In re Speight
| Decision Date | 11 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 89693–3.,89693–3. |
| Citation | 182 Wash.2d 103,340 P.3d 207 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Roland Arthur SPEIGHT, Petitioner. |
Dana M. Nelson, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Philip James Buri, Buri Funston Mumford PLLC, Bellingham, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Petitioner Ronald Speight filed a timely personal restraint petition, claiming for the first time on collateral review that his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, was violated when the trial court decided motions in limine and individually questioned potential jurors in chambers.1 While Speight's public trial right claim has merit, his petition must be denied. Consistent with our holding in In re Personal Restraint of Coggin, No. 89694–1, 182 Wash.2d 115, 340 P.3d 810, 2014 WL 7003796 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2014), a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Speight cannot show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition is denied.
¶ 2 On December 3, 2004, Speight drove Kelly Nixon to an inn where Speight was performing routine maintenance as a caretaker. While at the inn, Speight forced Nixon into oral and vaginal intercourse, resulting in torn clothing and injuries to Nixon's face and leg.
¶ 3 Speight was charged with second degree rape in San Juan County. At the beginning of jury selection, the judge had jurors fill out questionnaires regarding any experiences they may have had with a sexual offense. While the jurors were filling out these questionnaires, the trial judge, counsel, the clerk, the sheriff's deputy, and the court reporter went into the judge's chambers for motions in limine. Then, in response to the juror's answers to the questionnaires, 14 prospective jurors were questioned in chambers without the court engaging in the analysis required by State v. Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). Several prospective jurors were then excused or dismissed for cause.
¶ 4 Speight was convicted of second degree rape, and in 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in an unpublished opinion.2 Speight filed a timely personal restraint petition in 2007, arguing that his right to a public trial was violated during the in-chambers conference regarding the motions in limine and the individual questioning of jurors.3 Division One stayed the petition multiple times, pending decisions by this court. Division One of the Court of Appeals then certified the case to this court in December 2013, alongside Coggin.
¶ 5 Speight claims that he was denied his constitutional public trial right during pretrial in-limine rulings and the jury selection process. A criminal defendant has a right to a public trial as guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Wash. Const. . art. I, § 22 (); State v. Paumier, 176 Wash.2d 29, 34, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012).
¶ 6 We have repeatedly held that the public trial right applies to jury selection. Specifically, it is well established that the public trial right in voir dire proceedings extends to the questioning of individual prospective jurors. State v. Wise, 176 Wash.2d 1, 16–19, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012). While the right to a public trial is not absolute, the trial court here did not conduct the analysis required by Bone–Club timer implicitly or explicitly and therefore, the closure violated the defendant's right to a public trial. The State argues that the closure satisfies the five factors required by Bone–Club, but “[a] trial court is required to consider the Bone–Club factors before closing a trial proceeding that should be public.” Wise, 176 Wash.2d at 12, 288 P.3d 1113 (citing Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d at 261, 906 P.2d 325 ). From the record, the trial court did not consider any of these factors in its decision whether to question individual jurors in chambers. Moreover, a trial court should “ ‘resist a closure motion except under the most unusual circumstances.’ ” Wise, 176 Wash.2d at 11, 288 P.3d 1113 (quoting Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d at 259, 906 P.2d 325 ). Here, the defendant's constitutional right to a public trial was violated.
¶ 7 We have not yet addressed whether a closure occurs when a trial judge discusses and rules on motions in limine in chambers. This court uses the experience and logic test to evaluate whether a particular proceeding implicates the public trial right. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash.2d 58, 73, 292 P.3d 715 (2012). In State v. Smith, 181 Wash.2d 508, 334 P.3d 1049 (2014), we alluded to the fact that evidentiary motions may not implicate the public trial right, but because sidebars, and not evidentiary conferences, were at issue in that case we did not decide definitively one way or the other. See Smith, 181 Wash.2d at 512 n. 3, 334 P.3d 1049 ( ). Since jurors were privately questioned, a closure occurred, and we need not decide whether a second closure exists in this case.
¶ 8 Because Speight's public trial right violation has merit, we must determine whether he must show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the violation. We addressed the issue—whether actual and substantial prejudice must be shown from a public trial right violation in order to obtain relief by personal restraint petition—in Coggin. Because the issue is identical and the facts are similar, we incorporate the reasoning from that case here. To summarize, generally, for a petitioner to prevail on collateral review, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional error worked to his actual and substantial prejudice. In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wash.2d 321, 328, 823 P.2d 492 (1992). We carved out an exception to this general rule in In re Personal Restraint of Morris, 176 Wash.2d 157, 166, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012), where we held that we will presume prejudice for a petitioner who alleges a public trial right violation through an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. But in Coggin we refused to extend this exception any further and held that our interest in finality required us to draw a line and not presume prejudice when a petitioner raises a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review. Coggin, 182 Wash.2d at ––––, 340 P.3d 810. Therefore, in Coggin we held that a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must comply with the general rule for personal restraint petitions and show actual and substantial prejudice.
¶ 9 As a result, Speight can prevail only if he can show that the public trial right violation actually and substantially prejudiced him. Speight does not argue that he was actually and substantially prejudiced, nor do the facts suggest that he was. As a result of the individual questioning, he likely received a more fair trial and an impartial jury.
¶ 11 Like in the companion case, In re Personal Restraint of Coggin, No. 89694–1, 182 Wash.2d 115, 340 P.3d 810 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2014), I agree with the lead opinion's decision to deny Roland Speight's personal restraint petition, but for different reasons. First, I believe that this court must decide whether motions in limine implicate the public trial right, and I would decide this question in the negative. Second, I would hold that Mr. Speight invited the judge to conduct portions of voir dire in chambers. Thus, in contrast to the lead opinion and in line with my concurrence in Coggin, I believe we need not determine the prejudice showing required of personal restraint petitioners.
¶ 12 Nevertheless, because guidance is needed I would agree with the majority that the error here, failure to engage in the analysis outlined in State v. Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995), requires a petitioner in a personal restraint petition to prove prejudice unless he can demonstrate that the error in his case “ ‘infect[ed] the entire trial process' ” and deprive the defendant of “ ‘basic protections,’ ” without which “ ‘no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’ ” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ; Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 578, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) ).
¶ 13 In contrast to the companion case, here the petitioner alleges two different public trial right violations.
First, he challenges the trial court's decision to hear argument on motions in limine in chambers rather than in the courtroom, alleging that this behavior implicated his right to a public trial. While venire members were filling out questionnaires in the courtroom, the parties and the judge discussed motions in limine on the record in chambers. The State moved to bar the defendant from inquiring about the alleged victim's drug convictions. The defense brought several motions, including motions for the State to disclose certain information, to exclude mention of prior contact between the defendant and complainant, and to exclude mention of the defendant's mental disorder. In addition to challenging the judge's consideration of these motions in limine in chambers, Mr. Speight also makes an identical argument to William Coggin, namely that the in-chambers...
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