In re Stefan S.
| Decision Date | 09 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Ken-19-262 |
| Parties | ADOPTION BY STEFAN S. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Caleb J. Gannon, Esq., and John E. Baldacci, Jr., Esq. (orally), Lipman & Katz, Augusta, for appellant father
Maryellen Sullivan, Esq., and Joe Lewis, Esq. (orally), Port City Legal, Portland, for appellees mother and stepfather
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶1] The father of two children appeals from judgments of the Kennebec County Probate Court (E. Mitchell, J. ) terminating his parental rights in anticipation of adoptions pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 9-204(b) (2018) ; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(2), (B)(2)(a), and (B)(2)(b)(ii) (2018).1 He argues on appeal that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the court's findings that he is an unfit parent and that termination of his parental rights is in his children's best interests. See 18-A M.R.S. § 9-204(b) (2018) ; 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2). He also contends that the court erred as a matter of law by reaching these two findings in an improper sequence, and by failing to consider open adoptions that would have left his parental rights intact. We affirm the judgments.
[¶2] On July 30, 2018, the mother and stepfather of the children filed petitions to adopt the children the Kennebec County Probate Court, seeking to establish the stepfather as the children's legal father pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 9-103 (2018). Soon thereafter, the mother filed petitions to terminate the father's parental rights pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 9-204 (2018), thereby freeing the children for adoption by the stepfather. The father was duly served with notice of the petitions to terminate his parental rights, to which he registered his objection. The court held a one-day hearing on the matter on May 22, 2019. On June 10, 2019, the court entered judgments terminating the father's parental rights with regard to the children. The father did not file a motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, M.R. Civ. P. 52, or any other post-trial motion. The father timely appealed from both orders. M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
[¶3] The following facts are drawn from the court's explicit findings and the trial record. See Guardianship of Ard , 2017 ME 12, ¶ 15, 154 A.3d 609 . The older child was born in 2006 and is developmentally disabled. He attends public school, where he receives intensive special education services as part of an Individualized Education Program (IEP). The younger child was born in 2009 and also has been diagnosed with genetic and behavioral disorders. He attends a public school where his education is directed by an IEP and he receives one-on-one supervision at all times during the school day. He exhibits aggressive behaviors and is sometimes violent.
[¶4] The mother and father divorced in 2012, and a parental rights and responsibilities order was issued in conjunction with the divorce, awarding primary residence to the mother and contact rights to the father. In practice, the amount of time that each child spent with the father varied over time. Beginning in 2015, the father's contact with the children declined gradually. The father has not seen the children since July 2016, and has had no communication with the children since May 2018. This lack of contact is at least partially the result of the mother's conduct—the court found that she "wrongfully made it difficult for [the father] to contact her." Since at least 2015, the children have resided primarily with the mother and stepfather. The stepfather is consistently involved in caring for the children and interacts on a daily basis with their educational and medical providers.
[¶5] The two orders issued by the court are mirror images of one another except for the relevant child's name. The court made the following findings with regard to both children:
[T]he termination of the parental rights of [the father] thereby freeing the child for adoption by [the stepfather] would be in the child's best interests. This Court also specifically finds that [the father's] failure to make any attempt to establish a family relationship with the child, or contribute in any way toward the child's financial support, constitutes clear and convincing evidence that [the father] has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs.
[¶6] The court also found that Although the court noted that the mother had wrongfully made it difficult for the father to contact her or the children, the court found that the father "made no effort to legally enforce his rights or to contact [the child's] medical providers or his school." The medical and educational professionals who worked with the children "had never met [the father]." The court stated that both children "will need special care and attention for the rest of [their lives]," and that the father "has done nothing to assist with this challenge and did not demonstrate a valid reason for his absence."
[¶7] "When a private individual invokes court action to terminate parental rights ... the court engages in state action that implicates the constitutionally protected liberty interest a parent has in parenting his or her child free from state interference." Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 3, 175 A.3d 639. These protections are not absolute. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. "A state may interfere with a parent's fundamental right to parent a child when the court makes a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit and the child's best interest will be served by state intervention to avoid harm to the child." Id. ¶ 6.
[¶8] Petitions for private adoptions in Maine Probate Courts are governed by the Adoption Act, 18-A M.R.S. §§ 9-101 to 9-315 (2018). The Adoption Act incorporates by reference 22 M.R.S. §§ 4050 - 4059 (2018), the statutory framework governing termination in child protection proceedings. 18-A M.R.S. § 9-204(b) (2018). In Title 18-A adoption proceedings, "termination of parental rights occurs prior to the adoption in order to enable the child ... to be legally available for adoption."2 Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 9, 175 A.3d 639. In determining whether to terminate parental rights, the court engages in a two-step analysis, first making a finding of parental unfitness using the factors outlined in 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b), and only then determining whether termination is in the best interests of the child, 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). See Adoption of Shayleigh S. , 2018 ME 165, ¶ 17, 198 A.3d 791.
[¶9] A court's finding of unfitness must be grounded in one or more of the following findings:
22 M.R.S. § 4055 (1)(B)(2)(b).
[¶10] We review factual findings regarding whether termination is in the best interest of a child for clear error. Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 30, 175 A.3d 639. A finding of parental unfitness is also reviewed for clear error, and we will find such an error "only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it; if the fact-finder clearly misapprehended the meaning of the evidence; or if the finding is so contrary to the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth of the case." Id. "When the burden of proof at trial is clear and convincing evidence, our review is to determine whether the fact-finder could reasonably have been persuaded that the required findings were proved to be highly probable." Adoption of Shayleigh S. , 2018 ME 165, ¶ 14, 198 A.3d 791. The court's "ultimate decision to terminate parental rights" is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 30, 175 A.3d 639.
[¶11] The father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underpinning the trial court's findings that he was unfit and that termination would be in the children's best interests. Contrary to his contentions, the record evidence is such that the trial court "could reasonably have been persuaded that the required findings were proved to be highly probable." Id. ¶ 33. The court did not err in reaching its findings, nor did it abuse its discretion in its decision to terminate the father's parental rights. Adoption of Shayleigh S. , 2018 ME 165, ¶ 14, 198 A.3d 791 ; Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 30, 175 A.3d 639.
[¶12] Record evidence demonstrates that the father's efforts to maintain contact with his two children have been sporadic and ineffective. Prior to 2016, he had regular contact with the children and took advantage of his contact rights. After March 2016, he had virtually no in-person contact with the children and any phone contact was short and intermittent. After June 2018, he had no direct contact with the children. His efforts to maintain contact were limited to contacting the mother. What little indirect contact did occur was a product of the efforts of the paternal grandparents. The father moved to Florida in December 2016, to seek employment and work on his sobriety, staying for nearly two...
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