In re State, No. 13-05-370-CR (TX 1/3/2006)
| Decision Date | 03 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-05-370-CR.,13-05-370-CR. |
| Parties | IN RE: THE STATE OF TEXAS, EX RELATIONE, ARMANDO R. VILLALOBOS COUNTY (CRIMINAL DISTRICT) ATTORNEY, CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of Cameron County, Texas.
Before Justices YAÑEZ, CASTILLO, and GARZA.
Relator, the State of Texas, ex rel. Armando R. Villalobos, County (Criminal District) Attorney, Cameron County, Texas, filed a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court on June 9, 2005. By this petition, the State requests this Court to direct the trial court to withdraw a judgment of acquittal for real party in interest, C. Douglas Wright. According to the State, the trial court had a ministerial duty to enter a judgment of conviction following Wright's plea of nolo contendere. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
C. Douglas Wright was charged with driving while intoxicated, a violation of the duty upon striking fixture,1 and unlawfully carrying a weapon. At arraignment, the State and Wright recounted the terms of plea agreements that had been discussed. However, Wright, who was represented by substitute counsel, entered "open" pleas of nolo contendere to the charges. The trial court admonished Wright, found that the pleas were voluntarily and intelligently made, and accepted the pleas. The court informed Wright that the effect of the plea was that The State and Wright introduced evidence and argument regarding the charges. Wright denied the intoxication charge. Wright's counsel raised, without objection, the "traveling" defense to the charge of unlawfully carrying a weapon, and then moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence as to the other two charges. The State objected:
Your Honor, for the record, I would object to Mr. Cisneros' interpretation of a no contest plea. I believe it would have the same legal effect as a guilty plea. However, that being said, Your Honor, we have no opposition to deferred adjudication, minimal time limit of probation on each of the offenses.
The trial court stated that it believed it was the court's duty to hear the evidence "because sometimes defendants don't know better," and that it was within the court's authority to find the defendant not guilty of the charge.
Without further objection, the trial court deferred the finding of guilt on the failure of duty upon striking fixture, placed Wright on a six month period of probation, and assessed a fine of $300.00. The trial court found Wright not guilty of the charges of driving while intoxicated and unlawfully carrying a weapon. The State has not elected to challenge the trial court's rulings regarding the failure of duty or the weapon charge. The State attacks the trial court's acquittal on the driving while intoxicated charge through this writ of mandamus and by appeal in appellate cause no. 13-05-268-CR.
Mandamus relief may be granted if the relator shows the following: (1) that the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial and (2) that there is no adequate remedy at law. De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Winters v. Presiding Judge of the Crim. Dist. Court No. Three, 118 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); State ex rel. Rosenthal v. Poe, 98 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
An act is ministerial if it does not involve the exercise of any discretion. Winters, 118 S.W.3d at 775. Additionally, the relator must have a "clear right to the relief sought," meaning that the merits of the relief sought are "beyond dispute." In re Rodriguez, 77 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding). The requirement of a clear legal right necessitates that the law plainly describe the duty to be performed such that there is no room for the exercise of discretion. See id.
The State contends that the trial court did not have the authority to find Wright not guilty because Wright had entered an "open" plea of nolo contendere. A plea of nolo contendere, or no contest, is the equivalent of a plea of guilty insofar as criminal prosecution is concerned. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. § 27.02(5); Lucero v. State, 502 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). According to the State, Wright's plea of nolo contendere was conclusive of Wright's guilt and the trial court had a ministerial duty to enter a judgment of conviction.
We disagree. First, nothing in article 27.14 or the case law cited by the State requires the trial court to enter a verdict on the plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(a) (Vernon 1989 & Supp. 2004-05). Rather, the principle underlying the article and cases construing the article is that the validity of a conviction following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere can be sustained by the plea itself, without the necessity of proving facts substantiating the guilt of the defendant. See, e.g., Dees v. State, 676 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (); Perez v. State, 831 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (plea is sufficient, standing alone, to support conviction).
Second, although the defendant may not have the absolute right to withdraw his plea in a misdemeanor proceeding, see Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (en banc), the trial court retains discretion to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. A liberal practice has prevailed in Texas concerning the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Saldana v. State, 150 S.W.3d 486, 490 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.). When a defendant pleads guilty without a plea agreement and judgment has been pronounced or the case has been taken under advisement, the trial court's decision whether to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea is discretionary. See Zinn v. State, 35 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd) (). Abuse of that discretion is shown only when the trial court's ruling lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Watson v. State, 974 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd) ().
We conclude that the trial court retained discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal in this matter, and accordingly, the State has failed to show that the entry of a judgment of conviction was a ministerial task. De Leon, 127 S.W.3d at 5.
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that relator has not shown itself entitled to the relief sought. The petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
At a hearing convened on a plea of no contest, the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on grounds of legally insufficient evidence. The relator seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court directing the respondent trial court to vacate that judgment. In denying extraordinary relief, the majority concludes that the trial court retained discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal on grounds that the State failed to show that entry of a judgment of conviction, in lieu of acquittal, was a ministerial task. Because the accused confessed guilt, I conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient. Accordingly, the trial court had a non-discretionary duty to enter a judgment of conviction. Thus, I would conditionally grant relief because binding rules and precedent from a court of superior jurisdiction compel entry of a judgment of conviction.
The information alleged that, on or about November 20, 2004, the defendant unlawfully operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. The record contains a document signed by the accused, his defense counsel, and the prosecutor, confessing guilt. That document contains the following statement:
I confess that I committed the offense as alleged in the State's information and that each element of the State's pleading is true. In open court I freely and voluntarily enter my plea of guilty/nolo contendere to the offense charged in the information and request the Court to make immediate disposition of this case based upon my plea.
The document also reflects the trial court's finding as follows:
After consulting with the defendant and informing the defendant of the nature of the charges, all rights and the consequences of the plea of guilty/nolo contendere, the defendant waived arraignment and with the advice of counsel, decided not to contest the case. The Court finds that the defendant is competent and that the plea was entered only after the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to a trial by jury; and all other rights set out above. The Court hereby accepts this plea which is (is not) the result of a plea bargain agreement with the prosecuting attorney. . .
The Court finds that there is sufficient information in the record to permit the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion.
The document was executed by the parties and the trial court on March 30, 2005, the same date of the plea hearing.
During the plea hearing, on the trial court's questioning as to plea agreements on three charges stemming from the same incident, the defendant responded, ...
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