeding is the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts of all cases under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 157 provides that the district court may provide that all cases under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy court. The Chief District Judge of the Southern District of Texas signed an order entitled Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings Nunc Pro Tunc on August 9, 1984.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b) provides that the bankruptcy judge may enter final judgments in core proceedings and can submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court in a non-core related proceeding. Expressly included by Congress in the list of core proceedings are "determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts." 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). Therefore, this Court has the power to enter a final judgment on the merits of the adversary proceedings.
Dischargeability must be determined by the substance of the liability rather than its form. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939). The substance of the award must govern. Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 555 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71 L.Ed.2d 658 (1982). The crucial issue is the function the award was intended to serve. In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir.1983). Undertakings by one spouse to pay the other's debts including a debt to a lawyer for fees, can be support for bankruptcy purposes. The issue is "a question of fact to be decided by the bankruptcy court as trier of fact in light of all the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention of the parties." Id. at 1057-58. The bankruptcy court must decide each case upon its own facts and should determine the essence of the liability regardless of the label placed upon it by the parties. Ravin & Rosen, The Dischargeability in Bankruptcy of Alimony, Maintenance & Support Obligations, 60 Am.Bankr.L.J. 1, 9 (1986).
Whether a particular debt is a support obligation is a question of federal bankruptcy law, not state law. H.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 364 reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 6319. See also In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 904-05 (11th Cir.1985) ( ); In re Williams, supra at 1057 ( ); Erspan v. Badgett, supra at 555 () However, the Second Circuit has stated that "Congress could not have intended that federal courts were to formulate the bankruptcy law of alimony and support in a vacuum, precluded from all reference to the reasoning of the well-established law of the states." In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.1981). Based on this analysis, this Court will look to the principles of state law in its interpretation of support, alimony or maintenance but will rest its ultimate decision upon federal bankruptcy considerations which require a case by case analysis regardless of state court labels.
Plaintiff's Hill and Pena have the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a particular debt is non-dischargeable. In re Bradford, 22 B.R. 899 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1982) Intertwined with this evidentiary requirement, is the basic principle of bankruptcy that exceptions to discharge must be strictly construed against a creditor and liberally in favor of a debtor so that the debtor may be afforded a fresh start. Murphy & Robinson Inv. Co. v. Cross, 666 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir.1982).
A majority of the cases decided under § 523(a)(5) have held that an obligation to pay attorneys' fees is so tied up with the obligation of support as to be in the nature of support and excepted from discharge. In re Williams, supra at 1057; In re Spong, supra at 9; In re Gwinn, 20 B.R. 233, 234 (9th...
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