In re St. Paul & Northern Pacific Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1887
• Citation: 37 Minn. 164
• Parties: In the matter of proceedings by the ST. PAUL & NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY to acquire for its use a certain railroad crossing.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

37 Minn. 164

In the matter of proceedings by the ST. PAUL & NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY to acquire for its use a certain railroad crossing.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 28, 1887

The St. Paul & Northern Pacific Railway Company presented its petition to the district court for Ramsey county, alleging that it is a corporation invested with power to construct a railroad from Brainerd to Mankato by way of Minneapolis and St. Paul; that it has constructed its railroad from Brainerd to a point in the city of St. Paul about 200 feet southerly of Seventh street and immediately adjacent to the westerly side of the right of way of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company; that under the provisions of Sp.

Laws 1879, c. 318, petitioner has the right, and desires, to use the road, tracks and depot of the St. Paul Union Depot Company; that, by reason of numerous switch tracks of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company into the yards of the said company and other railroad companies, it is impracticable for petitioner to locate its railroad or to reach the tracks or grounds of the Union Depot Company on the said westerly side of the said right of way; that the petitioner in the location of its railroad from said point near Seventh street to the grounds and tracks of the Union Depot Company, elects to cross the railroad of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company, at a point specified, (a map of the proposed crossing being attached to the petition;) and that the petitioner and the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company cannot agree upon the amount of compensation to be made for the crossing. The petition thereupon prays for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain and determine such compensation.

The St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company interposed an answer to this petition, alleging, among other matters, that the public interests do not require the proposed crossing, that the same would be highly injurious to the interests of the public and of no substantial advantage to the petitioner, and that the crossing would make it impracticable to use the tracks proposed to be crossed, upon which the respondent and three other railroad companies transact a vast amount of business. Upon the issues made by this answer and the reply, evidence was taken before a referee, and the matter was fully argued before Wilkin, Brill, and Simons, JJ., who made an order denying the application of the petitioner. From this order the petitioner appeals.

D. A. Secombe, for appellant.

R. B. Galusha, Chas. E. Flandrau, and Geo. B. Young, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.¹

This appeal was taken from an order denying an application of the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Railway Company, pursuant to Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, § 47, as amended by Laws 1879, c. 35, § 3, for the appointment of commissioners to assess and determine the amount of compensation to be made to the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company for a crossing of the railway tracks of the latter company by the railroad of the petitioner, at a point in the city of St. Paul about 200 feet southerly of Seventh street.

The only point raised or urged by appellant is that, under the statute cited, it had an absolute right to make the crossing, conditional only upon payment of compensation; that the fact that it elected to make the crossing was conclusive evidence of its necessity; and that the court had no power to consider whether public interest required it, and no discretion except to prescribe the location and manner of making the crossing in case the two companies could not agree.

This is a bold claim of absolute power, to which the petitioner, in order to maintain its contention, must show no doubtful right. The power of eminent domain may doubtless be delegated to corporations, to be exercised in such manner and under such restrictions as the legislature may determine; yet it is a prerogative of sovereignty, and its exercise by corporations is a special privilege against common right. Therefore any corporation claiming to exercise it suo arbitrio, exempt from any judicial determination as to the necessity or propriety of such exercise, must show a clear and unambiguous grant from the legislature of the right claimed. The foundation idea upon which the right of eminent domain rests is public necessity; and, while the legislature is the absolute judge of the existence of such necessity, yet the delegation of the power to any corporation to decide for itself when this necessity exists is so dangerous, and so in conflict with all the previous policy of the state, that it would require very clear language to justify a court in holding that the legislature intended to give one railroad the absolute right, at its mere election, to cross another railroad, although such crossing might not only serve no useful purpose, but also destroy the public usefulness of the road crossed, by jeopardizing the lives of travellers and operatives. Even where special charters make railway companies the judges, in their own cases, as to what property is necessary to be taken for the purposes of their roads, courts of equity have often interfered, at the suit of private persons, to restrain the corporations from an abuse of their power.

In this state, in the case of railway companies organized under special charters which gave them very extensive powers to take private property, and which contained no provision for any determination by the court, in the condemnation proceedings, of the question of the necessity of the taking, this court has very clearly intimated that, if they attempted to abuse their powers, the companies would be subject to the control of the courts. Wilkin v. First Division, etc., R. Co., 16 Minn. 244, (271;) Weir v. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co., 18 Minn. 135, (155.)

In 1872, and again in 1879, Gen. St. c. 34, § 17, was so amended as to make the questions whether the public interests required the railroad to be built at all, and whether the lands proposed to be taken were required and necessary, judicial ones to be determined by the court.

In view of these considerations, we repeat that it would require unequivocal language to satisfy us that there had been so complete a relaxation of this policy as to leave the matter of making a railway crossing to the uncontrolled will of the corporation desiring to make it. But a consideration of the language...