In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 13-22-00589-CV |
| Parties | IN RE STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
Relator State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause on December 16, 2022. Through this original proceeding, relator contends that the trial court erred by granting a new trial. Because we conclude that the new trial order is facially invalid, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.
Real party in interest Tita G. Teran filed a lawsuit against relator in trial court cause number 2020-DCL-01830 in the 197th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, with the Honorable Adolfo E. Cordova Jr. presiding. Teran sought declaratory relief and damages pursuant to the uninsured/underinsured provisions of her automobile insurance policy with relator. Teran alleged that she sustained personal injuries and damages in an automobile collision when Olivia Lara Galvan, an uninsured driver, made an unsafe lane change and struck Teran's vehicle. Teran sought the following declarations under her insurance policy: (1) she was "a covered person"; (2) Galvan was an "uninsured motorist"; (3) the collision was an "accident"; and (4) relator "is obligated to pay the full amount of the [u]nderinsured [m]otorist [p]rovision's policy limits, plus attorney['s] fees and taxable court costs. . . ."
During pretrial hearings, Judge Cordova suggested that the parties might prefer for a different judge to handle the trial of the case because of his heavy criminal docket. Thus, the case was ultimately submitted to a jury trial before the Honorable Ricardo Adobbati. The jury found that Galvan was negligent and awarded Teran damages. Following the jury's verdict Teran filed a motion requesting that she be awarded attorney's fees and requesting the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the award of such fees. Relator asserted that Teran waived her claim for attorney's fees because, although the parties had agreed to bifurcate Teran's claim for attorney's fees from liability issues at trial, Teran did not submit her request for attorney's fees to the jury.
After hearings on these issues, Judge Cordova granted Teran's oral motion for new trial. The order granting a new trial does not provide a rationale for the trial court's ruling.
This original proceeding ensued. By one issue with multiple sub-issues, relator asserts that Judge Cordova abused his discretion in granting Teran's motion for new trial, because: (a) the new trial order is "blank" and "thus contains no specific, articulated reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate"; (b) the "record contains no merits-based reason supporting a new trial"; (c) Judge Cordova "had no valid basis [to grant] a new trial because [Teran] waived her recovery of attorney's fees"; and (d) Judge Cordova "did not have [the] authority to grant a new trial regarding trial proceedings conducted by [Judge Adobbati]." Relator further filed a motion to stay the trial court proceedings. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.10.
This Court granted relator's motion to stay and requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Teran.[2] Teran alleges that Judge Cordova did not abuse his discretion by: (1) granting a new trial "without a detailed written order because the basis and the legitimacy of [his] ruling is evident from the record"; (2) concluding that Teran did not "waive" her claim for attorney's fees; and (3) making post-trial rulings in this case.
Mandamus is an extraordinary and discretionary remedy. See In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 883 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The relator must show that (1) the trial court abused its discretion, and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy on appeal. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135-36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). "The relator bears the burden of proving these two requirements." In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
A writ of mandamus will issue to address a clear abuse of discretion committed by a trial court in granting a new trial. In re Whataburger Rests., LP, 429 S.W.3d 597, 598 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 757-58 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 689 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding).
Rule 320 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial court broad discretion to grant a new trial "for good cause, on motion or on the court's own motion." Tex.R.Civ.P. 320. However, because the Texas Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury, that authority is not "unfettered." In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding); see Tex. Const. art. I, § 15; In re Cambell, 577 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding). Although trial courts have significant discretion in granting new trials, "such discretion should not, and does not, permit a trial judge to substitute his or her own views for that of the jury without a valid basis." In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 212 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); see In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688-89; In re Pantalion, 575 S.W.3d 382, 383 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2019, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
Thus, we employ a two-tier analysis to determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion in granting a new trial. First, we examine the facial validity of the order granting a new trial. See In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 176; In re United Services Auto. Ass'n, 521 S.W.3d 920, 927 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (describing this analysis as determining "if a new trial order is sufficient on its face"). An order granting a new trial must provide "an understandable, reasonably specific explanation why [the parties'] expectations are frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process being nullified, and the case having to be retried." In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 176 (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213); see In re Munsch, 614 S.W.3d 397, 400 (). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial if its stated reason for granting a new trial is: (1) "a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate, such as a well-defined legal standard or a defect that probably resulted in an improper verdict"; and (2) "specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand." In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688-89. A new trial order may be an abuse of discretion if, for example, it is based on a reason that is not legally valid, or "if the articulated reasons plainly state that the trial court merely substituted its own judgment for the jury's," or "the order, though rubber-stamped with a valid new-trial rationale, provides little or no insight into the judge's reasoning." Id. at 689.
Second, we perform a merits-based review of the trial court's articulated reasons for granting a new trial. In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d at 758; see In re Whataburger Rests., L.P., 429 S.W.3d at 59. If the articulated reasons are not supported by the law and the record, mandamus relief is appropriate. In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d at 761-62. "[T]he abuse-of-discretion standard applies to merits review just as it does in all mandamus proceedings." In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 178.
We begin our analysis with relator's assertion that Judge Cordova abused his discretion in granting Teran's motion for new trial because the "Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial" contains no specific, articulated reason for why a new trial is legally appropriate. We agree. The trial court's new trial order merely states that "On this the 1st day of November, 2022, came on to be considered Plaintiff's [O]ral Motion for New Trial, and the Court, after hearing argument of counsel, the Court hereby Grants the motion and Orders a new trial . . . ."
As stated previously, an order granting a motion for new trial must provide a reasonably specific explanation of the court's reasons for setting aside a jury verdict. In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; In re Columbia Med Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. This order does not contain any rationale for the trial court's ruling, and thus fails to meet the requirements established by the Texas Supreme Court for such an order. Therefore, we conclude that the order granting a new trial is facially invalid. See In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 176; In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688-89; see also In re Nelsen, No. 14-19-00600-CV, 2019 WL 4071982, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 29, 2019,orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (conditionally granting mandamus relief based on the facial invalidity of the order granting a new trial); In re Ramos, No. 13-19-00039-CV, 2019 WL 1930111, at *3 (Tex....
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