In re Steelman
| Decision Date | 19 March 1941 |
| Docket Number | 529. |
| Citation | 13 S.E.2d 544,219 N.C. 306 |
| Parties | In re STEELMAN et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Proceeding under Unemployment Compensation Law to determine validity of claims and disqualifications for unemployment benefits.
The facts, essential to an understanding of the questions presented by the appeals, follow:
I. The Nebel Knitting Company is engaged in the manufacture of ladies' full-fashioned silk hosiery in the City of Charlotte, and normally employs about 400 workers.
II. For a period of five weeks, from 10 April to 13 May, 1940 there was a stoppage of work at the plant or factory of the Nebel Knitting Company because of a labor dispute--a strike having been called by the union to which some of the employees belonged, picket lines established, etc.
III. On 29 April, the Company addressed a letter to all of its employees, including the claimants, notifying them that operations would be resumed on 13 May, 1940, and that "all present employees" who reported for work on that day would be put back on their "former jobs" without reference to whether they belonged to a union or had participated in the current strike. This letter contained the further notice that "from and after May 13, 1940, if the company is operating, it will, on a permanent basis, fill vacant jobs, which it desires to run, with whoever applies or whomever it can employ to fill such jobs satisfactorily".
IV. On 13 May, the Company resumed operations to such an extent that there was no longer a stoppage of work within the meaning of the Act. The labor dispute still continued however, and the picket line was maintained for sometime thereafter. The president of the Nebel Knitting Company testified that all the employees on strike would be taken back to work if they would "make application or signify their intention of coming back or come in". There was evidence on behalf of the claimants that they did not return to their jobs because of the labor dispute.
V. A large number of these workers filed claims for unemployment benefits. A group hearing was had pursuant to the rules established by the Unemployment Compensation Commission, and the following conclusions finally reached:
1. The employee-claimants, 108 in number, referred to as James C. Jones and others, and represented by Jones & Smathers attorneys, and the employee-claimants, 7 in number, referred to as Sarah R. Bean and others, and represented by John Newitt, attorney, were denied benefits for the period from 10 April to 13 May, 1940, because it was found as a fact that they were either (a) "participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work at the plant or premises of Nebel Knitting Co., Inc.", or that they did (b) "belong to a grade or class of workers which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises, at which the stoppage occurred, which said members were participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute".
From this ruling, the employee-claimants excepted and appealed to the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County.
2. It further appearing to the Commission that operations were resumed on 13 May, 1940, to such an extent that there was no longer a stoppage of work at the plant or factory of the Nebel Knitting Company, it was adjudged that the above claimants would be entitled to benefits from and after this date, the date on which the stoppage of work at the plant or factory of the employer ceased, if they were found to be otherwise eligible for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law, and it was ordered that the eligibility of the claimants should be determined from and after 13 May 1940.
From this ruling the Nebel Knitting Company entered exceptions and appeal to the Superior Court.
In the Superior Court, the findings and conclusions of the Commission were sustained and confirmed.
From this judgment, the Nebel Knitting Company and the claimants as above designated, noted exceptions and appeal.
Guthrie, Pierce & Blakeney, of Charlotte, for Nebel Knitting Co., employer, appellant.
J. Laurence Jones, of Charlotte, for James C. Jones et al., employee-claimants, appellants.
John Newitt, of Charlotte, for Sarah R. Bean et al., employee-claimants, appellants.
Adrian J. Newton, Ralph Moody, and J. C. B. Ehringhaus, Jr., all of Raleigh, for Unemployment Compensation Commission.
The impression is gained from a careful perusal of the record that the Unemployment Compensation Law has been properly interpreted and applied to the facts of the instant case. While the record presents only a question of statutory construction, it may be useful to consult the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327, where the validity of the Alabama Act was considered and upheld. See, also, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R. 1293; "Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes", 49 Yale Law Journal, 461; "Unemployment Insurance", Columbia Law Review, 858.
Appeals of Employee-Claimants.
The questions presented by the appeals of the employee-claimants relate to the disqualifications for benefits proscribed in section 5(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Chap. 1, Public Laws 1936, Ex. Sess. The pertinent provisions follow:
The statute withholds benefits during the stoppage of work which is caused by a labor dispute, from all persons participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute and from all grades or classes of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, and any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute. Each claimant is required to show to the satisfaction of the Commission that he is not disqualified for benefits under the terms of this section. It thus appears that the State seeks to be neutral in the labor dispute as far as practicable, and to grant benefits only in conformity to such neutrality. Of course, it is recognized that in a matter of this kind, some allowance must be made in fixing the line or point of difference between granting and withholding benefits during the stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute. Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. 624, 194 S.E. 117. "But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and...
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